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HOW CHINA’S BOOM CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Since the financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing economic recession that rocked the
world economy, plenty of blame has been going around. The chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, specifically singled out subprime mortgages and the Wall Street
bankers that sold those mortgages. In bureaucratic jargon it is often dubbed a regulatory
oversight failure. This study, however, shows that the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary
policy at the start of the new millennium triggered the U.S. refinancing boom in 2003 and
2004, spurring personal consumption expenditures through home equity extraction. The
U.S. spending binge boosted economic growth and savings in China and oil-exporting
nations. The build-up of savings in China, which are heavily skewed towards fixed income
assets, depressed interest rates worldwide from 2004 on. The decline in long-term interest
rates accounts for the U.S. housing boom. Despite popular belief, the proliferation of
exotic mortgage products can hardly be faulted for the U.S. housing boom and eventual
bust.  
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I Introduction 
At the onset of the financial crisis, in 2007 and 2008, the main worry among commentators and economists 
was the growing purchasing power of sovereign wealth funds of authoritarian states like China and the United 
Arab Emirates. In a column in NRC Handelsblad in July 2007 I reckoned that, if China would keep 
accumulating foreign reserves the way it did, within 10 years China would be able to acquire all publicly 
listed companies in Europe. In June 2008 Laurence Kotlikoff predicted that China’s foreign reserves, which 
amounted already to $2 trillion at the time, would multiply within a matter of years. But Kotlikoff had a very 
benign view of China’s hoarding. He predicted that, by becoming the world's saver, China would also become 
the developed world's savoir, with respect to its long-run supply of capital and long-run general equilibrium 
prospects (Kotlikoff et al., 2005). Ben Bernanke, who was Fed Governor at the time, had an equally sanguine 
reading of the global saving glut. In his by now infamous 2005 Sandridge lecture, Bernanke boasted about the 
"depth and sophistication of U.S. financial markets, which (… ) allowed households easy access to housing 
wealth."  
In September 2008 it all started to unravel quickly. Government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, created in 1938 and 1970 in order to promote homeownership, were placed into 
conservatorship by the U.S. federal government, and little more than a week later the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers collapsed.  In order to prevent a full domino effect, the U.S. Treasury bailed out insurance 
behemoth AIG a few days after that. As stock markets tanked, the Dow Jones dropped more than 500 points 
on September 15, U.S. Congress consented to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that authorized 
expenditures in the order of $700 billion for the purchase of assets and equity from financial institutions to 
strengthen the financial sector. Images of foreclosed properties and displaced homeowners flooded the TV 
screens. Before that faithful September month, most people had never heard of credit default swaps, 
collateralized debt obligations or subprime mortgages.  
So it may not come as a surprise that Wall Street has been singled out as the villain in the prevalent 
narrative of the financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. I show, however, that there were even larger 
forces at work. The build-up of savings in China and oil-exporting nations, which were heavily skewed 
towards fixed income assets, depressed interest rates worldwide from 2004 on. By the time the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) wanted to put the brakes on the economy and started to raise its policy rate again in July 2004, 
it was too late. Long-term interest rates in the United States remained stubbornly low, in spite of the Fed 
raising the fed funds rate from 1 percent in July 2004 to 5.25 percent in June 2006, adding further fuel to the 
housing bubble. While the subprime mortgages with exotic features did not help either, my research shows 
that long-term interest rates are the most important factor driving housing demand (Chapter 2). 
In an early column in NRC Handelsblad (February 2005), I put forth that China purposely flooded 
U.S. financial markets with cheap money to wash away the very foundations on which the United States was 
built. I drew a parallel with the United Kingdom that lost its empire status after World War II as it succumbed 
under the burden of foreign debt. John Maynard Keynes always suspected a preconceived plan of the United 
States. At the time the United States played the role of world banker, just like China does today.  
In chapter 3, however, I show that Chinese households have more prosaic reasons than dethroning 
the United States to save almost 30 percent of disposable income. Rising household incomes and 
precautionary saving motives are the main explanations for China’s high household savings rate. Also, China 
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is not entirely unique; the trajectory of the world’s most populous nation over the past 30 years is actually 
quite similar to the experiences of – for example – Singapore and Malaysia. India’s household savings rate is 
at 32 percent of disposable income even higher than China’s. China is only different than other emerging 
economies because its economy is vastly larger, and has gotten much more scrutiny because of its role in the 
years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing economic recession. It’s worth noting that oil-
exporting nations’ savings, which are equally large as China’s, largely escape scrutiny because of the West’s 
oil dependence.  
 
This collection of papers reflects my first foray in academia. All papers relate – one way or the other – to 
China. Chapter 2 proves the central thesis of this thesis, namely that China’s boom caused the 2008 financial 
crisis and ensuing recession. It builds on the work by Taylor (2008), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010), Bernanke 
(2005), Greenspan (2011) and Warnock and Warnock (2009). Its main contribution is that it shows that the 
built-up of total debt securities, rather than foreign purchases of U.S. Treasuries, depressed 10-year Treasury 
yields from 2004 on. In addition, I show that the Fed, with its excessively loose monetary policy in the early 
2000s, contributed to a large extent to the housing bubble and current debt overload of U.S. households.  
The paper on China’s household savings rate (Chapter 3) builds on the work of Ando and Modigliani 
(1963), Modigliani and Cao (2004), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005), Horioka and Wan (2007), Chamon and 
Prasad (2010) and Wei and Zhang (2011). We use data that are more recent and cover a longer time span 
(1960 – 2009) than previous studies. The paper’s first contribution is that it disproves many assertions about 
China’s household savings rate, including (1) the claim that China’s one-child-policy explains the high 
household savings rate, (2) the claim that the household savings curve is u-shaped, (3) the claim that the 
savings rate is high because interest rate are low, and (4) the claim that the so-called competitive savings 
motive, also dubbed ‘keeping up with the Wangs,’ is a decisive factor in Chinese households’ preference for 
saving over consumption. Its second contribution is that it supports the conventional Keynesian savings 
hypothesis over Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis, although habit formation and precautionary saving 
motives are also important. Disposable income (which is measured by its reciprocal), the average 5-year 
income growth rate and the old-age dependency rate are the main determinants of the household savings rate.  
In chapter 4 we show that individuals in China are susceptible to money illusion, albeit to a lesser 
extent than their American counterparts. The paper builds on the seminal paper by Shafir, Diamond and 
Tversky (1997). Although it is tentative to draw conclusions from comparing two not entirely representative 
samples, our findings suggest that money illusion may be more prevalent in affluent societies, which may 
therefore be more vulnerable for irrational exuberance (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). In chapter 5 we look at 
financial markets’ response to U.S., Chinese and German quarterly GDP growth data. Based on a comparison 
of financial markets reactions, we have found no evidence that China’s National Bureau of Statistics ‘cooks 
the books.’ As far as financial markets respond less to Chinese growth data compared to U.S. growth data, the 
difference can fully be attributed to the size of the Chinese economy. Last and also least, in chapter 6 we 
show that China’s Q2, Q3 and Q4 GDP numbers are rather predictable because China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics reports quarterly GDP cumulatively. A keen understanding of the cumulated Chinese data, however, 
won’t bring any privileged knowledge about China’s quarterly GDP growth to which financial markets 
respond. 
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China will offer a trove of research topics for years to come. What puzzles me most, however, is how the 
dinner that Kotlikoff et al. (2005) prophesized in “Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us Out to Dinner?,” 
almost turned out to be our Last Supper. Why was the inexpensive capital that was on offer not put to a more 
productive use? Tobin’s q has gone out of fashion ever since Blanchard and Summers (1993) concluded that 
fundamentals were driving business investment, rather than stock market valuation as Tobin  (1968) would 
predict. But the precipitous drop in the real forward yield on 10-year Treasuries in the early 2000s coincided 
with a dramatic increase in the real forward yield on risk capital. This may – at least in part – account for 
today’s economic woes. So, perhaps it is time to revisit Blanchard and Summers. It would not surprise me if it 
turns out that, all the while we were agonizing about China’s sovereign wealth fund acquiring too large a 
stake in Western companies, we should have worried about China buying too little equity instead. 
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II U.S. Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Since the financial crisis in 2008 and ensuing economic recession that rocked the world economy, plenty of 
blame has been going around. Taylor (2008) claimed that loose monetary policy in the early 2000s fueled the 
housing boom that eventually went bust. Bernanke (2010), on the other hand, argued that the proliferation of 
exotic mortgage products was responsible for the housing boom. Still other economists maintained that the 
global imbalances in trade and capital flows were at fault, with the global saving glut depressing global 
interest rates and fuelling the housing boom (Greenspan (2010), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010)).  
We show that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy at the start of the new millennium, which 
resulted in negative real interest rates for a prolonged period of time, did not trigger so much the housing 
boom, as asserted by John Taylor, but rather the remortgaging boom, spurring personal consumption 
expenditures through home equity extraction.  
The U.S. spending spree in the early 2000s boosted economic growth and savings in China and oil-
exporting nations. China’s savings are heavily skewed towards fixed income assets. We see total debt 
securities outstanding rising at a higher rate from 2002 onward, despite the fact that the global savings rate 
was relatively low at the time. This coincides with a quickening in China’s savings, resulting from both an 
increase in China’s savings rate and GDP-growth rate. The buildup of debt securities has an economically 
large and statistically significant impact on the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and U.S. mortgage rates.  
We show that the decline in long-term interest rates accounts for the housing bubble in the United 
States. Despite popular belief, the proliferation of exotic mortgage products can hardly be faulted for the 
housing boom and eventual bust. Even if the exotic mortgage products were responsible for the initial 
banking crisis, they can’t account for the ensuing balance sheet recession (Koo, 2009). As a share of total 
mortgage originations, mortgages with exotic features are less than 5 percent of total mortgages from 2000 – 
2006.  
The outline of our paper is as follows. We first discuss how U.S. monetary policy in the early 2000s 
compared to the classic Taylor rule. Next, in Section 3, we show that monetary policy set off the 
remortgaging boom rather than the housing boom. Section 4 discusses the impact of the remortgaging boom, 
the Bush era tax cuts and spending on two wars on economic activity in the United States. In section 5 we 
show how China’s economic growth spurred savings. Section 6 deals with what is, probably, the most 
important contribution of this study. We show that the built-up of total debt securities, rather than foreign 
purchases of U.S. Treasuries, depressed 10-year Treasury yields from 2004 on. In Section 7 we conclude with 
a discussion of the main results.  
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2. U.S. Monetary Policy 
After the dot-com bubble burst by the end of 2000, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began to 
lower the target for the overnight fed funds rate, the monetary policy rate, in response to the 2001 recession, 
from 6.5 percent in late 2000 to 1.75 percent in December 2001 and to 1 percent in June 2003.1 The target fed 
funds rate was left at 1 percent for a year. From July 2004 on, the FOMC began to raise the target fed funds 
rate, reaching 5.25 percent in June 2006. The – at the time – historically low fed funds rate resulted in a 
negative real fed funds rate from November 2002 to August 2005 (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1  Nominal and Real Fed Funds Rate Using the GDP Deflator (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
At the Jackson Hole conference in August 2007, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, John 
Taylor delivered a stinging critique of the Fed’s monetary policy from 2003 through 2006. In Housing and 
Monetary Policy (2007), Taylor argues that the fed funds rate was on average about 200 basis points below 
the rate prescribed by the Taylor rule, fueling the housing boom.  
The classic form of the monetary policy rule, known as the Taylor rule, is:  
FFRt = 2 + 1.5(t – *) + 0.5(yt – yt*)  
t  = headline CPI as measured at t 
* = target rate of CPI inflation 
yt  = GDP as measured at t 
yt* = potential output 
The Taylor rule prescribes that the FOMC raises the federal funds rate if inflation is above target and/or 
output is above potential output, and vice versa.2 
                                                
1 The Greenbook that was prepared for the June 24-25, 2003 FOMC-meeting projected real GDP growth of 4-1/4 percent annual rate in 
the second half of 2003 and 5-1/4 percent in 2004 and headline PCE inflation in the range of 1 to 1-1/2 percent. At the meeting the 
FOMC decided to cut the fed funds rate from 1.25 to 1 percent.  
2 The Taylor rule at its invention was a descriptive rule of monetary policy, but it has gradually evolved into a prescriptive rule. As John 
Taylor (2007) phrases it: “interest rate decisions (…) in some years did not correspond so closely to such a policy description.”  
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According to Bernanke (2010), the monetary policy rule that the FOMC employs does not differ from 
the classical Taylor rule with respect to its parameters but solely with respect to the variables that are used.3 
These differences can almost entirely account for the deviations between the classic Taylor rule and the fed 
funds rate: 
• FOMC uses PCE instead of CPI as a measure of inflation; 
• FOMC uses core instead of headline inflation; 
• FOMC uses forecast values of inflation instead of current values. 
 
The fed funds rate in the period 2000 – 2007 fits the monetary policy path described by Bernanke’s version of 
the Taylor rule indeed more accurately (see Fig. 2). In the remainder of this chapter we will therefore discuss 
the deviations of Bernanke’s monetary policy rule and the classic Taylor rule in more detail.  
 
Figure 2  Classic Taylor rule and Bernanke’s Taylor rule (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
2.1 Use of PCE rather than CPI as a measure of inflation 
In February 2000 the FOMC replaced headline CPI by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) measure 
of inflation, according to Bernanke (2010) because it is less dominated than is the CPI by the imputed rent of 
owner-occupied housing.4 At the time that the FOMC shifted from headline CPI to headline PCE inflation, the 
Beige Book forecasted a headline CPI of 2.4 percent for 2000 and 2001 and headline PCE of 2.0 percent for 
both years.  
Historically, PCE inflation has been about 0.5 percent per year below the corresponding CPI 
measure. The PCE uses a chain index, which takes consumers' changing consumption due to price changes 
into account; the CPI uses a fixed basket of goods with weightings that do not change over time. Current-
                                                
3 Bernanke (2010) de facto appropriates the rule of thumb estimated by Orphanides and Wieland (2008) to match Fed interest rate setting. 
4 Monetary Policy Report submitted to the Congress on February 17, 2000. 
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weighted price indices like PCE show lower inflation rates than base-weighted price indices like CPI in case 
there are relative price changes.  
The FOMC’s own forecast, as shown in the Greenbook part 2 of February 2000, had CPI half a 
percentage point higher than PCE inflation. Despite the change in inflation concept, the FOMC kept using the 
same parameters and (implicit) inflation target for its interest rate setting in the 2000 – 2006 period (Fed staff, 
also Orphanides and Wieland, 2008). Using the identical rule of thumb with projections of headline PCE 
inflation instead of headline CPI will ceteris paribus result in lower interest rate prescriptions on average and, 
hence, higher inflation.5 
 
Figure 3  Headline CPI and headline PCE inflation (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
2.2 Use of core instead of headline inflation 
In July 2004 the FOMC replaced headline PCE with core PCE as a measure of inflation, which excludes food 
and energy prices.6 According to Bernanke (2010) the FOMC expected any changes in the price of food and 
energy to be temporary in nature, and therefore these should not be guiding monetary policy.7 Relying on core 
inflation instead of headline inflation, as the Fed does, is justified in case core inflation is – historically – a 
better predictor of headline inflation than headline inflation itself. Core goods and services tend to be subject 
to nominal price rigidities, while non-core goods, like agricultural commodities, oil, natural gas et cetera, 
have their prices set in auction markets. For much of the 20th century, core inflation therefore has been both 
less volatile and more persistent than the inflation rate of non-core goods.  
 It is essential to differentiate between what price index the Fed ‘cares about’ (if not ‘targets’) and 
what measure of inflation (i.e. CPI/PCE, current/forecast, headline/core) is the best predictor of the price 
index the Fed cares about (Buiter, 2008). According to then Fed Governor Mishkin (2007), controlling 
headline inflation, not core inflation, along with maintaining maximum sustainable employment (the second 
                                                
5 Both the Bank of England (BoE) and the European Central Bank (ECB) use headline CPI. 
6 Monetary Policy Report submitted to the Congress on July 20, 2004. 
7 On January 25, 2012 the FOMC reverted to headline PCE as its preferred measure of inflation, although it is unclear whether this refers 
to mid-term or long-term inflation.  
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leg of the Fed’s dual mandate), is the ultimate aim of the Fed’s monetary policy since it clearly does not make 
sense to pretend that people do not eat or drive. 
 
Figure 4  Headline PCE and core PCE (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
The integration of China and India in the global market added more than 2.3 billion consumers and producers 
to the global economy. They entered as suppliers of core goods and services and as demanders of non-core 
commodities. The IMF estimates that in 2005 more than 800 million people in the world’s labor force were 
engaged in export-oriented and therefore competitive markets, an almost threefold increase since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall (Greenspan, 2010). The result has been a major, persistent and continuing increase in the 
relative price of non-core goods to core goods (Buiter, 2008). A continuing upward movement in the relative 
price of non-core goods to core goods will ceteris paribus cause a permanent increase in the rate of headline 
inflation, as well as a permanent reduction in the rate of core inflation. Consequently, core inflation ceases to 
be a better predictor of headline inflation than headline inflation itself. Correlation between headline and core 
CPI dropped from 90 percent in the period 1990M1 – 1999M12 to a mere 42 percent in the period 2000M1 – 
2009M12.8   
By 2004 the price of non-core goods – notably the price of oil – was rising at an accelerating rate. 
The Fed’s easy monetary stance allegedly contributed to commodities speculation. By 2007 the prices of oil 
and other raw materials were spiraling, helped by the weakening U.S. dollar. Bernanke (2010) asserts that 
both the FOMC and private forecasters correctly assumed that the increases in energy prices would subside, 
and therefore did not much adjust their medium-term forecasts for inflation. While it is true that the financial 
crisis and the collapse of global trade in the second half of 2008 led to a sharp decline in energy prices and a 
corresponding drop in headline inflation, energy prices were back to their November 2007 level by January 
2010, despite an anemic economic recovery in both the United States and Europe. In January 2011 a barrel of 
oil cost $91.83 compared to $36.25 in July 2004. 
                                                
8 Our own calculations; similar argument made by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi in The Financial Times, June 1, 2011. 
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2.3 Use of forecast values of inflation instead of current values 
Bernanke (2010) claims that the use of forecast values of the goal variables instead of current values explains 
the deviation of the fed funds rate from the classic Taylor rule prescription.9 Orphanides and Wieland (2008) 
also conclude that the use of the FOMC forecasts of the goal variables instead of current values explains part 
of the deviation of the fed funds rate from the classic Taylor rule prescription. The FOMC changing its 
preferred measure of inflation twice, however, explains a larger part of the deviation of the fed funds rate 
from the classic Taylor rule prescription (see Figure 2). 10  
In response to Bernanke, Taylor (2010) objects to replacing current values with forecast values 
because “it is not how the Taylor rule was derived and there are problems with using forecasts, including that 
they are not objective and or accurate.” The deviation reflects both the fact that the Taylor rule was not 
derived that way, i.e. estimating the Taylor rule with forecast values rather than current values might have 
yielded different parameters, as well as the fact that inflation forecasts are not objective and/or accurate. 
Panelists of the Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over-predicted headline CPI inflation 
during 1982 – 2001 and under-predicted headline CPI inflation during 2002 – 2008. The mean errors 
(realization minus prediction) are negative over the first period and positive over the second period.11 From 
2002 – 2008 the margin of error – measured by the root-mean-square-error metric (RMSE) – is almost twice 
as large than from 1982 – 2001. The FOMC’s projections during 2002 – 2008 also over-predicted headline 
and core PCE inflation, but by a smaller margin.  
The under-prediction of headline CPI inflation during 2002 – 2008 by professional forecasters may 
indicate that the SPF-panelists did not fully grasp the significance of the integration of China and India in the 
global market economy. Another explanation may be that the SPF-panelists were not fully aware that the 
FOMC no longer aimed to control headline CPI inflation, but (core) PCE inflation instead.  Also, Bernanke 
and Woodford (1997) show that – to the extent that targeting the private sector inflation forecast is successful 
– inflation forecasts become uninformative as there is no longer an incentive for the private sector to gather 
information.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The FOMC created room to keep interest rates low by changing the preferred measure of inflation twice in 
less than 5 years, without a countervailing adjustment in the parameters of its monetary policy rule. At the 
onset of the housing boom the FOMC switched from headline CPI to headline PCE inflation because the 
latter is less dominated by the – at that time – rising costs of owner-occupied housing. Headline CPI was on 
average 0.500 percent higher than headline PCE between January 1, 2000 and July 1, 2004.  
Faced with rising energy prices the FOMC switched in July 2004 from headline PCE to core PCE, 
thus excluding the costs of energy and food from its measure of inflation. Headline PCE was on average 
0.525 percent higher than core PCE between July 1, 2004 and January 1, 2008. Between January 1, 2000 and 
January 1, 2008 headline CPI was on average 0.804 percent higher than core PCE inflation. Headline CPI 
rose 24.887 percent over that period, on average 2.829 percent per year. The use of forecast instead of current 
                                                
9 There was an apparent switch from current values to forecast values in the Paul Volcker period (1979 – 1987) relative to the Greenspan 
period (Lindsey et. al., 1997). 
10 Using the output gap measured in real time instead of the output gap as measured by the FRB/US model has no significant effect on the 
policy prescriptions over most of the period (Bernanke, 2010). 
11 The Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters only started collecting data on core and headline PCE inflation per 2007 Q1. 
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values of the goal variables also contributed to the loosening of monetary policy, as the FOMC’s forecasts 
understated PCE inflation compared to later PCE realizations. 
Though the prevailing view is that monetary policy should not be used to tackle asset and 
commodity bubbles (also dubbed ‘lean against the wind’), it is quite something else to replace the preferred 
measure of inflation twice in the face of rising housing and food/energy prices to mitigate the effect of the 
price-rises, as the FOMC did.  
 
 
3. The Housing Bubble 
Until 1998, housing prices in the United States had been rising at about the pace of the general price level. 
From 1998 onward national housing prices began to rise at a level exceeding the general price level, 
especially in the ten largest cities in the United States. Between January 1, 1998 and January 1, 2008 the 
OFHEO National Housing Index rose 66 percent (Figure 6). The Case-Schiller 10 City Housing Index, 
consisting of the top 10 U.S. cities, rose over that same period 144 percent (Figure 7). Both indexes measure 
nominal price changes. By July 2006 the Case-Schiller Housing Index started declining and in January 2010 
prices in the ten largest cities in the United States were on average back at their October 2003 level. 
 
Figure 6  OFHEO National Housing Index SA (% change y-o-y) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OFHEO 
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Figure  7 Case-Schiller 10 City Housing Index (% change y-o-y) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Case-Schiller 
 
 
 
Taylor (2008) asserts that the fed funds rate caused the housing boom and eventual bust. He establishes a 
relationship between housing starts and the fed funds rate. Bernanke (2010) argues that not the fed funds rate 
but the proliferation of exotic mortgage products, which lowered monthly mortgage installments significantly, 
is the culprit. These mortgage products kept housing prices rising through 2005 and much of 2006, according 
to Bernanke. Alan Greenspan (2010), on the other hand, blames the prolonged decline in long-term interest 
rates for the housing boom. According to Greenspan, prices of long-lived assets are determined by 
discounting the flow of income (or imputed services) by interest rates of the same maturities as the life of the 
asset, and not by short-term rates like the fed funds rate. 
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Figure 8  Mortgages for purchase and refinance (billion U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Fed funds rate, 10-year Treasury and 30-year mortgage rate (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac 
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To test the three alternative explanations for the housing boom, we performed linear regression analysis on 
real mortgage data for purchase and refinance on the fed funds rate, the 10-year treasury rate, real GDP 
growth and the real OFHEO housing price index in the period 1990Q1 – 2008Q2 and in the period 2000Q1 – 
2008Q2 (see also Figure 8 and 9).12 In the fall-out of the Lehman Brothers failure, credit markets froze for a 
considerable period of time. Therefore the period 2008Q3 – 2009Q4 is not included in the regression analysis. 
We make use of the 10-year Treasury rate at constant maturity instead of the 30-year mortgage rate as 
reported by Freddie Mac. The correlation between the two rates is 0.979 in the period under consideration and 
the choice for either one should not impact the outcome. Use of real interest rates in lieu of nominal interest 
rates does not influence the results in a significant way.13 
We first test both the dependent variables as well as the regressors for unit root. The results of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller with 0 lag, trend and constant for Real Refinance and 1 lag, trend and constant for 
all other variables are presented in Table 1. As all variables are stationary, we proceed with simple OLS 
regressions to find the main determinants of Real Purchase and Real Refinance (see Table 2 – 5).  
 
 
Table 1   Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results 
  
 Real Purchase 
Real 
Refinance 
10YR 
TREAS 
FED 
FUNDS 
Real GDP 
growth 
Real 
OFHEO 
 Real 
OFHEO 
ADF 
t-stat -4.01*** -2.71* -3.77** -3.69** -2.87** -1.43 -4.45*** 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Real Purchase = Mortgage originations for purchase in 1990 U.S. $ billion 
Real Refinance = Mortgage originations for purchase in 1990 U.S. $ billion 
10 YR TREAS = 10-year Treasury yield measured as 3-months average 
FED FUNDS = Effective federal funds rate measured as 3-months average 
Real GDP growth = Real GDP y-o-y change seasonally adjusted annual rate  
Real OFHEO = OFHEO national housing index seasonally adjusted in constant dollars 
 Real OFHEO = First level difference of Real OFHEO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Disposable income growth does not have a greater explanatory power than real GDP growth.  
13 Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006) show that the housing price–rent ratio is not affected by the real interest rate, but by the nominal 
interest rate. 
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Table 2   Model of mortgages for purchase from 1990 – 2008 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1990:2-2008:2 (T = 73) 
Dependent variable: Real PURCHASE 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 306.229 37.1494 8.2432 <0.00001 *** 
10 YR TREAS -27.8252 6.11273 -4.5520 0.00002 *** 
FED FUNDS -0.246774 3.86653 -0.0638 0.94930  
 real OFHEO -5.48999 9.10834 -0.6027 0.54868  
REAL GDP 2.95318 3.23461 0.9130 0.36447  
 
Mean dependent var  155.1132 S.D. dependent var  55.02258 
Sum squared resid  114076.4 S.E. of regression  40.95844 
R-squared  0.476663 Adjusted R-squared  0.445879 
F(4, 68)  10.14626 P-value(F)  1.68e-06 
Log-likelihood -372.0095 Akaike criterion  754.0190 
Schwarz criterion  765.4713 Hannan-Quinn  758.5829 
Rho  0.543855 Durbin-Watson  0.909348 
 
 
Table 3   Model of mortgages for purchase from 1990 – 200814 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1990:1-2008:2 (T = 74) 
Dependent variable: Real PURCHASE 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 316.3 32.0983 9.8541 <0.00001 *** 
10 YR TREAS -28.2256 4.83674 -5.8357 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  154.2873 S.D. dependent var  55.10429 
Sum squared resid  116502.3 S.E. of regression  40.22545 
R-squared  0.474418 Adjusted R-squared  0.467118 
F(1, 72)  34.05494 P-value(F)  1.42e-07 
Log-likelihood -377.3807 Akaike criterion  758.7614 
Schwarz criterion  763.3695 Hannan-Quinn  760.5996 
Rho  0.530868 Durbin-Watson  0.941824 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 This table shows the regression results after backward elimination. 
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Table 4  Model of mortgages for refinance from 1990 – 200815 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1990:1-2008:2 (T = 74) 
Dependent variable: real REFINANCE 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 590.397 80.7631 7.3102 <0.00001 *** 
10 YR TREAS -51.5214 8.91127 -5.7816 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS -22.9279 7.88429 -2.9080 0.00487 *** 
REAL GDP -17.2097 5.64095 -3.0509 0.00322 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  145.6074 S.D. dependent var  126.8863 
Sum squared resid  365024.7 S.E. of regression  72.21246 
R-squared  0.689423 Adjusted R-squared  0.676112 
F(3, 70)  13.54699 P-value(F)  4.60e-07 
Log-likelihood -419.6367 Akaike criterion  847.2734 
Schwarz criterion  856.4897 Hannan-Quinn  850.9499 
Rho  0.489556 Durbin-Watson  0.989574 
 
 
Table 5  Model of mortgages for refinance from 2000 – 200815 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2000:1-2008:2 (T = 34) 
Dependent variable: real_REFINANCE 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 2 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 442.992 69.5925 6.3655 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS -44.8907 10.5515 -4.2545 0.00018 *** 
REAL GDP -22.6423 12.1233 -1.8677 0.07129 * 
 
Mean dependent var  233.6632 S.D. dependent var  132.1523 
Sum squared resid  301189.3 S.E. of regression  98.56868 
R-squared  0.477392 Adjusted R-squared  0.443676 
F(2, 31)  9.385975 P-value(F)  0.000650 
Log-likelihood -202.7592 Akaike criterion  411.5184 
Schwarz criterion  416.0974 Hannan-Quinn  413.0800 
Rho  0.400583 Durbin-Watson  1.163419 
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Our analysis shows that mortgages for purchase do not respond significantly to changes in the fed funds rate, 
as Taylor (2007) suggested (see Table 2). Instead mortgages for purchase (measured in billion dollars) 
respond to changes in long-term interest rates, as suggested by Greenspan (2010) (see Table 3). Mortgages for 
refinance, on the other hand, respond to both changes in the fed funds rate and to changes in long-term 
interest rates (see Table 4). From 2000 – 2008 mortgages for refinance respond solely to changes in the fed 
funds rate in our model, and not to changes in the 10-year Treasury (see Table 5). Two thirds of the 
mortgages between 2003Q1 and 2004Q2, the time when the FOMC held the fed funds rate at 1 percent, were 
used for refinance (see Table 7 and Figure 8).15  
Bernanke (2010) argues that the proliferation of exotic mortgage products in 2005 and 2006, rather 
than the fed funds rate, fed the housing boom. These exotic mortgage features, which lowered initial monthly 
installments drastically compared to a fed funds rate cut, would have triggered homebuyers and kept home 
prices rising. His address included a slide showing exotic mortgage features (i.e. interest only, negative 
amortization, pay-option ARMs and extended amortization) as a share of subprime and Alt-A mortgages 
spiking from 2003 through 2006.  
Bernanke’s argument is not quite compelling. Expressed as a share of subprime and Alt-A mortgage 
originations, as shown in Table 6 (which is identical to slide 8 in Bernanke (2010)), exotic mortgage features 
indeed do appear to be omnipresent during the years 2003 – 2006. As a share of total mortgage originations, 
however, mortgages with exotic features are less than 5 percent of total mortgages until and including 2004, 
and only slightly above 5 percent of total mortgages in 2005 and 2006 (respectively 5.6 and 7.7 percent of 
total mortgage originations) as shown in Table 8.16 Moreover, the data include both mortgages for purchase as 
well as mortgages for refinance, the latter being more responsive to changes in short-term interest rates – and 
presumably also to changes in monthly mortgage installments – than the former. Hence, exotic features may 
be even less common in mortgages for purchase than in mortgages for refinance. Lastly, the proliferation of 
exotic mortgages with teaser rates of 1 percent may just as well be seen as a by-product of the ultra-low fed 
funds rate.  
Despite popular belief, the proliferation of exotic mortgage products can’t be faulted for the housing 
boom and eventual bust. While the subprime mortgages with exotic features did not help, the most important 
factor driving housing demand is long-term interest rates, as Greenspan (2010) asserted. Why long-term 
interest rates remained puzzlingly low in 2004 – 2005 despite the increase in the fed funds rate from 1 to 6.25 
percent, giving further fuel to the housing boom, will be subject of discussion in the remaining paragraphs. 
                                                
15 Bean et al. (2010) find that the deviation from the monetary policy rule explains 26 percent of the increase in housing prices in the U.S. 
16 Using data from LoanPerformance instead of Federal Reserve data yields similar results. 
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 Table 6  Share of exotic features in Alt-A and subprime mortgages (%) 
 Interest Only 
Negative 
Amortization Pay-Option ARMs 
Extended Amortization 
 Subprime 
Alt-
A Subprime 
Alt-
A Subprime Alt-A Subprime Alt-A 
2000 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 2 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 5 48 0 19 0 11 0 0 
2004 18 51 0 40 0 25 0 0 
2005 21 48 0 46 0 38 13 0 
2006 16 51 0 55 0 38 33 2 
 
Source: Bernanke (2010) 
 
 
 
Table 7 Market share of Alt-A and subprime mortgages, and mortgages for refinance (%) 
 
 
Market share 
 Subprime Alt-A 
Market share 
mortgages for 
refinance 
2000 9.5 5.1 20.8 
2001 7.2 5.2 55.7 
2002 6.9 5.7 59.0 
2003 7.9 5.6 64.8 
2004 18.5 11.3 52.7 
2005 20 11.7 50.2 
2006 20.1 14.4 48.8 
 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance 
 
Table 8  Market share mortgages with exotic features (%) 
 Interest Only 
Negative 
Amortization Pay-Option ARMs 
Extended 
Amortiza
tion 
Market share 
mortgages w. exotic 
features 
 Subprime 
Alt-
A Subprime 
Alt-
A Subprime Alt-A 
Subprim
e Alt-A  
2000 0 0.153 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.038 
2001 0 0.416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.104 
2002 0.138 2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.559 
2003 0.395 2.688 0 1.064 0 0.616 0 0 1.191 
2004 3.33 5.763 0 4.52 0 2.825 0 0 4.110 
2005 4.2 5.616 0 5.382 0 4.446 2.6 0 5.561 
2006 3.216 7.344 0 7.92 0 5.472 6.633 0.288 7.718 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, Inside Mortgage Finance 
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4. Spending out of Home Equity, Consumer Credit and Tax Cuts  
In the years running up to the financial crisis, economists often pointed out that Americans were living 
beyond their means, using their houses as ATMs to prop up personal consumption expenditures – on a micro-
level, and running large current account deficits – on a macro-level. Most economists thought the situation to 
be unsustainable.17, 18 Many predicted a dollar crisis (among others Krugman, 2007), and some foretold the 
collapse of the housing market and the financial sector (Roubini, 2004). 
According to a paper by Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy (2007), homeowners in 2005 extracted 
net $750 billion (or 5.9 percent of GDP) of equity from their homes (up from $106 billion in 1996), spending 
two thirds on personal consumption, home improvements and credit card debt and the rest for the acquisition 
of assets and other (see Figure 10). A considerable portion of the equity extracted through cash out 
remortgaging and home equity loans was used to repay non-mortgage debt, largely credit card loans. The 
non-mortgage debt repaid with those funds can be considered bridge financing for personal consumption 
expenditures (Greenspan, 2007).19  
Net home equity extraction is gross equity extraction minus originations to purchase a new home and 
closing costs. Gross home equity extraction includes equity extraction out of home sales, home equity loans 
net of unscheduled payments and cash out refinancing. Though equity extraction out of home sales concerns 
realized capital gains, as opposed to equity extraction through home equity loans and cash out refinancing, the 
distinction may be subtle, as most home-sellers went on to buy a new home with a higher mortgage. 
 
 
Figure 10  Spending out of home equity extraction (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
 
 
                                                
17 See for example Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2008) and Robert Skidelsky (2008). 
18 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that the general mood in the run-up to the financial crisis of the late 2000s was one of “this time is 
different”, which I don’t believe to be true, with the notable exception of the Fed perhaps. 
19 According to a revised estimate, home equity extraction in 2006 was $703 billion. In this paper we make use of the revised estimates. 
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From the FOMC transcripts in 2003 and 2004 emerges that the FOMC in general looked favorably upon 
home equity extraction as a source of personal consumption expenditure. In his Sandridge-lecture, Bernanke 
(2005) boasted of the depth and sophistication of the country's financial markets, which allowed households 
easy access to rising housing wealth. The fact that, in case the housing boom would go bust, many 
homeowners would end up ‘underwater’ (with home mortgage loans exceeding the value of the underlying 
property) apparently did not set off any alarm bells with Bernanke. At the end of 2009 almost 25 percent, or 
11.4 million, of all residential properties with mortgages in the United States had negative equity. More than 
half of these underwater mortgages were the result of remortgaging, given the scale of refinancing/home 
equity extraction during the housing boom (see Figure 8).20 Nor did Bernanke seem to appreciate the fact that 
the credit boom through home equity extraction left the financial sector severely exposed to the U.S. housing 
market, vulnerabilities that in 2008 turned a housing correction into a financial crisis and deep recession 
(Palumbo and Parker, 2009).21 
In addition to home equity extraction, consumer credit rose as well in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis, albeit at a moderate pace of about 1 percent of GDP per year as many households used home 
loans to pay off credit card debt (Figure 11). Consumer credit includes credit card debt, car loans and personal 
loans. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Change in consumer credit (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Negative equity is being blamed for reduced labor mobility in the U.S., and there is preliminary evidence showing that negative equity 
is correlated with unemployment. 
21 Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) show that real per capita GDP growth rates are significantly lower and unemployment rates significantly 
higher during the decade following severe financial crises and the synchronous worldwide shocks. 
 
 
21 
Figure 12   Spending out of consumer credit and home equity (% GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve  
 
Beyond home equity extraction and consumer credit, the U.S. economy got stimulus from the Bush tax cuts, 
which transformed sovereign debt de facto into consumer credit, and from incremental government spending 
on two wars (Figure 13).22 
 
Figure 13 Tax cuts and war spending (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy Tax Model, Congressional Research  
 
Figure 14 shows that the overall stimulus from the 2002 and 2003 tax cuts, war spending, consumer credit 
and spending out of home equity extraction, ran well over 7 percent GDP early 2004. The fed funds rate at the 
time stood at 1 percent.  
 
                                                
22 During World War II the U.S. economy grew at a double-digit rate. 
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Figure 14 Overall stimulus (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  15 Nominal and real GDP growth (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Figure 16 The unemployment gap (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rudebusch (2009) 
 
Figure 17 The output gap (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CBO 
 
The U.S. economy did not benefit much from the massive stimulus that was administered by various means in 
the early 2000s. The sum of tax cuts, war spending, consumer credit and spending out of home equity 
extraction was in the range of 4 to 8 percent of GDP from 2002 to 2008. As shown in Figure 15, nominal 
GDP growth was on average about two percentage points lower than the overall stimulus, even though the 
economy was operating below potential and experienced an unemployment gap and output gap during most 
of those years (Figure 16 and 17). As commodity prices spiked, real GDP growth declined from 4.1 percent in 
2004Q1 to 1.3 percent in 2007Q1, despite the overall stimulus.  
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 We apply a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model to estimate the dynamic effects of 
shocks in government spending, home equity withdrawal and taxes on economic activity in the United States. 
We use quarterly data from 1992Q1 – 2008Q4 since our data set on home equity withdrawal starts in 1992. A 
drawback of using quarterly data is that it is more likely that decisions on purchases take place in another 
quarter than when the actual outlays are done (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011). This raises the chance that the 
identified shocks are wrongly dated. Since we are mostly concerned with the question how much each 
stimulus contributed to actual GDP growth, and less with the exact timing, this objection appears 
surmountable.  
 First we look at the response of Y to G. The vector of endogenous variables that we use is X = [G, Y, 
IRS, HEW]´, where G is government spending, Y is real GDP seasonally adjusted, IRS is the fed funds rate, 
and HEW is home equity withdrawal. We put G first since we assume that within a quarter the government 
does not react to changes in output, which is also the identifying assumption chosen (and extensively 
explained) by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).23  
The model can be described as: 
 
 
where  is the first differences operator, , the shocks to the respective variables 
and  
 
 
 
That G is not affected by changes in output or any of the other variables corresponds with: 
 
 
 
As the first panel in figure 18 shows, real output has a negative response to G, which is in contrast with the 
findings of Blanchard and Perotti. Their results (sample 1960Q1 – 1997Q4) consistently show positive 
government spending shocks as having a positive effect on output. 
Regarding the response of Y to HEW, it is important that HEW is a function of housing prices, 
which is reactive to economic and financial conditions.24  We therefore position HEW last in our model [G, Y, 
IRS, HEW]. This ordering implies that Y is not allowed to react contemporaneously to HEW within the same 
quarter, which corresponds with  
 
 
The final restriction we have is that the fed funds rate is not affected by the HEW, which is translated in the 
model to  
 
                                                
23 In the model with endogenous variables  [G, Y, IRS and HEW]´, Y also responds negatively to shocks in G, albeit it to a slightly 
smaller extent. See the variance decomposition of real output included in Appendix 1.  
24  HEW  is not identical to mortgages for refinance as shown in paragraph 3 as HEW also includes home equity withdrawal resulting 
from the sale of a house. 
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As the second panel of Figure 18 shows, real output responds positively to HEW, making it the sole driver of 
economic activity. The home-improvement component of HEW, which amounts to about one third of total 
HEW, is obviously geared towards domestic goods and services. The variance decomposition is included in 
Appendix 1. 
In order to look at the responses of Y to exogenous net taxes we add TAXEXO in the previous 
model and take away HEW to make the system more parsimonious (otherwise we have to estimate a five 
variable system which might be too much with 15 years of quarterly data). Again, TAXEXO is positioned 
first, which implies that TAXEXO is not affected within a quarter by G, Y and IRS. This is also the 
assumption taken by Romer and Romer (2010) who constructed the exogenous measure of taxation. Quite 
surprisingly, the response of output to exogenous tax changes, which include the Bush era tax cuts, is close to 
nil (see panel 3 in Figure 18). This is in contrast with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who find that positive tax 
shocks have a negative effect.25 Romer and Romer (2010), however, suggest that the Bush era tax cuts are an 
outlier in terms of their effect on real output. Excluding the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts (jointly) from 
Romer and Romer’s sample substantially increases the negative impact of a tax change.   
In order to look at the response of economic activity in China to shocks in the United States, we 
include quarterly real GDP growth in China, seasonally adjusted, in the structural VAR. The vector of 
endogenous variables we use is [G, Y, IRS, HEW, Y_China_SA]´, where G is government spending, Y is real 
GDP seasonally adjusted, IRS is the fed funds rate, HEW is home equity withdrawal and Y_China_SA is real 
China GDP seasonally adjusted. The first panel of Figure 19 shows that real economic activity in China 
responds positively to a shock in G. Real economic activity in China also responds positively to a shock in 
HEW during the first 16 quarters, as shown in the second panel. In order to determine the response of 
economic activity in China to a shock in taxes in the United States, we include TAXEXO and again drop 
HEW to make the system more parsimonious. The vector of endogenous variables then becomes [TAXEXO, 
G, Y, IRS, Y_China_SA]. In the third panel of Figure 19 we see that economic activity in China responds 
positively to a negative shock in exogenous taxes in the United States, although the effect is rather limited. 
The variance decomposition are included in Appendix 1. 
Our findings regarding economic activity in China must be considered preliminary. The response of 
economic activity in China to U.S. shocks will be the subject of a forthcoming paper.   
 
  
 
                                                
25 The Bush era tax cuts are obviously not included in Blanchard and Perotti’s sample, which runs from 1960Q1 – 1997Q4. 
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Figure 18 Baseline with G, Y, IRS and HEW (1992Q1 – 2008Q4) in panel 1 and 2  
Baseline with TAXEXO, G, Y and IRS (1992Q1 – 2007Q4) in panel 326 
 
 
 
         
                   
                                                
26  Response to Cholesky One S.D Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Figure 19 Baseline with G, Y, IRS, HEW and Y_China_SA (1992Q1 – 2008Q4) in panel 1 and 2 
Baseline with TAXEXO, G, Y, IRS and Y_China_SA (1992Q1 – 2007Q4) in panel 326 
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5. China’s Current Account, GDP Growth and Savings Rate 
If economic activity in the United States did not get a huge boost from the Bush era tax cuts, the spending out 
of home equity withdrawal, consumer credit and the spending two wars the United States was involved in, 
then who did? The rather unsurprising answer is China (as figure 19 also suggests) and the oil-exporting 
nations. Between 2001 and 2006 the bilateral trade deficit between the United States and China tripled (see 
Figure 20 and 21).  China’s double-digit economic growth was accompanied by an increase in China’s 
savings rate (see Figure 22 and 23). 
 
Figure 20 U.S. and China’s current account balance (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 
 
 
Figure 21 U.S., China and oil-Exporters’ current account (billion U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 
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Figure 22 U.S. and China real GDP growth (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 
 
 
Figure 23 U.S. and China savings rate (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, World Bank 
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In 2006 China’s savings rate hit 55 percent of GDP. According to Louis Kuijs (2006), China’s savings rate is 
much higher than what would be expected on the basis of the country’s characteristics. While the household 
savings rate increased from 17 percent in 1995 to 27 percent in 2008, household savings declined as a 
percentage of national income, mainly because of a fall in the share of household income in national income 
(Chamon and Prasad, 2008). At 16 percent of GDP household saving in China is, though significantly higher 
than in OECD countries, less than in India. Rather, China’s high savings rate is due to unusually high 
enterprise and government saving. Rising enterprise savings can account in full for the increase in saving in 
the 2000s. The increase in enterprise savings in the last 10 years is associated with a steady rise in the profits 
and profitability of enterprises. 
 In a paper for the Conference Board, Pieter Bottelier and Gail Fosler (2007) show that the 
profitability of enterprises in China in the 2000s is mainly driven by a strong productivity growth of about 6 
percent per year, especially in the manufacturing sector. There is no equivalent rise in labor costs, which is 
conform Arthur Lewis’ prediction in “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor” (1954).27 
Retained earnings in China rose between 2000 and 2005 by an estimated 5 percentage points from 15 percent 
of GDP to around 20 percent of GDP. Weak corporate governance structures and underdeveloped financial 
markets are often cited as reasons that in China few dividends get distributed (Kuijs, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 24 U.S. and China savings (trillion U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, World Bank Estimates 
 
                                                
27 The role of the renminbi and its (under)valuation fall outside the scope of our paper. 
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6. The Interest Conundrum  
In 2010 more than 40 percent of global GDP resided in jurisdictions running fiscal deficits of 10 per cent of 
GDP or more, overwhelmingly in the advanced economies (Buiter, 2010). In spite of the explosion of 
sovereign debt, long-term interest rates were declining instead of rising.28 The flailing economic recovery and 
dim inflation expectations in 2010 and 2011 surely accounted in part for the exceptionally low yields. 
However, the vast and continuous demand for fixed income assets seems also to be part of the equation.29  
 On February 16, 2005, the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, in his testimony 
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in the U.S. Senate, said: “(…) the broadly 
unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum.” In a speech to the International 
Monetary Conference in Beijing (via satellite) on June 6, 2005, Greenspan elaborated further on the interest 
conundrum: “The pronounced decline in U.S. Treasury long-term interest rates over the past year despite a 
200-basis-point increase in our fed funds rate is clearly without recent precedent. (…) The unusual behavior 
of long-term rates first became apparent almost a year ago.”  
 According to Greenspan (2010), the failure in 2004 and 2005 of the 400 basis point rise in the funds 
rate to carry the yield on the 10-year Treasury note along with it (as it historically almost invariably did), 
dramatically changed the long held view that U.S. long-term interest rates were significantly influenced, if not 
largely determined, by monetary policy (see Figure 25 and 26). The correlation coefficient in the United 
States between the fed funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate from 1963 to 2002 had been a tight 0.83. In 
the early 2000s, however, the 30-year mortgage rate clearly delinked from the fed funds rate with the 
correlation between the funds rate and the 30-year mortgage rate falling to an insignificant 0.17 during the 
years 2002 to 2005.  
 The correlation between the fed funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield was 0.87 from 1982 to 
2001 and fell to an insignificant 0.24 during the years 2002 to 2005. From 2002 – 2008 the correlation was at 
0.51 still much smaller than during the period dubbed the Great Moderation.  
In the United Kingdom we see a similar decoupling of the monetary policy rate and long-term 
interest rates. The correlation between the Bank Rate (the monetary policy rate of the Bank of England) and 
the yield on 10-year Gilts was 0.79 from 1982 – 2001 and 0.30 from 2002 – 2008. In Germany the correlation 
between the discount rate and the yield on 10-year Bunds was 0.61 from 1982 – 2001.30 Both the 
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 and the introduction of the single currency impacted the 
term structure during this period.31 From 2002 – 2008 the correlation between the European Central Bank’s 
monetary policy rate (the so-called Main Refinancing Minimum Bid Rate) and the yield on 10-year Bunds 
was 0.40. 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Only countries facing immediate risk of default, like those in the eurozone periphery in the first half of 2010, have seen a steep rise in 
treasury yields. 
29 The German economy grew quite robust and still the yield on 10-year Bunds was at a historical low in 2010 and 2011. 
30 We used the discount rate plus 0.50 percent and the ECB’s monetary policy rate from 1999 M1 on. Use of the repo-rate of the 
Bundesbank yields a similar result. 
31 The discount rate went from 4 percent in early 1989 to 8.75 percent in the summer of 1992 to choke off the additional demand created 
by spending on East Germany while long-term rates remained relatively low. In the second half of the 1990s the forthcoming 
introduction of the euro seems to have lifted long-term rates in Germany. 
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Figure 25 Fed funds rate and the yield on the 10-year Treasury (%)   
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
Figure 26 Close-up of the conundrum (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
Ben Bernanke, who was Fed governor at the time, in March 2005 advanced in the Sandridge lecture the 
theory of a global saving glut. He argued that there was an excess of world savings – a global saving glut – 
and that the United States was the consumer of last resort. Both Taylor (2008) and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2009) have pointed out that the global savings rate – that is world savings as a fraction of world GDP – was 
actually low in the 2002 – 2004 period.32 According to Obstfeld and Rogoff the increase in global saving 
plays out largely after 2004.    
                                                
32 Smith and Taylor (2009) have an alternative theory for the interest conundrum, deriving a formula that links the coefficients of the 
monetary policy rule for the short-term interest rate to the coefficients of the implied affine equations for long-term interest rates. They 
show that an increase in the coefficients in the monetary policy rule will lead to an increase in the coefficients in the affine equations. 
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By focusing on the global savings rate as a fraction of world GDP, Taylor, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
overlook the changing composition of world savings. In 2000 advanced economies accounted for 78 percent 
of global savings. By 2008 the share of emerging economies in global savings had doubled to 44 percent, 
while advanced economies accounted for a mere 56 percent of global savings (see Figure 27).33  
Emerging economies’ savings have been heavily skewed towards fixed-income assets, either 
because emerging economies’ investors are genuinely more risk averse, and/or because they are 
institutionally constrained to invest in equity capital. Institutional constraints include emerging economies’ 
underdeveloped financial markets and the reluctance of most Western countries to allow emerging 
economies’ sovereign wealth funds to invest in equity capital of Western companies. Of China’s holdings of 
U.S. dollar assets, for instance, a mere 7 percent is invested in equities (Setser, 2008). Daley and Broadbent 
(2009) point out that the 2000s saw a sharp increase in the global return on physical capital and a rise in the 
yield on quoted equity, which can only be explained by emerging economies’ portfolio ‘preferences.’ 
We see total debt securities outstanding rising at a higher rate from 2002 onward, despite the fact 
that the global savings rate was relatively low at the time (see Figure 28). It corroborates Greenspan’s 
statement in June 2005 that “the unusual behavior of long-term rates first became apparent almost a year ago” 
(Greenspan, 2005).  
The data on total debt securities outstanding are compiled by adding up domestic and international 
debt securities as reported by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Though there may exist some 
overlap and inconsistencies between both datasets, according to BIS-staff it is save to assume that the 
overestimation is minimal and that any overlap in the data on domestic and international debt securities would 
result in a similar error over time, so the data should reflect the trend correctly. 
 
Figure 27   Advanced, emerging economies and global savings (% world GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 
 
                                                
33 Emerging economies includes developing economies. 
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Figure 28   Total debt securities outstanding (billion U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements 
 
 
Figure 29   Global market capitalization of stock exchanges (billion U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
According to Alan Greenspan (2010), the FOMC in the early 2000s assumed that “the term premium was a 
relatively stable, independent variable (…) as it had been through the latter part of the 20th century.” This can 
be stylized in a straightforward level model (affine term structure), wherein the 10-year Treasury equals the 
fed funds rate plus a constant.  
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MODEL I 10-YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS 
 
From 1983 M1 – 2008 M12 the relationship between the 10-year Treasury and the fed funds rate is significant 
at the 1 percent level. The fed funds rate explains 74 percent of the 10-year Treasury.  The same model 
applied to two sub-samples, shows that the impact of the fed funds rate on the 10-year Treasury is much 
larger, with a coefficient  of 0.83, in the period from 1983 M1 – 2001 M12 than in the period from 2002 M1 
– 2008 M12, when the coefficient  is a mere 0.15. The R2 is 0.67 in the period from 1983 – 2001 versus a 
mere 0.26 in the period from 2002 – 2008, supporting Greenspan’s conundrum claim (the full output tables 
are included in the appendix).34  
This basic model, on which Greenspan based his expectations, shows that from 2001 – 2003 the yield 
on the 10-year Treasury note, though declining, was actually higher than was to be expected given the fed 
funds rate.35 This would be consistent with the low rate of global saving at the time and a minimal increase in 
global debt securities outstanding from 2001 – 2003. That long-term interest rates remained relatively high in 
the early 2000s after the FOMC had cut the federal funds interest rate 13 times was also the perception at the 
time. In a New York Times-column “Eleven And Counting” on December 14, 2001 Paul Krugman 
complained that the Fed was getting little ‘bang for its bucks’ as long-term interest rates weren’t coming 
down.  
The transcript of the FOMC meeting on 16 September 2003 includes the following excerpt (emphasis 
ours):  
The Committee may be especially inclined to keep policy unchanged, at least for now, if it thinks 
that there are other sources of impetus to economic growth that may make it difficult to restrain 
                                                
34 We adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance. 
35 The notable exception was in the run-up to the June 24-25, 2003 FOMC-meeting when the financial markets expected the FOMC to 
cut the fed funds rate by more than 25 basis points.  
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inflation to its current pace. In particular, as shown in the middle panel, the term structure of 
nominal yields is unusually steeply sloped, at least by the experience of the past twenty-five 
years.  
In addition to the often cited deflation-scare (Rudebusch, 2006; Bernanke, 2010), the fact that long-term 
interest rates weren’t coming down as much as expected was a reason for the FOMC to keep the fed funds 
rate at 1 percent for an extended period of time, thereby setting the stage for the subsequent interest 
conundrum. 
  By adding the global savings rate to the basic model, we are better able to explain the 10-year 
Treasury rate. The R2 in MODEL II for the period 1983 – 2008 is 80 percent (compared to 74 percent in 
MODEL I). The same model applied to two samples, shows that the global savings rate is not significant in the 
period from 1983 – 2001. From 2002 – 2008 the global savings rate is significant at the 5 percent level and 
the R2 is 0.44 (compared to 0.26 in Model I).  
 
MODEL II 10-YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS +   GLOBAL SAVINGS RATE 
 
Adding debt securities, which reflects not only the increase in global savings but also the change in 
composition, instead of the global savings rate, to the basic model results in an R2 of 0.79 for the 1989M12 – 
2008M12 period.36  Judging by the sum of the squared residuals (SSR), MODEL III provides a much better fit 
than MODEL I or MODEL II. Debt securities is statistically significant at the 1 percent level both in samples 1 
and 2. The R2 is 0.74 in 1989M12 – 2001M12 (compared to 0.26 in MODEL I and 0.27). The R2 is 0.52 in 
2002M01 – 2008M12 (compared to 0.26 in MODEL I and 0.44 in MODEL II).  
                                                
36 Data on total debt securities outstanding are only available starting in 1989.  
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MODEL III  10-YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS +  DEBT SECURITIES 
 
Adding both debt securities and the global savings rate to the basic model, improves the fit further to 84 
percent (80 and 53 percent respectively for sample 1 and 2). The coefficient for the global savings rate turns 
positive, however, suggesting that the model uses the global savings rate as a proxy for factors that have not 
been included in the model, such as inflation expectations.37 We therefore won’t give this model further 
consideration. 
 Table 9 and 10 present a recapitulation of the output of MODEL I – III. The full output tables for 
MODEL I - III can be found in Appendix 2. In the 1st column of table 9 all observations available are used for 
the estimations, which means that MODEL I AND II begin in 1983M1 and model III begins in 1989M1. The 2nd 
and 3rd column show sub-samples of column 1. Since a larger sample size generally leads to a better fit, we 
also run MODEL I - II with the same sample size as MODEL III beginning in 1989M1 (see Table 10).38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 The global savings rate is insignificant in sample 1 and 2. 
38 The 3rd column in Table 9 and 10 and the corresponding output tables in the Appendix are identical. 
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Table 9  Recapitulation of output with different sample sizes 
 
 1983M1/89M12-2008M12* 1983M1/89M12-2001M12* 2002M1-2008M12 
 R2 SSR0 R2 SSR1 R2 SSR2 
I 0.737430 433.9901 0.674940 310.7148 0.261749 14.95703 
II 0.796248 336.7728 0.687246 298.9520 0.440086 11.34390 
III 0.785274 93.70908 0.746084 42.76092 0.529646 9.529415 
 
* Model I and II begin in 1983M1, model III begins in 1989M12  
 
 
Table 10 Recapitulation of output with same sample sizes 
 
 1989M12-2008M1 1989M12-2001M12 2002M1-2008M12 
 R2 SSR0 R2 SSR1 R2 SSR2 
I 0.497034 219.5002 0.255793 125.3287 0.261749 14.95703 
II 0.629883 161.5234 0.273669 122.3183 0.440086 11.34390 
III 0.785274 93.70908 0.746084 42.76092 0.529646 9.529415 
 
An econometric issue that needs to be addressed is whether the variables are stationary. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test indicates that both the fed funds rate and debt securities may have a unit root, and 
therefore be non-stationary. Wu and Zhang (1997), however, show that due to sample size ADF-tests often 
indicate interest rates to be non-stationary while they are in fact stationary. We assume that here to be the case 
with regard to the fed funds rate as well.39, 40  
 With regard to debt securities it is important in our static model that we can think of total debt 
securities as exogenous. The share of U.S. debt securities – which is most likely to be affected by the 10-year 
Treasury yield – in total debt securities has been falling steadily from 18 percent in 1989 to 8 percent 2009. 
It’s not evident that portfolio decisions in the rest of the world to invest in domestic debt securities are 
triggered by the U.S. Treasury yield. Firstly, at the time U.S. debt securities were still a relatively large share 
of total debt securities, financial markets had not yet been liberalized. Secondly, the 10-year Treasury yield 
has not been very indicative for the yield on foreign governments’ bonds. Lastly, the drifting lower of (real) 
interest rates during the past two decades coincides with an increasing appetite for debt securities, which 
suggests that causality runs from the latter to the former, and not the other way around.  
 Warnock and Warnock (2009), using data on foreign capital flows until and including May 2005, 
conclude that foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds have an economically large and statistically 
significant impact on the U.S. Treasury yield.41 They find that foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds 
have a similar impact on other interest rates such as corporate bond yields and 30-year mortgage rates, which 
suggests that the increase in foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds is rather a manifestation of a 
broader phenomenon, namely the global saving glut.  
 We performed an OLS-regression identical to the one in Warnock and Warnock (2009), which 
includes inflation expectations, interest rate risk premium, expected real GDP growth and the structural 
budget deficit. We find that debt securities explains the 10-year Treasury yield considerably better than 
foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds (see Table 11). 
                                                
39 Also, from an economic-theoretical perspective it should not be possible for interest rates to be non-stationary (Van Dijck, 2012).  
40 In Table 1 the fed funds rate (1990Q1 – 2008Q2) is actually stationary but that may be due to small sample size.  
41 Sack (2004) and Rudebusch et.al. (2006) find that foreign capital flows had only a small or no impact on U.S. long-term rates. They 
made however use of a partial measure of foreign flows from the FRBNY. Warnock and Warnock (2009) use an estimate of total foreign 
capital flows (see also Bertaut and Tryon, 2007) 
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Table 11 Model of the 10-year Treasury yield42 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ET+10 0.733***              (22.50) 0.619***              (18.60) 0.608***           (17.42) 
ET+1 - ET+10 0.055                     (0.27) –0.033                  (–0.15) 0.070                   (0.29) 
rpt 2.262                     (1.49) 0.855                      (0.50) –0.286                 (–0.16) 
yet+1 0.218***               (2.90) –0.039                  (–0.52) –0.044                 (–0.54) 
it,3m 0.267 0.381 0.399 
deficit t-1 –0.037                  (–1.24) –0.213***            (–7.52) –0.205***            (–7.09) 
debt t –4.00E-05***      (–9.26)   
foreign t  –0.180***           (–5.37)  
foreign off t   –0.230***           (–2.79) 
observations 186 186 186 
r-squared 0.912 0.889 0.877 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield using domestic 
variables and total debt securities outstanding. The specification is as follows:  
it,10 = a + bet+10 (1 - b)it,3m + c(et+1 - et+10) + d(rpt) + e(yet+1) + f(deficitt-1) + g(debtt) + t 
where it,10 is the nominal 10-year Treasury yield, et+1 - et+10 are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead 
inflation expectations; it,3m is the 3-month Eurodollar rate; rpt is an interest rate risk premium; yet+1 is expected 
real GDP growth over the next year; deficitt-1 is the structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP); debtt is 
total debt securities and foreignt is 12-month aggregate foreign flows into U.S. Treasury and agency bonds. 
Column 2 and 3 include total foreign flows (foreignt) and official foreign flows (foreign_offt), respectively, 
instead of total debt securities. Short-term expectations of future output and inflation are from the Blue Chip 
survey. Long-term inflation expectations are from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
In all columns, t-statistics, computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Constants are included but not reported. The sample is monthly from 1989 M12 to 2005 M5. 
 
Our findings are consistent with recent research into the effectiveness of the Fed’s quantitative easing or asset 
purchase programs, which shows that the impact of the Fed’s asset purchase programs is determined 
primarily by the quantity of securities that the Federal Reserve holds, measured in U.S. dollars, rather than by 
the pace of new purchases.  In other words, it is stock rather than flows that explain the 10-year Treasury rate 
((Gagnon 2010 and Krishnamurthy 2011).43 This implies that there is no actual “financial balance of terror” 
as Larry Summers suggested. After all, if China or Japan were to cease buying U.S. government bonds other 
investors would step in, drawn by rising bond yields. 44  
Our data show that in the early 2000s U.S. long-term interest rates largely delinked from the Fed’s 
monetary policy. We see a similar outcome in the U.K., and to a lesser extent in Germany, where the term 
structure was not as stable to begin with. Total debt securities outstanding, instead of foreign flows into U.S. 
Treasury and agency bonds, can explain the interest conundrum in the United States.  
 
                                                
42 The ADF-test indicates that in Warnock and Warnock’s OLS-regression most variables (short-term interest rates, GDP, the budget 
deficit, the volatility of the 10-year interest rate as well as foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds) may contain a unit root. For a 
discussion of the implications we refer to Warnock and Warnock (2009). 
43 Since Operation Twist does not affect the quantity of Treasuries that the Fed holds, but only (the composition of) its maturity, 
Operation Twist may be effective only in as far as long-term and short-term Treasuries are not perfect substitutes. 
44 It does, however, not preclude ‘sovereign risk’, i.e. that the market suddenly perceives the debt of a sovereign as ‘risky’, perceptions 
that may in part be driven by Keynesian ‘animal spirits’. 
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7. Conclusion 
When the dot-com bubble burst by the end of 2000, the FOMC started cutting the fed funds rate  – 13 times in 
total – until it reached 1 percent in June 2003. Though the FOMC stuck to a monetary policy rule similar to 
the classic Taylor rule using inflation forecasts instead of current values, it did change the preferred measure 
of inflation twice in the early 2000s without a countervailing change in the parameters, thereby effectively 
loosening the rule.  
We show that the Fed’s easy monetary policy did not trigger so much the housing boom, as asserted 
by John Taylor, but rather the refinancing boom and ensuing spending spree. Contrary to popular belief, the 
housing boom had little to do with the proliferation of exotic mortgage products. The decline in long-term 
interest rates accounts mostly for the housing boom.  
The Fed’s easy monetary stance, together with the Bush tax cuts and the spending on the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, did not boost the U.S. economy to the extent that might have been expected from such a 
massive stimulus at a time when the economy was operating below potential. Instead, China and oil-exporting 
nations reaped most of the fruits of U.S. spending. These countries invested a major part of the proceeds in 
fixed income assets, resulting in – what Alan Greenspan dubbed – the interest conundrum. 
Our data demonstrate that in the early 2000s U.S. long-term interest rates largely delinked from the 
Fed’s monetary policy. At first, in 2001 – 2003, interest rates did not come down as much as was to be 
expected based on the experience in the past two decades. Subsequently, in 2004 – 2005, the 200-basis point 
rise in the fed funds rate failed to lift long-term interest rates. Our model shows that the increase in total debt 
securities outstanding accounts for the interest conundrum in the United States. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Variance decomposition of real output with [G, Y, IRS, HEW]´ 
 Period S.E. G Y IRS HEW 
 1  0.014520  5.153989  94.84601  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.015841  2.483602  91.50355  3.556735  2.456109 
 3  0.018141  3.763412  88.27725  3.176908  4.782433 
 4  0.021184  8.462435  77.22069  3.676140  10.64073 
 5  0.025040  10.94949  67.52762  3.896637  17.62625 
 6  0.027897  15.24855  56.48155  3.175166  25.09473 
 7  0.031026  18.31709  47.91450  2.560670  31.20774 
 8  0.033855  20.93822  40.46614  2.164710  36.43093 
 9  0.036234  22.93296  34.21702  1.917208  40.93281 
 10  0.038421  24.22304  29.37604  1.715268  44.68565 
 11  0.040076  25.21751  25.44367  1.503181  47.83564 
 12  0.041402  25.88380  22.29792  1.318338  50.49993 
 13  0.042416  26.28505  19.72075  1.246578  52.74762 
 14  0.043142  26.42238  17.59685  1.376016  54.60475 
 15  0.043660  26.34661  15.83254  1.757300  56.06355 
 16  0.044018  26.09467  14.36303  2.396874  57.14542 
 17  0.044276  25.71803  13.12114  3.258462  57.90237 
 18  0.044485  25.26658  12.05022  4.284552  58.39865 
 19  0.044680  24.79291  11.10143  5.398621  58.70703 
 20  0.044885  24.34593  10.23645  6.523096  58.89453 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
Variance decomposition of real output with  [TAXEXO, G, Y, IRS]´ 
 Period S.E. TAXEXO G Y IRS 
 1  0.001948  5.770825  6.706398  87.52278  0.000000 
 2  0.002122  5.325170  3.771361  87.87675  3.026717 
 3  0.002163  3.785275  3.050263  90.83269  2.331771 
 4  0.002210  2.835788  4.847628  87.65619  4.660395 
 5  0.002239  2.878509  6.006308  85.34664  5.768539 
 6  0.002246  2.751842  8.950796  81.66117  6.636191 
 7  0.002265  2.500004  10.73448  79.71449  7.051022 
 8  0.002273  2.307388  12.08957  78.38203  7.221012 
 9  0.002277  2.194652  13.09806  77.52822  7.179066 
 10  0.002279  2.117793  14.07442  76.79128  7.016510 
 11  0.002285  2.076645  15.02156  76.04109  6.860704 
 12  0.002292  2.057177  15.99698  75.23367  6.712174 
 13  0.002297  2.048331  16.92671  74.41264  6.612319 
 14  0.002303  2.037269  17.79576  73.58407  6.582906 
 15  0.002307  2.028153  18.61533  72.73908  6.617441 
 16  0.002310  2.026892  19.37253  71.89850  6.702074 
 17  0.002313  2.038326  20.10195  71.05123  6.808496 
 18  0.002314  2.062608  20.80509  70.21374  6.918564 
 19  0.002315  2.092355  21.47280  69.41577  7.019068 
 20  0.002316  2.122661  22.09041  68.68133  7.105593 
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Variance decomposition of Y_CHINA_SA with [G, Y, IRS, HEW, Y_China_SA]´ 
 Period S.E. G Y IRS HEW Y_CHINA_SA 
 1  0.006654  0.008638  0.712297  3.484342  1.262644  94.53208 
 2  0.008413  0.011736  0.470859  2.427020  2.552346  94.53804 
 3  0.009121  0.021838  0.808372  2.266371  8.038359  88.86506 
 4  0.009484  1.043775  0.929040  3.277444  9.543185  85.20656 
 5  0.010271  0.923558  0.816766  5.260963  11.34250  81.65621 
 6  0.011349  1.073501  0.897779  5.390684  14.52523  78.11280 
 7  0.012260  1.054292  1.661512  5.833134  17.19789  74.25318 
 8  0.012929  0.949918  2.474581  6.658545  19.96278  69.95417 
 9  0.013566  1.007504  3.754863  6.794999  22.01566  66.42698 
 10  0.014233  1.097785  5.552297  6.629153  23.47399  63.24677 
 11  0.014922  1.255872  8.224481  6.281973  24.15827  60.07941 
 12  0.015526  1.487616  11.71011  5.924549  23.94348  56.93425 
 13  0.016132  1.834842  16.04750  5.536992  22.98541  53.59525 
 14  0.016769  2.461822  20.70721  5.126673  21.46982  50.23447 
 15  0.017485  3.443359  25.39456  4.732336  19.74732  46.68242 
 16  0.018294  4.723082  29.65006  4.399504  18.27515  42.95220 
 17  0.019215  6.286316  32.97530  4.148618  17.49542  39.09435 
 18  0.020272  8.116553  35.03255  3.980847  17.66509  35.20496 
 19  0.021479  10.12722  35.71970  3.881936  18.86100  31.41014 
 20  0.022833  12.20857  35.15657  3.816104  20.99427  27.82449 
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Variance decomposition of Y_CHINA_SA with [TAXEXO, G, Y, IRS, Y_China_SA]´ 
 Period S.E. TAXEXO G Y IRS Y_CHINA_SA 
 1  0.006447  10.55263  3.430592  0.300124  0.054817  85.66184 
 2  0.009015  12.90672  8.296848  0.213925  2.294010  76.28850 
 3  0.010507  11.35826  14.28687  1.164479  3.827858  69.36254 
 4  0.012213  8.768933  23.40489  0.952067  5.188491  61.68561 
 5  0.013346  7.893741  24.11426  1.069224  6.879090  60.04368 
 6  0.014250  7.310254  24.18058  2.011017  8.082079  58.41607 
 7  0.015202  6.739500  24.24152  3.705983  9.103772  56.20923 
 8  0.015951  6.582127  23.42964  5.514354  9.608734  54.86514 
 9  0.016656  6.286527  22.10353  8.369012  9.540320  53.70061 
 10  0.017448  6.049996  20.70607  11.78780  9.441966  52.01417 
 11  0.018252  5.935044  19.23488  15.66012  9.121413  50.04854 
 12  0.019068  5.788922  17.77973  19.81848  8.747460  47.86540 
 13  0.019906  5.648788  16.40300  24.00105  8.444789  45.50238 
 14  0.020740  5.516208  15.13240  28.03267  8.194103  43.12462 
 15  0.021546  5.358332  14.02227  31.82006  8.019875  40.77946 
 16  0.022303  5.183173  13.09402  35.21519  7.925241  38.58237 
 17  0.022990  5.007787  12.36514  38.13576  7.872723  36.61859 
 18  0.023604  4.835741  11.83761  40.59110  7.837977  34.89758 
 19  0.024138  4.676721  11.50110  42.58646  7.803175  33.43254 
 20  0.024594  4.534442  11.34528  44.15052  7.749049  32.22071 
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Appendix 2  
 
MODEL I 10 -YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS RATE  
 
Model OLS, using observations 1983:01-2008:12 (T = 312) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 5 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 2.52605 0.334244 7.5575 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.793259 0.063928 12.4086 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  6.751731 S.D. dependent var  2.305353 
Sum squared resid  433.9901 S.E. of regression  1.183202 
R-squared  0.737430 Adjusted R-squared  0.736583 
F(1, 310)  153.9742 P-value(F)  5.59e-29 
Log-likelihood -494.1917 Akaike criterion  992.3834 
Schwarz criterion  999.8694 Hannan-Quinn  995.3754 
Rho  0.970182 Durbin-Watson  0.057220 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1983:01-2001:12 (T = 228) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 2.48278 0.569647 4.3585 0.00002 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.822705 0.090438 9.0969 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  7.645658 S.D. dependent var  2.052041 
Sum squared resid  310.7148 S.E. of regression  1.172538 
R-squared  0.674940 Adjusted R-squared  0.673501 
F(1, 226)  82.75355 P-value(F)  4.94e-17 
Log-likelihood -358.8044 Akaike criterion  721.6088 
Schwarz criterion  728.4675 Hannan-Quinn  724.3760 
Rho  0.970397 Durbin-Watson  0.060687 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2002:01-2008:12 (T = 84) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 3.89988 0.165638 23.5446 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.154579 0.0406764 3.8002 0.00028 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.325357 S.D. dependent var  0.494062 
Sum squared resid  14.95703 S.E. of regression  0.427086 
R-squared  0.261749 Adjusted R-squared  0.252746 
F(1, 82)  14.44165 P-value(F)  0.000277 
Log-likelihood -46.71414 Akaike criterion  97.42828 
Schwarz criterion  102.2899 Hannan-Quinn  99.38261 
Rho  0.868993 Durbin-Watson  0.322795 
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We repeat MODEL I using data starting in 1989M12 instead of 1983M1     
 
Model OLS, using observations 1989:01-2008:12 (T = 240)      
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 3.44541 0.212559 16.2092 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.528075 0.0406989 12.9752 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5.823292 S.D. dependent var  1.483374 
Sum squared resid  222.0179 S.E. of regression  0.965841 
R-squared  0.577829 Adjusted R-squared  0.576055 
F(1, 238)  168.3548 P-value(F)  1.80e-29 
Log-likelihood -331.1995 Akaike criterion  666.3990 
Schwarz criterion  673.3603 Hannan-Quinn  669.2039 
Rho  0.969969 Durbin-Watson  0.062186 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1989:01-2001:12 (T = 156) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 4.29507 0.418484 10.2634 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.428761 0.0676206 6.3407 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  6.629872 S.D. dependent var  1.179574 
Sum squared resid  128.9310 S.E. of regression  0.914994 
R-squared  0.402174 Adjusted R-squared  0.398292 
F(1, 154)  40.20433 P-value(F)  2.41e-09 
Log-likelihood -206.4893 Akaike criterion  416.9785 
Schwarz criterion  423.0782 Hannan-Quinn  419.4559 
Rho  0.965523 Durbin-Watson  0.062887 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2002:01-2008:12 (T = 84) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 3.89988 0.165638 23.5446 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.154579 0.0406764 3.8002 0.00028 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.325357 S.D. dependent var  0.494062 
Sum squared resid  14.95703 S.E. of regression  0.427086 
R-squared  0.261749 Adjusted R-squared  0.252746 
F(1, 82)  14.44165 P-value(F)  0.000277 
Log-likelihood -46.71414 Akaike criterion  97.42828 
Schwarz criterion  102.2899 Hannan-Quinn  99.38261 
Rho  0.868993 Durbin-Watson  0.322795 
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MODEL II 10-YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS RATE +   GLOBAL SAVINGS RATE 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1983:01-2008:12 (T = 312) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 5 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 16.9395 3.14998 5.3777 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.852508 0.0556119 15.3296 <0.00001 *** 
GL. SAVING -0.656384 0.142163 -4.6171 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  6.751731 S.D. dependent var  2.305353 
Sum squared resid  336.7728 S.E. of regression  1.043973 
R-squared  0.796248 Adjusted R-squared  0.794929 
F(2, 309)  118.1087 P-value(F)  7.92e-39 
Log-likelihood -454.6281 Akaike criterion  915.2562 
Schwarz criterion  926.4852 Hannan-Quinn  919.7440 
Rho  0.961546 Durbin-Watson  0.076773 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1983:01-2001:12 (T = 228) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 11.6348 6.74318 1.7254 0.08583 * 
FED FUNDS 0.888272 0.0938385 9.4660 <0.00001 *** 
GL. SAVING -0.429058 0.312696 -1.3721 0.17139  
 
Mean dependent var  7.645658 S.D. dependent var  2.052041 
Sum squared resid  298.9520 S.E. of regression  1.152682 
R-squared  0.687246 Adjusted R-squared  0.684466 
F(2, 225)  53.02830 P-value(F)  1.35e-19 
Log-likelihood -354.4049 Akaike criterion  714.8097 
Schwarz criterion  725.0978 Hannan-Quinn  718.9606 
Rho  0.967093 Durbin-Watson  0.066998 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2002:01-2008:12 (T = 84) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 10.6546 2.78338 3.8279 0.00025 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.371964 0.0948145 3.9231 0.00018 *** 
GL. SAVING -0.321832 0.131635 -2.4449 0.01666 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.325357 S.D. dependent var  0.494062 
Sum squared resid  11.34390 S.E. of regression  0.374230 
R-squared  0.440086 Adjusted R-squared  0.426261 
F(2, 81)  11.57655 P-value(F)  0.000038 
Log-likelihood -35.10109 Akaike criterion  76.20219 
Schwarz criterion  83.49464 Hannan-Quinn  79.13369 
Rho  0.812999 Durbin-Watson  0.444143 
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We repeat MODEL II using data starting in 1989M12 instead of 1983M1. 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1989:01-2008:12 (T = 240) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 15.3907 2.58255 5.9595 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.610357 0.0466735 13.0772 <0.00001 *** 
GL. SAVING -0.54988 0.116773 -4.7090 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5.823292 S.D. dependent var  1.483374 
Sum squared resid  165.5087 S.E. of regression  0.835673 
R-squared  0.685282 Adjusted R-squared  0.682626 
F(2, 237)  89.85966 P-value(F)  9.04e-30 
Log-likelihood -295.9514 Akaike criterion  597.9028 
Schwarz criterion  608.3447 Hannan-Quinn  602.1102 
Rho  0.955164 Durbin-Watson  0.087883 
 
 
Model 14: OLS, using observations 1989:01-2001:12 (T = 156) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C -4.95548 8.20145 -0.6042 0.54659  
FED FUNDS 0.320451 0.119501 2.6816 0.00813 *** 
GL. SAVING 0.444166 0.391431 1.1347 0.25827  
 
Mean dependent var  6.629872 S.D. dependent var  1.179574 
Sum squared resid  124.8143 S.E. of regression  0.903205 
R-squared  0.421261 Adjusted R-squared  0.413696 
F(2, 153)  21.93337 P-value(F)  4.21e-09 
Log-likelihood -203.9582 Akaike criterion  413.9164 
Schwarz criterion  423.0659 Hannan-Quinn  417.6325 
Rho  0.967735 Durbin-Watson  0.061666 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2002:01-2008:12 (T = 84) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 10.6546 2.78338 3.8279 0.00025 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.371964 0.0948145 3.9231 0.00018 *** 
GL. SAVING -0.321832 0.131635 -2.4449 0.01666 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.325357 S.D. dependent var  0.494062 
Sum squared resid  11.34390 S.E. of regression  0.374230 
R-squared  0.440086 Adjusted R-squared  0.426261 
F(2, 81)  11.57655 P-value(F)  0.000038 
Log-likelihood -35.10109 Akaike criterion  76.20219 
Schwarz criterion  83.49464 Hannan-Quinn  79.13369 
Rho  0.812999 Durbin-Watson  0.444143 
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MODEL III  10-YEAR TREASURY = C +  FED FUNDS RATE +  DEBT SECURITIES 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1989:01-2008:12 (T = 240) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 5.96589 0.266918 22.3510 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.332068 0.03344 9.9303 <0.00001 *** 
DEBT -4.00726e-05 3.66609e-06 -10.9306 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5.823292 S.D. dependent var  1.483374 
Sum squared resid  95.53012 S.E. of regression  0.634886 
R-squared  0.818348 Adjusted R-squared  0.816815 
F(2, 237)  160.9854 P-value(F)  6.95e-45 
Log-likelihood -230.0016 Akaike criterion  466.0031 
Schwarz criterion  476.4451 Hannan-Quinn  470.2105 
Rho  0.929597 Durbin-Watson  0.135479 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 1989:01-2001:12 (T = 156) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 8.48023 0.484317 17.5097 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.246128 0.0466989 5.2705 <0.00001 *** 
DEBT -0.000116166 1.12229e-05 -10.3509 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  6.629872 S.D. dependent var  1.179574 
Sum squared resid  42.98418 S.E. of regression  0.530040 
R-squared  0.800691 Adjusted R-squared  0.798086 
F(2, 153)  106.7606 P-value(F)  9.45e-30 
Log-likelihood -120.8105 Akaike criterion  247.6211 
Schwarz criterion  256.7707 Hannan-Quinn  251.3372 
Rho  0.917717 Durbin-Watson  0.184989 
 
 
Model OLS, using observations 2002:01-2008:12 (T = 84) 
Dependent variable: 10-YEAR TREASURY 
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
C 4.99587 0.349215 14.3060 <0.00001 *** 
FED FUNDS 0.252155 0.0326175 7.7307 <0.00001 *** 
DEBT -2.07474e-05 5.2742e-06 -3.9338 0.00018 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  4.325357 S.D. dependent var  0.494062 
Sum squared resid  9.668601 S.E. of regression  0.345493 
R-squared  0.522776 Adjusted R-squared  0.510993 
F(2, 81)  30.16136 P-value(F)  1.62e-10 
Log-likelihood -28.38964 Akaike criterion  62.77929 
Schwarz criterion  70.07174 Hannan-Quinn  65.71079 
Rho  0.748936 Durbin-Watson  0.504434 
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III Why Do Chinese Households Save So Much?* 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
China’s savings rate is a popular topic of research. Not only is the national savings rate at 54 percent of GDP 
high by almost any standard (Kuijs, 2006), and persistently so, China’s high savings rate and concurrent 
current account surplus also have been blamed for the global financial crisis and ensuing economic recession 
(Bernanke, 2010). Although household savings declined as a share of China’s total savings as the growth of 
corporate profits outpaced the growth of household income, the household savings rate nonetheless climbed 
robustly, from a mere 12 percent in 1978 to 27 percent in 2009. This compares with (gross) household 
savings rates in OECD countries ranging from 6 to 16 percent of GDP (OECD, 2009).    
Compared to previous research we use data that are more recent and cover a longer time span (1960 
– 2009), including the periods with the most important economic reforms, to determine the determinants of 
the household savings rate in China. We find that the main determinants of variations over time in the 
household savings rate in China are disposable income (which we measure by its reciprocal), the average 5-
year income growth rate and the old-age dependency rate. Our findings support the conventional Keynesian 
savings hypothesis, instead of Modigliani’s life cycle theory, although habit formation and precautionary 
saving motives are also important. 
The coefficient of the old-age dependency rate is positive rather than negative, as the life cycle 
hypothesis would predict. Individuals approaching the age of 65 presumably save a higher percentage of 
disposable income than they did before, while the group of 65+, which are supposed to be dissavers, is still 
relatively small in China.45 In 2010 only 8.2 percent of China’s population was age 65+, compared to 13.1 
percent of the population in the United States and 18.3 percent in Western Europe (see Figure 1 in Appendix 
1). Due to one-child-policy and low mortality rates, China’s population will age rapidly in the years to come.  
Using exclusively our data, we find that for all Chinese households (1978 – 2009) the reciprocal of 
real disposable income per capita, the average income growth, the young age dependency ratio as well as the 
old age are the main determinants of the variations in the savings rate over time. The young age dependency 
ratio has the expected negative sign. The old age dependency ratio again has a positive sign, just as it had in 
the combined dataset.  
The main determinants of the urban household savings rate (1978 – 2009) are the real disposable 
income per capita (measured by its reciprocal), the old age dependency ratio and the young age dependency 
ratio. Both the young age dependency ratio as well as the old age dependency ratio have a positive sign, 
which is contrary to the life cycle hypothesis. The findings lend support to the Keynesian saving theory and 
precautionary saving motives, and not to the life cycle hypothesis. 
The main determinants of the rural household savings rate (1978 – 2009) are real disposable income 
per capita (measured by its reciprocal) and the young age dependency ratio. Considering the life cycle 
hypothesis, the young age dependency ratio unexpectedly has a positive sign. The fact that immigrants work 
                                                
* Together with Raman Ahmed. 
 
45 The age group 65+ is a very close proxy for the age group approaching 65.  
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in urban areas but are still included in rural statistics may account for that. The findings lend support to the 
Keynesian saving theory and not to the life cycle hypothesis. The R2 with regard to rural savings rate is only 
half of the R2 for the urban savings rate and the total savings rate, which means that a large part of the rural 
savings rate remains unexplained. 
In each sample the reciprocal of real disposable income per capita turns out to be an important 
determinant of the household savings rate, suggesting that the conventional Keynesian model goes a long way 
to explain the Chinese experience of the last fifty years. The coefficient has a negative sign as expected, as it 
implies a long-run tendency for the savings rate to rise with income (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). Since it is 
clear from developed economies like the United States that the household savings rate will not keep rising 
with household income indefinitely, this result can best be viewed within the context of China as an emerging 
economy in the past three/five decades. 
There is no evidence that the household savings rate in China is high because of low deposit rates, as 
Michael Pettis (2012) has asserted time and again, which would indicate that the income effect of lower 
deposit rates trumps the substitution effect. The coefficient of the deposit rate has alternating signs, but is 
insignificant in every single estimate.  
The concept of ‘forced savings’ in relation to household savings is generally understood to be (1) 
expansionary monetary policy to stimulate investment at the expense of higher inflation that curbs households 
real purchasing power, or (2) an undervalued currency that depresses households real purchasing power, or 
(3) the government imposing taxes on households to subsidize national industry. Since we measure household 
savings as a share of real disposable income (i.e. after tax), forced savings can’t account for our findings.   
Although the savings rate varies significantly per income group, with the lowest income group’s 
savings rate in urban areas in the single digits and the highest income group’s savings rate at almost 40 
percent of disposable income, our findings do not support the so-called competitive saving motive, which 
holds that income inequality as such is a motive for households to save a larger portion of their income. The 
sex ratio (i.e. the number of men per woman in the pre-marital cohort) also does not significantly impact the 
savings rate. 
Since disposable income per capita is higher in urban areas than in rural areas (urban income per 
capita was more than threefold rural income per capita in 2009) and because of the rapid urbanization of 
China (in 2009 47 percent of the population was counted as urban compared to 18 percent in 1978), the urban 
household savings rate and its determinants have become increasingly indicative for the total household 
savings rate (see Figure 2). 
 
 
2. Existing Literature 
Modigliani and Cao (2004) find that China’s high and rising savings rate is in concordance with the life cycle 
theory, which predicts that the income growth rate instead of the income level determines the savings rate 
(Modigliani, 1970). The life cycle hypothesis (LCH) also predicts that the savings rate rises with the share of 
working age population in the total population, for which Modigliani and Cao find modest support.  
 Carroll and Weil (1994) show that, in the fast-growing high-saving East Asian countries, growth 
precedes the rise in savings rates. Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) argue that habit formation, instead of the 
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LCH, accounts for the fact that saving and growth are positively correlated, as consumption growth does not 
catch up with income growth immediately. 
Horioka and Wan (2007), carrying out a dynamic panel analysis of the savings rate in different 
provinces over a limited time span (1995 – 2004), find that the lagged savings rate and the income growth 
rate are important determinants of the savings rate while age structure is not, lending mixed support for the 
LCH. Horioka and Terada (2011), who compare national savings rates in 12 economies in emerging Asia 
during the 1966 – 2007 period, on the other hand, find that age structure is an important determinant of the 
national savings rate. 
Chamon and Prasad (2010) dismiss the findings of Modigliani and Cao based on the fact that in 2005 
the saving curve by age group was u-shaped: younger and older generations (measured by the age of the head 
of household) saved a higher percentage of their income than the generations in between, while the LCH 
would predict a hump-shaped saving curve. 
An alternative explanation for China’s high savings rate is the precautionary savings motive and the 
rising income uncertainty, which is favored by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) and also Chamon and Prasad 
(2010). Underdeveloped financial markets may reinforce this argument, if there is no market for annuities to 
insure for old age.  
Wei and Zhang (2009) have pointed out that the problem with both theories may be that while the 
public pension and health care systems as well as the financial system in China have been improving since 
2003, household savings as a share of disposable income have continued to rise sharply during the same 
period. This contradicts both the precautionary motive theory as well as the underdeveloped financial markets 
theory. It does support the habit formation theory, though. 
A new strand of literature, notably from Chinese academics, emphasizes the competitive savings 
motive. Jin, Li and Wu (2010) suggest that income inequality can directly stimulate household savings due to 
the desire to improve social-status. It is the Chinese version of  ‘keeping up with the Joneses,’ albeit that 
‘keeping up with the Wangs’ does not induce conspicuous consumption but rather conspicuous saving.  
In a similar vein are Wei and Zhang (2009), who argue that Chinese parents with a son raise their 
savings in a competitive manner in order to improve their son's relative attractiveness for marriage. Wei and 
Zhang claim that about half of the increase in the savings rate of the last 25 years can be attributed to the rise 
in the sex ratio imbalance. It is noteworthy that these competitive saving theories do not predict a u-shaped 
household saving curve either. 
 
 
3. Data on Savings Rates and Related Variables 
We set out to update the analysis carried out by Modigliani and Cao (2004) whose dataset spans 1953 – 2000. 
Modigliani and Cao have a rather circuitous approach to establish household income and the household 
savings rate.  They add savings (calculated as the change in currency + deposit + bonds + individual 
investment in fixed assets) to consumption expenditures in order to establish (gross) income.  
We use data from the household survey as reported in the Statistical Yearbook from the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, which includes data on household income, disposable household income and 
household expenditures, both for urban and rural from 1978 on. The household survey does not distinguish 
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between current and capital expenditures of households (counting both as consumption). We use the 
household survey-based measure of saving, nevertheless, as it gives the most accurate picture of household 
savings rates.46  
As far as our dataset and the dataset of Modigliani and Cao overlap, we find substantially different 
savings rates (see Figure 3).  As Kraay (2000) points out, since 1986 the change in household saving deposits 
exceeded household savings by a large and rising margin. China’s rapid financial sector development since 
the initiation of economic reforms in 1978 improved households’ access to banking institutions, especially in 
rural areas.47  
Also, in the late 1980s and early 1990s inflation-indexed saving deposits offering very attractive 
real returns were made available to households, and there is some evidence that significant volumes of 
corporate saving have illicitly found their way into these instruments. These two reasons probably account for 
the overestimation of savings from 1986 onward in asset-based measures of the savings rate like Modigliani 
and Cao’s.  
We start our analysis using a data set that includes both Modigliani and Cao’s data from 1953 – 
1977 and our data from 1978 – 2009. We used a dummy to account for a level shift in the data for the 
regressions. As we apply an error correction model, the first differences for this dummy only takes the value 
one in 1978. The coefficient for the first differences in the dummy was not significant, which is why it can be 
excluded from the analysis. However, we do include the dummy variable itself in the cointegration relation as 
within the cointegration relation it can make a difference. We also run the analysis on the dataset that 
stretches from 1978-2009, which allows us to distinguish between urban and rural effects. For our analysis we 
use exogenous variables similar to Modigliani and Cao (2004) and Horioka (2007), i.e. (disposable) income 
growth, the reciprocal of disposable income per capita, the age structure of the population and inflation and 
the 5-year income growth rate. We also include the deposit rate and the sex ratio for the dataset 1978 - 2009.  
Since data on distribution of disposable income and consumption expenditures are only available 
from 1985, and for urban households only, we run separate tests with this subsample. What catches the eye, 
though, is that income inequality is much higher in rural areas than in urban areas, even though average 
income in urban areas is higher. The fact that immigrants working in urban areas are tabulated as rural may 
account for that, or simply the fact that the income of the lowest income groups in rural areas in China is still 
very low.  
 Modigliani and Cao measure the long-term income growth trend by using the average annual rate 
of growth over the previous fourteen years (year one through year fifteen). Also, the savings rate of 
Modigliani and Cao is savings expressed as a share of gross income, while we employ the more commonly 
used savings as a share of disposable income. The national savings rate is construed on the basis of urban and 
rural disposable income and consumption expenditure per capita weighted by urban and rural population. 
 We define the savings rate simply by (income net of taxes - living expenditure)/living expenditure, 
and not by log(income net of taxes/living expenditure) as Chamon and Prasad (2011) and Wei and Zhang 
(2011) do. However, this does not lead to changes in the analysis as mathematically they are approximations 
of each other and the variations over time are similar. 
                                                
46 For an elaborate discussion see Kraay (2000). 
47 This also implies that the deposits-based measure of household saving understates actual household savings in the years before 1986. 
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Nominal disposable income is transformed into real disposable income using the CPI-index in the 
Statistical Yearbook (1978 = 100) and real disposable income growth is measured as the year-on-year 
percentage change. Average income growth is the geometric average of growth rates of the latest 5 years. For 
this we use the data before 1960 as well to get an average of the growth rates of the 5 years before 1960.  
 With regard to the age structure, the World Bank database includes national data expressed as a 
percentage of population age 14 or younger, age 15 – 64 and age 65 and higher starting 1960. For a 
breakdown into urban and rural we rely on census data that are interpolated using the national data on age 
structure and the population growth (decline) in urban/rural areas. The deposit rate from 1980 on is taken 
from the IMF-database, and the deposit rate for 1978 and 1979 we obtained from the People’s Bank of China. 
Data on sex ratios at the national level are taken from Wei and Zhang (2009). 
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
For the analysis we make use of an error correction model (ECM). Within this specific regression framework 
we include other exogenous variables next to the variables in the cointegration equation to find the effects on 
a savings rate. Therefore, the standard ADF-test for the residuals cannot be performed as the test-statistic 
follows a different unknown distribution. Hence, to investigate the presence of cointegration between the 
variables, we follow the method set out in Boswijk (1994) and use his critical values for the significance of 
the cointegrating factors.  
 
 4.1 National data 1960 – 2009 
In the table below, we have set out the results for the regression using the full sample of the data. We find that 
the cointegration relation is significant when we consider the averaged growth rate, following Modigliani and 
Cao (2004) (see Appendix 2A for the elaborate results where we show the cointegration relation is 
significant). The cointegration relation is therefore included in the regression through the ECM. From this we 
can derive that the savings rate is mean-reverting towards the long-run equilibrium defined by:  
 
. 
 
Then the deviation can be described by: 
 
.  
 
The C1-coefficient in front of the deviation in the previous period represents the adjustments in the next 
period for this deviation. It signifies that if the current value of the savings rate deviates from the equilibrium, 
the savings rate will have a tendency to correct for this in the following periods. The coefficient for Real 
Income Averaged Growth is positive in this case. Increases in growth will correspond with proportional 
increases in savings. We can additionally see that the old-age ratio plays a large role in both the long-term 
equilibrium as well as short-term effects.  
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 The reciprocal is also significant in explaining the short-term movements. As explained in 
Modigliani and Cao, only including a constant and the reciprocal of income per capita would correspond with 
the standard Keynesian model where the national saving ratio rises as per-capita income rises within a 
country in the form: 
 
 , implying .  
 
Intuitively, the negative coefficient here implies that an increase in Real Income PC leads to a smaller value 
of the reciprocal, thus to an increase in the savings rate. However, as we consider the reciprocal, for large 
incomes this effect becomes increasingly smaller on the marginal. The reasoning is that people with low 
incomes may not be capable to save sufficiently for their old age as a large part of their income goes to their 
current living expenses, in comparison with higher incomes. When they start earning more, they will be able 
to save more.  
 
Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
 
 
 
where D(·) signifies the first differences function. 
 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
-16.89 Constant (-4.62) 
-0.61 C1 (-4.78) 
3.87 C3 (Old)  (10.28) 
5.66 Cdummy (4.59) 
0.32 C11 (3.08) 
13.98 D(Old) (4.14) 
-3478.67 D((Real Income PC)-1) (-7.79) 
R² 0.71 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 1.94 
Corresponding P-value 0.93 
We have tested for the significance of the initial cointegration relation through a Wald test. As the Wald test does not 
have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropriate critical values from Boswijk  (1994). For the elaborate 
regression results, see Appendix 2A. 
 
 
 
61 
4.2 National data 1978 – 2009 
We have set out the results for the smaller sample of the national data in the table below. We again find that 
the cointegration relation is significant when we consider the averaged growth rate (see Appendix 2B for the 
elaborate results where we show the significance of the cointegration relation). The cointegration relation is 
therefore again included in the regression through an ECM and the coefficient for this relationship similarly 
has a negative sign. In contrast to the previous regression, the young-age ratio is relevant for this specific 
time-period for the cointegrating relationship and it also has short-term effects.  Again the old-age ratio is 
relevant and has a positive sign. The reciprocal of Real Income PC has a similar negative effect on the 
savings rate for this period as for the whole sample. Additionally, we find a negative, rather than positive 
effect of the averaged growth rate in the cointegrating relationship.  
 
Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
 
 
 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.27 Constant (5.43) 
-0.64 C1 (-4.96) 
-0.83 C2 (Young) (-8.21) 
-0.58 C11 (-2.42) 
-2.05 D(Young) (-2.32) 
28.58 D(Old) (3.86) 
-184.03 D((Real Income PC)-1) (-5.07) 
R² 0.70 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 5.80 
Corresponding P-value 0.33 
We have tested for the significance of the initial cointegration relation through a Wald test. As the Wald test does not 
have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropiate critical values from Boswijk  (1994). For the elaborate 
regression results, see Appendix 2B. 
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4.3  Urban data 1978 - 2009 
When we consider a subsample where only the urban population is included we find the results set out in the 
table below. The cointegrating relation here does not include averaged income growth (See Appendix 2C for 
the complete results). Similar to the results for the complete sample, we can find that the old-age ratio plays a 
role in the cointegration relationship and has a positive effect on the long run. The young-age ratio has a 
negative effect, which is different from the effect we have seen for the smaller sample in the previous section. 
However, the effect from the reciprocal of Real Income PC again is the same as we have previously seen for 
the different samples.   
 
Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
 
 
 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Urban Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
-0.25 Constant (-3.59) 
-0.89 C1 (-4.90) 
6.06 C2 (Urban Old) (10.40) 
3.12 D(Urban Young) (3.65) 
-128.27 D((Urban Real Income PC)-1) (-2.81) 
R² 0.57 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 8.45 
Corresponding P-value 0.21 
We have tested for the significance of the initial cointegration relation through a Wald test. As the Wald test does not 
have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropiate critical values from Boswijk  (1994). For the elaborate 
regression results, see Appendix 2C. 
 
 
4.4 Rural data 1978 - 2009 
When looking at the results for the rural population we do not find a cointegrating relationship between the 
variables (See Appendix 2D for the complete results). Therefore, the cointegrating relation has not been 
included in the regression. We still find that the young-age ratio and the reciprocal of the Real Income PC 
have a significant effect on the savings rate for the rural population.  
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Regression results of the linear model to estimate the error correction terms (the cointegration relation 
was found not to be significant, so it is excluded from this regression) 
 
 
We have tested for the significance of the initial cointegration relation through a Wald test. As the Wald test does not 
have the regular χ 2-distribution, we have used the appropiate critical values from Boswijk  (1994). For the elaborate 
regression results, see Appendix 2D, where you can find that the cointegration relation is not significant. 
 
 
5. Comparing Our Results to Previous Studies 
Our findings, which show a long-term relationship between the savings rate and the age structure and the 
average income growth rate, lend only very weak support to the life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Cao, 
2004). The analysis they have performed considers only the long-term effects, as they have not used an error-
correction model (ECM) to account for the unit root in the level of the savings rate (S/Y).48 A unit root in the 
level of the savings rate entails that the following period starts approximately at the level of the previous 
period and incorporates a change from one period to another.49 This does make sense as household savings 
actually stay at their current level if households do not choose to adjust it. With an error correction model, we 
then try to model and explain the changes from one period to the next. The analysis of Modigliani and Cao 
also incorporates the stationary variables in the determination of the long-term relationship between the 
cointegrated variables. 
In contrast, we have implemented a single step estimation of the long run and short run relationships 
present through the use of the ECM, after establishing the presence of the cointegration relationship. This 
provides a more accurate analysis of how the variables actually affect the savings rate, while the R2 is 
informative about the part of the variation explained. Additionally, we find short-term effects of the age 
structure conflicting with the LCH and short-term effects of the reciprocal of the income level. Habit 
                                                
48 The results of the ADF-test for S/Y reported on p.156 of Modigliani and Cao (2004) are incorrect, as the columns with the outcomes 
for S/Y and ∆S/Y have been exchanged erroneously. S/Y does contain a unit root. 
49 The main implication of non-stationarity is that there is no long-term average, and so the variable therefore can take on any value, 
albeit in this case a value between 0 and 1. Our findings are in accordance with Jansen (1997) who finds for the large majority of 
countries that the national savings rate appears to be a non-stationary process, and Horioka (1997) who concludes that Japan’s household 
savings rate has a unit root. 
Variables (Dependent variable: 
ΔRural Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.02 0.02 Constant (0.74) (0.64) 
0.09 1.78*10-3 D(Rural Real Income PC Growth) (1.02) (0.46) 
-1.96*10-4 -2.03*10-4 D(Rural Real Income PC) (-0.91) (-0.88) 
2.05 1.80 D(Rural Young) (1.40) (1.12) 
0.49 0.60 D(Rural Old) (0.07) (0.09) 
0.02 -0.02 D(Inflation) (0.16) (-0.17) 
-79.90 -76.39 D((Rural Real Income PC)-1) (-2.47) (-2.07) 
-2.62*10-3 -2.26*10-3 D(Deposit Rate) (-0.68) (-0.56) 
R² 0.41 0.39 
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formation (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000) rather than the LCH probably accounts for the long run relation 
between the savings rate and average real disposable income growth per capita. 
Chamon and Prasad (2010) also dismiss the findings of Modigliani and Cao, pointing out that in 
2005 the saving curve by age group was u-shaped: younger and older generations (measured by the age of the 
head of household) saved a higher percentage of their income than the generations in between, while the LCH 
would predict a hump-shaped savings curve. This methodology is flawed. After all, one has to observe the 
savings rate of a certain generation over its lifetime to establish what the curvature of the saving curve is, 
instead of comparing the savings rate of different generations at a certain point in time as Chamon and Prasad 
do. If you plot the savings rate of the different generations over the course of Chamon and Prasad’s 15-year 
long sample (1990 – 2005), it is clear that the savings rate of each generation rises considerably during that 
period of time, and that the u-shape of Chamon and Prasad disappears like snow in summer (see Figure 4).  
What is interesting though is the last panel of Figure 3 that is included in Chamon and Prasad (2010). 
It shows that in 2005 average disposable income plotted over generations is also u-shaped, with the trough of 
the curve being the generation born in 1960 (head of household aged 45 in 2005). This “u-shaped” income 
curve provides a straightforward explanation for the “u-shaped” savings curve that Chamon and Prasad find. 
It suggests that the generation born around 1960 – during the Great Leap Forward and at the onset of the 
Cultural Revolution – has markedly less earning capacity than preceding and following generations. The 
Great Leap Forward resulted in the deadliest famine in the history of China and in the history of the world: 
estimates range from 16.5 million to 30 million deaths (Li and Yang, 2005). Because of the Cultural 
Revolution many schools remained closed throughout the late 1960s and universities were shut till 1973 
(Hewitt, 2008).  
Wei and Zhang (2011), who perform a cross-province panel analysis, find a positive relationship 
between the sex ratio and household savings rate and a negative relationship between household income 
growth and the savings rate. We have no explanation for the discrepancy between their findings and our 
findings. The key statistics presented by Wei and Zhang on disposable income per capita for China in table 12 
do not match our data. Wei and Zhang seem to have used nominal data on rural disposable household income 
per capita for their cross-province panel analysis, as they do not account for inflation at all. The variables may 
therefore contain a unit root and the process may be non-stationary. In that case the use of OLS can produce 
invalid estimates.  
More notably, Wei and Zhang find that the sex ratio has a larger effect on savings by urban 
households with a daughter than on savings by urban households with a son. Only after slicing and dicing the 
full sample, the sex ratio has a larger effect on savings by urban households with a son than on savings by 
urban households with a daughter, although the difference is still not statistically significant. Wei and Zhang 
successively remove households whose reported annual income or expenditure is less than ¥3000, the top and 
bottom 5 percent of households in terms of their savings rate, and families with no explicit information on the 
marital status of their children from their sample. In doing so, they reduce the overall sample size by half 
(from N = 769/766 to N = 384/399). 
Overall, urban households with a daughter have a fractionally higher propensity to save than urban 
households with a son. This undercuts the entire premise of Wei and Zhang’s exercise, which holds that 
households with a son increase savings in order to improve their son’s marital status. That the sex ratio has a 
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larger effect on savings by rural households with a son than on rural households with a daughter is of little 
solace. As we have argued before, the rural household savings rate and its determinants are hardly indicative 
for the overall household savings rate in China. 
 Horioka and Wan (2007) do not find evidence that variables relating to the age structure of the 
population have a significant impact on the household savings rate, while we find in most samples that both 
the young-age as well as the old-age dependency rate have an impact on the (urban) household savings rate. 
A possible explanation for this difference may be found in the fact that the time span of Horioka and Wan’s 
panel analysis is quite limited (1995 – 2004) and the age structure probably does not exhibit sufficient 
variation in such a short time interval to find relevant effects on the savings rate. This may also explain why 
the lagged savings rate has large explanatory power in Horioka and Wan (2007). Horioka and Terada (2011), 
using data on national savings rates in twelve Asian economies during the 1966 – 2007 period, conclude that 
the age structure of the population actually is an important determinant of the (national) savings rate. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
We started this paper by noting that China’s national savings rate was remarkably high by most standards. 
The high national savings rate reflects high savings in all three sectors – corporate, household and 
government (Ma and Yi, 2010). China is however not unique, as Carroll and Weil (2004) and Modigliani and 
Cao (2004) have pointed out before. China's trajectory over the past 30 years is actually quite similar to the 
experiences of – for example – Singapore and Malaysia, which also have average national savings rates of 
about 45 percent of GDP (Horioka and Terada, 2011). Emerging economies in Latin America, such as 
Argentine and Chile, have national savings rates close to 30 percent of GDP. 
 There are fewer data on household savings rates compared to national savings rates. Italy (1960–
70) and Japan (1971–80) had average household savings rates of 24.5 percent of disposable income, while the 
average household savings rate in China (2000 – 2009) was 24.6 percent of disposable income. The 
household savings rate in India was – at 32 percent of disposable income in 2008 – even 5 percentage points 
higher than in China. China’s national savings rate (expressed as a percentage of GDP) is nonetheless 20 
percentage points higher than India’s, due to much higher corporate savings (retained earnings) and higher 
government savings.50 Weak corporate governance structures, with many enterprises being (formerly) state-
owned enterprises, and underdeveloped financial markets are often cited as reasons that in China few 
dividends get distributed (Song, 2010).51 Another reason for high corporate savings may lie in the capital 
controls that are still in place, because of which foreign money has to be held at the People’s Bank of China. 
The capital controls result in forced savings, although we suggest that the forced savings are rather a by-
product than the aim of capital controls.  
 Studies that treat China as a unique case of a deviation from the textbook model therefore seem off 
the mark. In case a unique feature of China is used to explain China’s high household savings rate, the studies 
are (a) unscientific, in the sense that essentially one data point is being used, and (b) not very interesting even 
if true because they have no obvious applicability to any broader understanding of how the world works. 
                                                
50 The IMF’s World Economic Outlook projects India’s national savings rate to climb to 43 percent of GDP in 2016, while China’s 
national savings rate will remain above 50 percent of GDP.  
51 For a more elaborate discussion of corporate savings in China see Ma and Yi (2010). 
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China is only different than other emerging economies because its economy is vastly larger, and has gotten 
much more scrutiny because of its role in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing 
economic recession (Mees, 2011). 
 The fact that the conventional Keneysian savings model, which implies a long-run tendency for the 
savings rate to rise with income, may largely explain the Chinese household savings rate in the past 3 to 5 
decades, is best understood against the background of China as an emerging economy. There is evidence from 
developed countries that when income growth slows, savings rates decline. Italy and Japan’s household 
savings rates have dropped below 10 percent of disposable income. It suggests that China’s future household 
savings rate may largely depend on China’s GDP growth and household income growth. The latter will 
depend on labor productivity, as well as on the (empirical) question whether the Lewis turning point has been 
reached. Cai and Wang (2010) conclude that a trend of labor shortage is emerging, suggesting a coming 
Lewis turning point. Kuijs (2009), on the other hand, argues that it is unlikely that China has already 
exhausted its labor surplus since 40 percent of China’s employees are still employed in agriculture. If that 
were the case, household income growth could remain muted in the face of robust GDP growth. 
 Since the high household savings rate is in part prompted by precautionary savings motives, 
especially for old age, the successful implementation of credible retirement plans – as announced in The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) – may reduce the household savings rate. As many Chinese fear that 
their country will grow old before it grows rich, precautionary motives may continue to fuel household 
savings as a share of disposable income in the years to come. 
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Appendix 1   
 
 
Figure 1 Share of population 65+ (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNDP 
 
 
Figure  2 China’s household savings (in billion 1978 RMB)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
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Figure  3 Modigliani-Cao savings rate and Mees-Ahmed savings rate (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modigliani and Cao (2004), China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008, Statistical Yearbook 2010 
 
 
Figure  4 Savings rate of different generations (by year of birth) over time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Chamon and Prasad (2010) 52 
                                                
52 Data for 2005 are from the China National Bureau of Statistics, and data for 1990, 1995 and 2000 are estimates based on Chamon and 
Prasad (2010) as the authors were not willing to share their data in spite of repeated requests.   
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 Appendix 2 
 
A: National Data 1960-2009 
 
Table A.1: The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots within the variables. 
Variable ADF test-statistic P-value 
S/Y -0.342 0.911 
S/Y -8.347*** 0.000 
Real income pc growth -5.487*** 0.000 
Real income pc growth 5yrs -0.603 0.859 
Real income pc growth 5yrs -6.576*** 0.000 
Young -0.495 0.883 
Young -5.664*** 0.000 
Old 3.607 1.000 
Old -6.417*** 0.000 
Inflation -4.049*** 0.002 
***, ** and * signify rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. The lag lengths to be included are automatically selected based on the SIC.  
 
 
We can see here that the savings rate, the averaged income growth, young-age ratio and the old-age ratio 
contain a unit root. Therefore, we have to check in the ECM whether there is a cointegrating relationship 
present between these variables.  
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Table A.2: Regression result to test for the significance of the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent Variable: Savings Rate) Regular Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
-17.63 -17.73 Constant 
(-1.73) (-1.81) 
-0.48 -0.61 
Savings Ratet-1 (-3.68) (-4.27) 
0.08 0.04 
Youngt-1  (0.92) (0.50) 
1.77 2.08 
Oldt-1 (2.21) (2.61) 
5.15 4.78 
Dummyt-1 (2.39) (2.13) 
Real Income Growtht-1  0.18 
  (1.36) 
0.92 2.30 
D(Dummy) 
(0.37) (1.02) 
0.05 -0.07 
D(Real Income PC Growth) 
(0.95) (-0.40) 
0.01 0.01 
D(Real Income PC) 
(1.10) (0.89) 
-0.08 0.30 
D(Young) 
(-0.20) (0.73) 
12.31 14.31 
D(Old) 
(3.09) (3.52) 
0.03 0.02 
D(Inflation) 
(0.62) (0.45) 
-2378.38 -3092.04 
D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-2.99) (-3.84) 
R² 0.70  0.72 
Wald test on significance of the error correction 
variables53 14.35 19.70*  
* signifies rejection of the null hypothesis of no presence of a cointegration relation at the 10% significance level.  
   
For the regression in which we include one year growth we have looked at the following regression:  
 
where D(·) signifies the first differences function.  
In contrast, for the regression in which we include the five-year averaged growth we have looked at the 
following regression where we include a cointegration relation, which was significant as is visible in table 
A.2:  
 
                                                
53 As the Wald test does not have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropriate critical values from Boswijk, 
H. Peter (1994), “Testing for an unstable root in conditional and structural error correction models.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 63, pp 37-60. 
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We have looked at the significance of the cointegrating relation through the use of a Wald-test, where the 
critical values are taken from Boswijk (1994). The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation has been 
rejected at the 10% significance level when using the averaged growth rate. We therefore include this 
cointegrating relation in a non-linear model and estimate the corresponding coefficients.  
 
Table A.3: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
Variable: Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
-0.45 -17.73 Constant 
(-1.29) (-1.81) 
 -0.61 C1  (-4.27) 
 0.07 C2 (Young)  (0.49) 
 3.40 C3 (Old)  (3.36) 
 7.81 Cdummy  (2.20) 
 0.29 C11   (1.53) 
-0.05 2.30 Cdummy2 (D(Dummy)) (-0.02) (1.02) 
0.06 -0.07 C4 (D(Real Income PC Growth)) (1.23) (-0.40) 
1.69*10-3 0.01 C5 (D(Real Income PC)) (0.32) (0.89) 
0.21 0.30 C6 (D(Young)) (0.74) (0.73) 
5.41 14.31 C7 (D(Old)) (1.86) (3.52) 
-9.53*10-3 0.02 C8 (D(Inflation)) (-0.20) (0.45) 
-3280.47 -3092.04 C9 (D((Real Income PC)-1)) (-4.30) (-3.84) 
R² 0.58 0.72 
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After removing the variables with the lowest t-statistics, one by one we get the following regression, with the 
test of the joint significance of the removed variables. We see that the tests return that the removed variables 
do not have coefficients that significantly deviate from zero. 
 
Table A.4: Regression results of the linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent variable: 
Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
-0.49 Constant 
(-1.69) 
0.07 D(Real Income PC) 
(2.09) 
5.24 D(Old) 
(2.30) 
-3006.81 D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-4.87) 
R² 0.57 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 0.69 
Corresponding P-value 0.95 
 
Table A.5: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
-16.89 Constant 
(-4.62) 
-0.61 C1 (-4.78) 
3.87 C3 (Old)  (10.28) 
5.66 Cdummy (4.59) 
0.32 C11 (3.08) 
13.98 D(Old) 
(4.14) 
-3478.67 D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-7.79) 
R² 0.71 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 1.94 
Corresponding P-value 0.93 
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B: National Data 1978-2009 
 
Table B.1: The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots within the variables. 
Variable 
ADF test-
statistic 
P-
value 
S/Y -2.178 0.485 
S/Y -6.079*** 0.000 
Real income pc growth -2.318 0.173 
Real income pc growth -10.435*** 0.000 
Real income pc growth 5yrs -2.472 0.133 
Real income pc growth 5yrs -2.669* 0.093 
Young -3.314* 0.085 
Young -4.869*** 0.001 
Old -0.889 0.944 
Old -5.985*** 0.000 
***, ** and * signify rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. The lag lengths to be included are automatically selected based on the SIC.  
 
 
The savings rate, real income growth, the averaged income growth, young-age ratio and the old-age ratio 
contain a unit root. Therefore, we have to check in the ECM whether there is a cointegrating relationship 
present between these variables.  
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Table B.2: Regression result to test for the significance of the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent Variable: Savings Rate) Regular Averaged 
0.36 0.87 Constant 
(-1.43) (3.75) 
-0.67 -0.63 
Savings Ratet-1 (-3.06) (-3.94) 
-0.54 -1.18 
Youngt-1  (-1.98) (-4.22) 
-1.13 -4.61 
Oldt-1 (-0.56) (-2.58) 
Real Income Growtht-1  0.02 
  (0.11) 
-0.05 -1.13 
D(Real Income PC Growth) 
(-0.52) (-3.10) 
1.12*10-4 1.26*10-4 
D(Real Income PC) 
(-0.45) (0.59) 
-3.28 -5.06 
D(Young) 
(-1.69) (-3.35) 
34.62 58.42 
D(Old) 
(1.88) (3.84) 
-0.03 0.01 
D(Inflation) 
(-0.37) (0.09) 
-124.56 1.83*10-3 
D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-1.88) (0.78) 
5.79*10-4 -265.73 
D(Deposit Rate) 
(-0.20) (-4.09) 
R² 0.63  0.78 
Wald test on significance of the error correction 
variables54 12.22* 36.56***  
*** and * signify rejection of the null hypothesis of no presence of a cointegration relation at the 1% and 10% 
significance levels respectively.   
 
For the regression in which we include one-year growth we have looked at the following regression, where 
we include the significant cointegrating relation:  
 
 
In contrast, for the regression in which we include the five-year averaged growth we have looked at the 
following regression where we include a cointegration relation, which was significant as is visible in table 
B.2:  
 
 
                                                
54 As the Wald test does not have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropriate critical values from Boswijk, 
H. Peter (1994), “Testing for an unstable root in conditional and structural error correction models.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 63, pp 37-60. 
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We have looked at the significance of the cointegrating relation through the use of a Wald-test, where the 
critical values are taken from Boswijk (1994). The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation has been 
rejected at the 1% (10% respectively) significance level when using the averaged growth rate (real income 
growth rate). We therefore include this cointegrating relation in a non-linear model and estimate the 
corresponding coefficients.  
 
Table B.3: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
Variable: Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.36 0.87 Constant 
(1.43) (3.75) 
-0.67 -0.63 C1 (-3.06) (-3.94) 
-0.81 -1.86 C2 (Young) (-2.01) (-3.20) 
-1.7 -7.27 C3 (Old) (-0.58) (-2.24) 
 0.03 C11   (0.11) 
-0.05 -1.13 D(Real Income PC Growth) 
(-0.52) (-3.10) 
1.12*10-4 1.26*10-4 D(Real Income PC) 
(0.45) (0.59) 
-3.28 -5.06 D(Young) 
(-1.69) (-3.35) 
34.62 58.42 D(Old) 
(1.88) (3.84) 
-0.03 5.24*10-3 D(Inflation) 
(-0.37) (0.09) 
-124.56 -265.73 D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-1.88) (-4.09) 
5.59*10-4 1.83*10-3 D(Deposit Rate) 
(0.20) (0.78) 
R² 0.63 0.78 
 
After removing the variables with the lowest t-statistics, one by one we get the following regression, with the 
test of the joint significance of the removed variables. We can again see that the removed variables do not 
have coefficients that significantly deviate from zero. 
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Table B.4: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
0.23 Constant 
(4.29) 
-0.62 C1 (-4.28) 
-0.68 C2 (Young) (-8.12) 
-2.69 D(Young) 
(-2.79) 
27.19 D(Old) 
(3.31) 
-92.77 D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-4.20) 
R² 0.59 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 0.59 
Corresponding P-value 0.99 
 
 
Table B.5: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients (Dependent 
variable: Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.27 Constant 
(5.43) 
-0.64 C1 (-4.96) 
-0.83 C2 (Young) (-8.21) 
-0.58 C11 (-2.42) 
-2.05 D(Young) 
(-2.32) 
28.58 D(Old) 
(3.86) 
-184.03 D((Real Income PC)-1) 
(-5.07) 
R² 0.70 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 5.80 
Corresponding P-value 0.33 
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C: Urban Data 1978-2009 
 
Table C.1: The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots within the variables 
for the urban population 
Variable 
ADF test-
statistic P-value 
Urban S/Y -2.290 0.425 
Urban S/Y -3.365** 0.021 
Urban Real Income pc growth -4.398*** 0.002 
Urban Real Income pc 5 yr growth -1.324 0.601 
Urban Real Income pc 5 yr growth -3.660** 0.012 
Urban Young -3.260* 0.093 
Urban Old55 -0.206 - 
Urban Old47 -1.624* - 
***, ** and * signify rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. The lag lengths to be included are automatically selected based on the SIC information criterion.  
 
 
Also for the urban population we can see that the savings rate, the averaged income growth and the old-age 
ratio contain a unit root. Therefore, we have to check in the ECM whether there is a cointegrating relationship 
present between these variables.  
                                                
55 To increase the power for this test, we have used the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares test proposed by  Elliott, 
Graham, Thomas J. Rothenberg and James H. Stock (1996), "Efficient Tests For An Autoregressive Unit Root" 
Econometrica, v64 (4,Jul), pp. 813-836. Using this test only leads to different results for the Urban Old variable. Note that 
the way we have performed this test does not give us a P-value. 
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Table C.2: Regression result to test for the significance of the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent variable: Urban Savings Rate) Regular Averaged 
-0.29 -0.27 Constant 
(-3.60) (-3.10) 
-1.31 -1.21 
Urban Savings Ratet-1 (-5.84) (-5.97) 
6.33 5.99 
Urban Oldt-1 (4.97) (4.39) 
 -0.03 
Urban Real Income Growtht-1  (-0.16) 
-0.08 -0.19 
D(Urban Real Income PC Growth) 
(-0.91) (-0.57) 
1.78*10-4 1.54*10-4 
D(Urban Real Income PC) 
(1.75) (1.54) 
2.35 2.27 
D(Urban Young) 
(2.58) (2.19) 
14.37 13.52 
D(Urban Old) 
(2.39) (2.19) 
-0.08 -0.06 
D(Inflation) 
(-1.12) (-0.78) 
-170.29 -160.92 
D((Urban Real Income PC)-1) 
(-2.38) (-2.18) 
-7.85*10-4 -2.09*10-4 
D(Deposit Rate) 
(-0.27) (-0.07) 
R² 0.78  0.78 
Wald test on significance of the error correction 
variables56 36.31*** 37.31***  
*** signifies rejection of the null hypothesis of no presence of a cointegration relation at the 1% significance level.   
 
For the regression in which we include one-year growth we have looked at the following regression:  
 
 
 
Similarly, for the regression in which we include the five-year averaged growth we have looked at the 
following regression:  
 
 
 
                                                
56 As the Wald test does not have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropriate critical values from Boswijk, 
H. Peter (1994), “Testing for an unstable root in conditional and structural error correction models.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 63, pp 37-60. 
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The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation has been rejected at the 1% significance level in both cases. 
The cointegrating relation therefore turns out to be significant and should be included in the ECM.  
 
Table C.3: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
 
 
 
After removing the variables with the lowest t-statistics, one by one we get the following regression, with the 
test of the joint significance of the removed variables. Again the removed variables when using the averaged 
growth rate in the regression do not have coefficients significantly different from zero and therefore can be 
excluded in the regression. 
 
 
 
 
Variables, or coefficients  
(Dependent variable: Urban 
Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
-0.29 -0.30 Constant 
(-3.60) (-3.29) 
-1.31 -1.33 C1 (-5.84) (-5.63) 
4.83 4.98 C2 (Urban Old) (6.42) (5.92) 
 -0.05 C11   (-0.41) 
-0.08 -0.11 D(Urban Real Income PC Growth) 
(-0.91) (-0.95) 
1.78*10-4 1.78*10-4 D(Urban Real Income PC) 
(1.75) (1.71) 
2.35 2.18 D(Urban Young) 
(2.58) (2.15) 
14.37 14.71 D(Urban Old) 
(2.39) (2.37) 
-0.08 -0.09 D(Inflation) 
(-1.12) (-1.17) 
-170.29 -180.52 D((Urban Real Income PC)-1) 
(-2.38) (-2.33) 
-7.85*10-4 -7.01*10-4 D(Deposit Rate) 
(-0.27) (-0.23) 
R² 0.78 0.78 
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Table C.4: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients  (Dependent 
variable: Urban Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
-0.23 Constant 
(-2.74) 
-1.28 C1 (-6.79) 
4.28 C2 (Urban Old) (6.44) 
2.20*10-4 D(Urban Real Income PC) 
(2.94) 
1.75 D(Urban Young) 
(2.13) 
16.57 D(Urban Old) 
(2.79) 
R² 0.67 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 8.74 
Corresponding P-value 0.07 
 
Table C.5: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables, or coefficients  (Dependent 
variable: Urban Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
-0.25 Constant 
(-3.59) 
-0.89 C1 (-4.90) 
6.06 C2 (Urban Old) (10.40) 
 C11  
3.12 D(Urban Young) (3.65) 
-128.27 D((Urban Real Income PC)-1) 
(-2.81) 
R² 0.57 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 8.45 
Corresponding P-value 0.21 
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D: Rural Data 1978-2009 
 
Table D.1: The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots within the Rural 
variables. 
Variable 
ADF test-
statistic P-value 
Rural S/Y -1.571 0.485 
Rural S/Y -4.629*** 0.001 
Rural Real Income pc growth -3.315** 0.023 
Rural Real Income pc growth 5yr -2.472 0.133 
Rural Real Income pc growth 5yr -3.469*** 0.001 
Rural Young -3.252* 0.094 
Rural Old -2.430 0.358 
Rural Old -2.782* 0.073 
***, ** and * signify rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. The lag lengths to be included are automatically selected based on the SIC.  
 
 
Similarly, for the rural population we can see that the savings rate, the averaged income growth and the old-
age ratio contain a unit root. Therefore, we have to check in the ECM whether there is a cointegrating 
relationship present between these variables.  
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Table D.2: Regression result to test for the significance of the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent variable: Rural Savings Rate) Regular Averaged 
-0.01 -0.05 Constant 
(-0.14) (-0.57) 
-0.16 -0.27 
Rural Savings Ratet-1 (-1.09) (-1.31) 
0.47 0.00 
Rural Oldt-1 (0.51) (0.55) 
 1.07 
Rural Real Income Growtht-1  (0.86) 
0.05 2.57*10-3 
D(Rural Real Income PC Growth) 
(0.56) (0.41) 
-1.87*10-4 0.00 
D(Rural Real Income PC) 
(-0.41) (-0.69) 
1.17 1.12 
D(Rural Young) 
(0.66) (0.60) 
3.85 3.92 
D(Rural Old) 
(0.46) (0.46) 
0.03 -8.86*10-5 
D(Inflation) 
(0.30) (0.00) 
-70.57 -64.24 
D((Rural Real Income PC)-1) 
(-1.50) (-1.18) 
-3.83*10-3 -3.63*10-3 
D(Deposit Rate) 
(-0.94) (-0.83) 
R² 0.45  0.45 
Wald test on significance of the error correction 
variables57 1.27 1.97  
The wald test, using the appropiate critical values does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no presence of a 
cointegration relation at the 10% significance levels.  
 
For the regression in which we include one year growth we have looked at the following regression:  
 
 
 
Similarly, for the regression in which we include the five-year averaged growth we have looked at the 
following regression:  
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 As the Wald test does not have the regular 2-distribution, we have used the appropriate critical values from Boswijk, 
H.Peter. (1994). “Testing for an unstable root in conditional and structural error correction models.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 63 , pp 37-60. 
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The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relation has not been rejected at the 10% significance level in both 
cases. The cointegrating relation does not turn out to be significant and should not be included in the ECM. 
We, therefore, only need to estimate a linear model in both cases.  
 
Table D.3: Regression results of the linear model to estimate the error correction terms, the 
cointegration relation was found not to be significant, so it is excluded from this regression 
 
 
 
After removing the variables with the lowest t-statistics, one by one we get the following regression, with the 
test of the joint significance of the removed variables. The test for the joint significance of deviation of the 
coefficients of the removed variables from zero does not turn out to be larger than the critical values. 
Therefore, these do not significantly deviate from zero and can be excluded from the regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables (Dependent variable: 
Rural Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.02 0.02 Constant 
(0.74) (0.64) 
0.09 1.78*10-3 D(Rural Real Income PC 
Growth) (1.02) (0.46) 
-1.96*10-4 -2.03*10-4 D(Rural Real Income PC) 
(-0.91) (-0.88) 
2.05 1.80 D(Rural Young) 
(1.40) (1.12) 
0.49 0.60 D(Rural Old) 
(0.07) (0.09) 
0.02 -0.02 D(Inflation) 
(0.16) (-0.17) 
-79.90 -76.39 D((Rural Real Income PC)-1) 
(-2.47) (-2.07) 
-2.62*10-3 -2.26*10-3 D(Deposit Rate) 
(-0.68) (-0.56) 
R² 0.41 0.39 
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Table D.4: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
Variables (Dependent variable: 
Rural Savings Rate) 
Regular 
Growth 
0.02 Constant 
(1.92) 
2.08 D(Rural Young) 
(2.84) 
-73.23 D((Rural Real Income PC)-1) 
(3.93) 
R² 0.36 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 2.78 
Corresponding P-value 0.73 
 
 
Table D.5: Regression results of the non-linear model to estimate the error correction terms 
 
Variables (Dependent variable: 
Rural Savings Rate) 
Averaged 
Growth 
0.02 Constant 
(1.92) 
2.08 D(Rural Young) 
(2.84) 
-73.23 D((Rural Real Income PC)-1) 
(3.93) 
R² 0.36 
Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of the removed variables 1.88 
Corresponding P-value 0.87 
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IV Are Individuals in China Prone to Money Illusion?* 
 
 
“It isn’t the sum you get, it’s how much you can buy with it, that’s the important thing; and 
it’s that that tells whether your wages are high in fact or only high in name.”  
Mark Twain A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The term “money illusion” refers to a tendency to think in terms of nominal monetary values rather than real 
monetary values. The relevant literature presents various experiments to establish whether people are subject 
to money illusion, and various potential psychological causes that underlie this phenomenon. In this paper we 
examine how respondents in Beijing, China, respond to changes in inflation and prices, using the 
questionnaire designed and implemented by Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997).  
We set out to examine whether there is money illusion in China. In addition, we examine whether 
respondents in China tend to think in different terms about economic transactions than respondents in the 
United States, where the original questionnaire was held. Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) conclude on 
the basis of the responses to the survey that money illusion is a widespread phenomenon in the United States. 
As (an unexpected bout of) inflation hurts creditors and aids debtors, we expect respondents in China, which 
is a creditor nation, to be less susceptible to money illusion than respondents in the United States, which is a 
debtor nation (Okimoto, 2009).  
Our survey-based findings suggest that money illusion is prevalent in China just like in the United 
States. However, respondents in our sample are in general less prone to money illusion than respondents in 
the sample of Shafir et al. If asked explicitly to evaluate an economic transaction in terms of happiness or 
satisfaction, respondents in our sample are as likely as respondents in Shafir et al.’s sample to prefer the 
transaction with the highest nominal monetary value instead of the economic transaction with the highest real 
monetary value.  
As recent research shows that money illusion may play a much greater and more disruptive role in 
the economy than economists have allowed for in the past, both with regard to the functioning of the labor 
market (Mees, 2011) as well as the housing market (Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008), Bernanke (2010)), it is 
important to shed further light on the phenomenon in all its forms, and its implications for economic theory. 
The outline of our paper is as follows. We first give a review of the relevant economic literature on 
money illusion. Next, in Section 3, we discuss potential occurrences of money illusion in China. Section 4 
deals with the main contribution of our study, which is the survey and the responses, for which we 
interviewed many Chinese individuals. This unique dataset allows us to answer the question in the title. In 
Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of the main results, the implications for economic theory and we 
suggest avenues for further research.  
 
                                                
* Together with Philip Hans Franses 
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2. Existing Literature  
In the early ‘20s John Maynard Keynes coined the term ‘money illusion’ to describe the tendency of people to 
be fooled by thinking in nominal rather than real terms, ignoring the effect of inflation on the purchasing 
power of money. A few years later Irving Fisher devoted an entire book to the subject (Fisher, 1928). But 
even though money illusion was recognized early on in the economic literature (see also Leontief (1936) and 
Patinkin (1965)), mainstream economists have generally considered money illusion an anathema, as the 
phenomenon is irreconcilable with the rational expectations postulate (Fehr and Tyran, 2001, page 1239).  
That did, however, not prevent Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) from drafting a fascinating 
questionnaire and collecting evidence that people often tend to think about economic transactions in both 
nominal and real terms, resulting in a bias toward a nominal evaluation. Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) 
conclude on the basis of the responses to their survey that money illusion is a widespread phenomenon in the 
United States. 
There have also been more experimental approaches to money illusion. Using a pricing game with 
students in Switzerland as participants, Fehr and Tyran (2001) show that seemingly innocuous differences in 
payoff representation cause pronounced differences in nominal price inertia, indicating the behavioral 
importance of money illusion. Moreover, money illusion causes asymmetric effects of negative and positive 
nominal shocks. While nominal inertia is rather small after a positive shock, it is quite substantial after a 
negative shock. This may account for downward wage stickiness in the U.S. in the 2000s (Mees, 2011). 
Noussair, Richter, and Tyran (2008) find an asymmetry in the price response to inflationary and deflationary 
nominal shocks in a laboratory asset market situation as well. 
Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) show that a reduction in inflation can fuel run-ups in housing 
prices if people suffer from money illusion. They mistakenly assume that real and nominal interest rates move 
in lockstep. Hence, they wrongly attribute a decrease in inflation to a decline in the real interest rate and 
consequently underestimate the real cost of future mortgage payments. According to Brunnermeier and 
Julliard (2008), inflation and nominal interest rates explain a large share of the mispricing in the British 
housing market from 1966 to 2004. 
Bernanke (2010) asserts that mortgages with exotic features, which lowered monthly mortgage 
installments significantly, are to blame for the U.S. housing boom in the 2000s. This suggests not so much 
money illusion on the part of economic subjects, but rather money delusion. Regardless of the veracity of 
Bernanke’s claim (mortgages with exotic features accounted for less than 5 percent of total mortgage 
originations from 2000 – 2006 (Mees, 2011)), Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) find for the United States a 
similar link between housing market mispricing and inflation as for the United Kingdom.  
Liu (2010) suggests that money illusion may account to a large extent for the mechanism of sharp 
run-ups in stock prices during the low inflation period in China. Chinese investors failed to recognize that the 
nominal dividend growth rate would drop significantly, and estimated the value of the future nominal 
dividend growth rate simply by extrapolating the historical nominal dividend growth rate. According to Liu, 
long-term low inflation spurred China’s stock market to rise sharply twice via the money illusion effect last 
decade.  
In view of the findings of Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008), Bernanke (2010) and Liu (2010), money 
illusion may be of greater economic significance than most mainstream economists allow for, because of the 
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interaction between the housing market, stock market and the real economy. Given its potential impact on the 
functioning of the economy, it is of interest to see whether money illusion also holds for China.  
 
 
3.  The Occurrence of Money Illusion in China 
Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) distinguish three phenomena in the real economy that suggest the 
existence of money illusion on the part of economic subjects.58 One is that prices are sticky. A second is that 
indexing does not occur in contracts and laws in times of relatively low inflation, as theory would predict. 
The third occurrence is through conversation, rather than behavior, that is, people talk and write in ways that 
seem to indicate some confusion between money’s nominal and real value. We would like to add a fourth 
phenomenon to the previous ones, which occurs at the intersection of asset markets and the real economy, and 
that is that parameters from the real economy (interest, dividends) are used as yardsticks for asset pricing. 
Within the context of China, which still has abundant characteristics of a centrally planned economy, 
price stickiness may primarily be the result of price and quantity controls.59 Kim, Nan, Wan and Wu (2011), 
for example, find that significant price stickiness exists for U.S. imports from China. The mean duration is 11 
months compared to 7 months for China imports from the United States. The price stickiness of U.S. imports 
from China however declined after June 2005, when China switched from a fixed exchange rate regime to a 
managed floating one (Kim et al. (2011). 
 Compared to the United States and Europe, you find in China less indexed contracts, which should 
not come as a complete surprise as China is still very much an economy in transition. As noted by Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky (1997), even in developed economies you do not find indexed contracts in nearly as 
many places as economic theory suggests they should be found. As China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. 
Treasuries and agency bonds, it is worthwhile to note that only few are so-called treasury inflation-protected 
securities (TIPS) that hold their value as inflation rises.60  
 With regard to stock markets, Liu (2010) suggests that money illusion played a major role in the 
sharp run-ups in Chinese stock prices. There is not similar research available for China’s still young housing 
market, which is often deemed to be in bubble-territory. Since the traditional regime of welfare-oriented 
home distribution was terminated in 1998 and the housing market was liberalized, mortgage loans have 
become the primary home financing tool for Chinese citizens. Though Hong and Chen (2010) conclude that 
there is a strong correlation between mortgage credit and housing prices, the variation in inflation and 
mortgage rates over 10 years is insufficient to find a link between housing market mispricing and inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
58 See Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) for an in-depth discussion of money illusion in the US. 
59 In an attempt to dampen inflation, the Chinese government in 2010 announced price controls and said it would put state commodity 
reserves (grains, edible oils and sugar) on the market when necessary in order to guarantee supplies (China Daily, November 17, 2010). 
In May 2011 Unilever got fined $300,000 for simply talking about plans to raise prices (Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 2011). 
60 The US Treasury Department, responding to growing demand from China and other investors, announced in August 2009 that it would 
boost the sale of inflation-protected bonds (Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2009). 
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4. The Survey 
In this section we will examine whether money illusion is prevalent in China as well. For that purpose we 
replicate a well-established survey, which was implemented in Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997). We 
translated the survey questions designed by Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) to (simplified) Chinese, 
using Chinese names and adapting prices and dates to present respondents with realistic choices in the context 
of Beijing anno 2011. Shafir, Diamond and Tversky collected responses from people in Newark International 
Airport and in two New Jersey shopping malls. In addition, they surveyed undergraduate students at 
Princeton University. As the responses from these groups did not differ significantly, Shafir, Diamond and 
Tversky reported the data in a combined format.  
We collected responses from undergraduate students from the economic departments at Peking 
University (1/2) and Tsinghua University in Beijing (1/4), as well as from workers at Alibaba, a tech 
company with a large office in Beijing (1/4).61 The undergraduate students were about 19 – 21 years old and 
the Alibaba workers were in their mid twenties and early thirties. The students were of both sexes, while the 
majority of Alibaba workers were male.  
The survey questions were in part handed out on paper sheets (3/4) and in part collected through an 
Internet survey tool (1/4). More than 400 respondents participated in the survey. For each problem below we 
will report the exact number of respondents. Where appropriate, respondents were presented with only one 
version of the problem at hand. With respect to problem 1, for example, we asked one group of respondents to 
make a decision based on economic terms, another group of respondents to make a decision in terms of 
happiness and still another group of respondents to make a decision based on job attractiveness. Problem 4 
was presented in six different versions to six different groups. For each (version of a) problem we had at least 
as many respondents as for the original 1997 survey, but often we had many more respondents than Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky (1997).  
Although neither sample is representative of the respective general populations, we believe that it is 
nonetheless worthwhile to compare the results of Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) with our results. Shafir 
et al. indicate that their sample is drawn from people in New Jersey shopping malls and Newark airport as 
well as from undergraduate students at Princeton University without specifying the number of respondents in 
each group.62 Since general background information such as gender, age and profession is lacking in their 
study, we cannot determine the differences between their and our sample using statistical tests. The fact that 
respondents in China and in the United States respond in virtually the same way to two specific questions 
pertaining to job satisfaction (see problem 1 and 7), may serve as an indication that the samples are in fact 
comparable. 
 We test the differences between the scores for the United States and China by using the following 
test. Denote p2 as the relevant fraction in the sample of size N2 (China) and p1 as the associated fraction in the 
sample of size N1 (U.S.). Further, denote p as the relevant total fraction in the total sample N1+N2. The test 
statistic is then given by 
                                                
61 We decided not to collect responses in public places, as it was highly unlikely that we would get official clearance from Chinese 
authorities amid the popular uprisings in the Arab world at the time.  
62 A repeated request to the authors for information about the number of respondents in each group was left unanswered.   
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Each time we evaluate the fractions for China relative to the fractions for the U.S., assuming that it each time 
deals with a binary choice. We indicate significant differences at the 5% level with a * and at the 1% level 
with **.  To test whether the scores for China amount to randomness with a probability 0.5 in case of two 
choice options and 0.33 in case of three, we use the familiar test. We indicate significant differences at the 5% 
level with a + and at the 1% level with ++.    
 
A. Earnings 
The following survey presented three different groups of subjects with a scenario involving two individuals 
who receive raises in salary. One group was asked to rate the two protagonists’ salary raises on purely 
“economic terms;” a second group was asked to indicate which of the two they thought would be happier; the 
third group was asked to indicate which of the two was more likely to leave her present job for another 
position. (To the right of each option is the percentage of subjects who chose it, while the percentage in 
parentheses reflects the U.S.-based results given by Shafir, Diamond and Tversky). 
 
Problem 1 
Consider two individuals, Li Li and Wang Lan, who graduated from the same college a 
year apart. Upon graduation, both took similar jobs with publishing firms. Li Li started with 
a yearly salary of ¥120,000. During her first year on the job there was no inflation, and in 
her second year Li Li received a 2% (¥2400) rise in salary. Wang Lan also started with a 
yearly salary of ¥120,000. During her first year on the job there was 4% inflation, and in 
her second year Wang Lan received a 5% (¥6000) rise in salary. 
 
Economic terms (N=137): 
As they entered their second year on the job, who was doing better in economic terms? 
Li Li:   82% (++)   (71%)* Wang Lan:     18%(++)   (29%)*    
 
Happiness (N=138): 
As they entered their second year on the job, who do you think was happier? 
Li Li: 39%(+)  (36%)  Wang Lan:     61%(+)     (64%) 
 
Job attractiveness (N=134): 
As they entered their second year on the job, each received a job offer from another firm. 
Who do you think was more likely to leave her present position for another job? 
Li Li:   65%(++)   (65%)  Wang Lan:     35%(++)   (35%) 
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Just as in Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), the majority of respondents correctly evaluate the above 
scenario in real rather than in nominal terms when economic terms are emphasized. However, significantly 
more respondents in China than in the United States (82% versus 71%) were likely to evaluate the scenario 
correctly, suggesting that respondents in China better seem to understand the logic of inflation. An alternative 
explanation may be that more respondents in the United States than in China have interpreted ‘economic 
terms’ sufficiently broadly to incorporate happiness and/or job attractiveness.  
When the emphasis is not on economic terms, but on terms like ‘happiness’ and ‘job attractiveness’ 
instead, the majority of Chinese respondents prefer the transaction that is most attractive in nominal terms. In 
this instance the outcome among Chinese respondents is precisely the same as among American respondents. 
Just like in the United States, wellbeing in China is driven primarily by a nominal rather than a real 
evaluation. 
 
B.  Transactions 
If we consider people’s assessment of specific transactions instead of income, we see below that respondents 
in China are twice as likely to assess the transactions represented to them correctly in real terms rather than in 
economic terms.  
 
Problem 2 (N=415): 
Suppose Zhang, Wang and Li each received an inheritance of ¥800,000 and each used it 
immediately to purchase a house. Suppose that each of them sold the house a year after 
buying it. Economic conditions, however, were different in each case: 
 
* When Zhang owned the house, there was a 25% deflation – the prices of all goods and 
services decreased by approximately 25%. A year after Zhang bought the house, he sold it for  
¥616,000 (23% less than he paid). 
 
* When Wang owned the house, there was no inflation or deflation – prices had not changed 
significantly during that year. He sold the house for ¥792,000  (1% less than he paid for it). 
 
* When Li owned the house, there was 25% inflation – all prices increased by approximately 
25%. A year after he bought the house, Li sold it for ¥984,000  (23% more than he paid).  
 
Please rank Zhang, Wang, and Li in terms of the success of their house-transactions. Assign 
‘1’ to the person who made the best deal and ’3’ to the person who made the worst deal.  
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Zhang          Wang       Li 
Nominal transaction:  – 23%          – 1%      + 23% 
Real transaction:   + 2%          – 1%       – 2% 
 
Rank: 
1st:   64% (++)     (37%)**             12% (++)     (17%)*            12% (++)     (48%)** 
2nd:   13% (++)     (10%)           80% (++)     (73%) *           18% (++)     (6%)** 
3rd:   23%         (53%) **             8% (++)      (10%)             70% (++)     (36%)** 
 
Note that the question was to assess Zhang, Wang, and Li’s transactions in terms of “success,” which 
is a rather neutral phrasing that does not frame the case in economic terms, or in terms of happiness for that 
matter. Compared to respondents in the United States, respondents in China were twice as likely to rank 
Zhang, who had the best deal in real terms but the worst deal in nominal terms, number 1 and also twice as 
likely to rank Li, who had the best deal in nominal terms but the worst deal in real terms, number 3. Also 
respondents in China were more likely than respondents in the United States to rank Wang correctly as the 
person who had the second best deal. The differences are significant and suggest that respondents in China 
are either (much) better at understanding the logic of inflation than their peers in the United States, or they are 
more likely to conceive “success” in economic terms while respondents in the United States are more likely 
to conceive “success” in terms of happiness. In view of the previous results (problem 1), we propose that it is 
a combination of both.  
 
Problem 3: 
Changes in the economy often have an effect on people’s financial decisions. Imagine that 
China experienced unusually high inflation that affected all sectors of the economy. Imagine 
that within a six-month period all benefits and salaries, as well as the prices of all goods and 
services, went up by approximately 25%. You now earn and spend 25% more than before.  
 
Six months ago, you were planning to buy a leather armchair whose price during the 6-month 
period went up from ¥3200 to ¥4000. Would you be more or less likely to buy the armchair 
now? (N=209) 
 
More:    Same:    Less:   
19% (++) (7%)**   29%  (55%)**  59% (++)  (38%)** 
 
Six months ago, you were also planning to sell an antique desk you own, whose price during 
the 6-month period went up from ¥3200 to ¥4000. Would you be more or less likely to sell 
your desk now? (N=202) 
More:     Same:     Less:   
15% (++) (43%)**   17% (++)  (42%)**  68% (++)  (15%)** 
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While inflation makes respondents in the United States more likely to sell at higher prices and less 
likely to buy at higher prices, a majority of respondents in China exhibit significantly greater wariness to buy 
as well as to sell at higher prices. This may seem at odds with the previous outcome (problem 2), where the 
judgment of respondents in China did not seem to be clouded by inflation, but is not. In problem 2 
respondents were asked to evaluate – ex-post – transactions that had already taken place, following decisions 
taken by others. Respondents were not asked to reflect on whether they themselves would have been more 
likely to sell a house at a lower nominal price but higher real price, or vice versa.  
In problem 3, on the other hand, respondents were asked whether they themselves would be more or 
less likely to buy or sell (durable) consumption goods in times of high inflation. The fact that respondents in 
China are less likely to engage in economic transactions of any kind in times of high inflation probably does 
not imply money illusion.  After all, if that were the case you would see an asymmetry with regard to buying 
and selling (less likely to buy, more likely to sell). The actual outcome may well reflect (1) path-dependence 
of inflation expectations (respondents in China expect prices to increase even further), (2) a more general 
association of inflation with economic hardship that may result in economic paralysis at the level of the 
individual, or a combination of (1) and (2).63 
 
C.  Contracts 
We asked subjects to consider signing a contract for a future transaction in an inflationary context, and to 
decide whether to agree upon a specified amount to be paid upon delivery or, instead, agree to pay whatever 
the price is at the future time. A risk-averse decision-maker is likely to prefer an indexed contract since, at a 
future time, a predetermined nominal amount may be worth more or less than its anticipated real worth. On 
the other hand, a nominally risk-averse decision maker may perceive indexed contracting as riskier as the 
indexed amount may end up being greater or smaller in nominal terms than a fixed dollar amount (Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky, 1997). The following problem was presented in China in the spring of 2011. 
 
Problem 4-1 (N=68): 
Imagine that you are the head of a corporate division located in Singapore that produces 
office computer systems. You are now about to sign a contract with a local firm for the sale 
of new systems, to be delivered in January 2013.  
These computer systems are currently priced at ¥4000 a piece but, due to inflation, all prices, 
including production costs and computer prices, are expected to increase during the next 
couple of years. Experts’ best estimate is that prices in Singapore two years from now will be 
about 20% higher, with an equal likelihood that the increase will be higher or lower than 
20%. The experts agree that a 10% increase in all prices is just as likely as a 30% increase. 
You have to sign the contract for the computer systems now. Full payment will be made only 
upon delivery in January 2013. Two contracts are available to you. Indicate your preference 
between the contracts by checking the appropriate contract below: 
 
                                                
63 Nineteen percent of respondents in China (versus 7 percent in the US) indicated that they were more likely to buy at a higher price, 
which suggests that they expected further price increases and hoped to beat future inflation. 
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One group of subjects chose between contracts A and B below.  
Contracts framed in real terms: 
 
Contract A: You agree to sell the computer systems (in 2013) at  ¥4800 a piece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time. Thus, if inflation is below 20% you will be 
getting more than the 2013-price, whereas if inflation exceeds 20% you will be getting less 
than the 2013-price. Because you have agreed on a fixed price, your profit level will depend 
on the rate of inflation.  
59%  (19%)** 
 
Contract B: You agree to sell the computer systems at 2013’s price. Thus, if inflation exceeds 
20%, you will be paid more than ¥4800, and if inflation is below 20%, you will be paid less 
than ¥4800. Because both production costs and prices are tied to the rate of inflation, your 
“real” profit will remain essentially the same regardless of the rate of inflation.  
41%  (81%)** 
         
Problem 4-2 (N=70): 
Another group of subjects chose between contracts C and D: 
Contracts framed in nominal terms: 
Contract C: You agree to sell the computer systems (in 2013) at ¥ 4800 a piece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time.  
53%  (41%)  
 
Contract D: You agree to sell the computer systems at 2013’s price. Thus, instead of selling 
at ¥4800 for sure, you will be paid more if inflation exceeds 20%, and less if inflation is 
below 20%.  
47%  (59%) 
 
Problem 4-3 (N=69): 
A third group of subjects was presented with the following, neutral version of the problem: 
Contracts under a neutral frame: 
Contract E: You agree to sell the computer systems (in 2013) at ¥4800 a piece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time.  
60%  (46%)  
 
Contract F: You agree to sell the computer systems at 2013’s prices.  
 40%  (54%) 
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We have run a second version of the above study; this time exploring people’s contracting preferences as 
buyers rather than sellers. The following problem, along with the alternative framings of contract choices, is 
identical to those of Problem 4 except that the subject is now buying instead of selling. 
 
Problem 4-4 (N=66): 
Contracts framed in real terms:  
Contract A’: You agree to buy the computer systems (in 2013) at ¥ 4800a piece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time. Thus, if inflation exceeds 20%, you will 
be paying for the computers less than the 2013-price, whereas if inflation is below 20%, you 
will be paying more than the 2013-price. Because you have agreed on a fixed price, your 
profit level will depend on the rate of inflation.  
50%  (36%) 
 
  Contract B’: You agree to buy the computer systems at 2013’s price. Thus, if inflation 
exceeds 20%, you will pay more than ¥4800, and if inflation is below 20%, you will pay less 
than ¥4800. Because the prices of both computer systems and financial services are tied to 
the rate of inflation, your “real” profit will remain essentially the same regardless of the rate 
of inflation.  
  50%  (64%)   
 
Problem 4-5 (N=67): 
Contracts framed in nominal terms: 
Contract C’: You agree to buy the computer systems (in 2013) at ¥4800 a piece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time.  
60%   (51%) 
 
Contract D’: You agree to buy the computer systems at 2013’s price. Thus, instead of buying 
at ¥4800 for sure, you will pay more if inflation exceeds 20%, and less if inflation is below 
20%.  
40%   (49%)  
 
Problem 4-6 (N=68): 
Contracts under a neutral frame:  
Contract E’: You agree to buy the computer systems (in 2013) at  ¥4800 apiece, no matter 
what the price of computer systems is at that time.  
58%  (52%) 
 
Contract F’: You agree to buy the computer systems at 2013’s price.  
42%  (48%) 
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In the United States the framing of the problem – either in real, nominal or neutral terms – 
significantly influenced respondents’ choices between contracts. In China, on the other hand, the framing of 
the problem did not notably impact respondents’ choices. A majority of respondents in China preferred the 
option that was risky in real terms, no matter how the decision was framed although the differences found 
were often not significant. 
The outcome of problems 4-1 through 4-6 reinforces the notion that respondents in our sample in 
China are less clouded by the “veil of money” (Schumpeter, 1908) compared to respondents in Shafir et al.’s 
sample in the United States While respondents in the United States exhibit frame-dependent risk-aversion  (a 
larger proportion opt for the contract that is nominally riskless when the contracts are framed in nominal 
terms than when they are framed in real terms), we do not find frame-dependent risk-aversion in China. Not 
only does the framing of the question not predict the outcome, also respondents in China exhibit risk-
preference instead of risk-aversion (in real terms at least), which somewhat runs counter to common (western) 
perceptions about Asian culture.  The demographics of our respondents (young and talented with a promising 
future), the demographics of China in general (the population is so vast that you cannot stand out by playing 
safe), or – most likely – a combination of both, may account for this result. 
 
D.  Mental accounting 
Money illusion may arise from the use of historic cost, which can differ from replacement cost because of a 
change in the value of money or because of a change in relative prices. With nominal and real prices 
changing, people’s assessment of the value of their possessions may present them with some conflicting 
intuitions, as illustrated by the following problem that Shafir and Thaler (1996) presented to experienced wine 
collectors and subscribers to a wine newsletter in the United States. We did not look for wine connoisseurs in 
China. Judging by Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), however, that should not prejudice the plausibility of 
our outcome. They presented a variant of the problem to students at Princeton University, which yielded 
identical results as the problem presented to wine connoisseurs. So, we will do that also for our survey 
participants in China. 
 
Problem 5 (N=415): 
Suppose you bought a case of good 1982 Bordeaux in the futures market for ¥160 a bottle. 
The wine now sells at auction for about ¥600 a bottle. You have decided to drink a bottle of 
this wine with dinner.  
Which of the following best captures your feeling of the cost to you of drinking this bottle? 
Costs ¥600     48% (++)   (20%)**   
Doesn’t cost anything   25% (++) (30%) 
Feels like saving ¥440  27% (++)   (25%)   
 
Shafir and Thaler (1996) included two other possibilities (feels like it costs $20 (historic cost) and feels like it 
costs $20 plus interest) so the results are not entirely comparable. However, the observation that respondents 
in China were more than twice as likely to see the replacement cost as the actual cost of drinking the bottle of 
wine, suggests that they are less susceptible to money illusion.  
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Problem 6 (N=412): 
Two competing bookstores have in stock an identical leather-bound edition of Oscar Wilde’s 
collected writings. Store A bought its copies for 80 ¥ each. Liu, who works for Store A, has 
just sold 100 copies of the book to a local high school for ¥176 a copy. Store B bought its 
copies a year after Store A. Because of a 10% yearly inflation, Store B paid ¥88 per copy. 
Xiao Wu, who works for Store B, has just sold 100 copies of the book to another school for 
¥180 a copy. 
 
Who do you think made a better deal selling the books, Liu or Xiao Wu? 
Liu  69%  (++)  (87%)** 
Xiao Wu   31%  (++)  (13%)** 
 
Like in the United States, a majority of respondents in China perceived Liu, who had the highest profit 
margin in nominal terms, as having the better book selling deal. But just as in previous cases, we see that 
respondents in China are less likely to be guided by nominal monetary values than by real monetary values, 
indicating that they are significantly less prone to money illusion.   
 
E.  Fairness and morale 
Community standards of fairness appear to have a significant influence on economic behavior. The 
perception of fairness is expected to impinge on worker morale and, consequently, may have implications for 
actual job decisions. To explore this issue, we presented respondents in China with the hypothetical scenario 
below, followed by one of two questions. Half the subjects received the “morale” question, the other half the 
“job decision” question: 
 
Problem 7: 
Ablex and Booklink are two publishing firms, each employing a dozen editors. Because the 
firms are small, unequal raises in salary can create morale problems. In a recent year of no 
inflation, Ablex gave half its editors a 6% raise in salary and the other half a 1% rise. The 
following year there was 9% inflation, and Booklink gave half its editors a 15% raise in 
salary and the other half a 10% rise. 
 
Morale (N=204): 
In which firm do you think there were likely to be more morale problems? 
Ablex    51%  (++)  (49%)   
Booklink:     27%    (8%)**   
Same in both:   21% (++)   (43%)** 
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Job decision (N=202): 
Suppose that an editor who received the lower raise in each firm was then offered a job with 
a competing company. Which editor do you think was more likely to leave their present 
position for another job? 
 
The editor who received the lower raise in Ablex   60%  (++)  (57%)  
The editor who received the lower raise in Booklink     7%  (++)  (5%) 
The two were equally likely      33%    (38%) 
 
Problem 7 describes two situations where salary raises were the same in real terms, but proportionally 
different in nominal terms. Virtually to the same extent as respondents in the United States, respondents in 
China expected morale problems in Ablex, where there was a 500 percent difference in salary raises in 
nominal terms (between 1 percent and 6 percent).   
However, there were quite a few respondents in China who expected morale problems at Booklink, 
where the editors received higher raises in nominal terms and where the difference between the nominal 
raises was smaller, that is 50 percent.  It is unclear what led respondents in China to see significantly more 
often greater morale problems with Booklink compared to Ablex. Perhaps respondents considered the salary 
raises at Ablex negligible altogether, while the pay rises at Booklink were more ostensible, and hence the 
difference in pay rises.    
Asked subsequently who was more likely to leave his job, the outcome in the United States and 
China was nearly identical. Just like in the United States, most participants in China thought that the editor 
who received a 1 percent rather than a 6 percent raise would be more likely to leave his present job than the 
editor who got 10 percent rather than 15 percent. As Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) suggested, money 
illusion enters into respondents’ perceptions of fairness and worker morale, and then naturally extends to their 
views regarding workers’ propensity to quit their present position. Note the striking similarity with problem 
1, where respondents in China and the United States also gave virtually identical responses to a question 
pertaining to the likelihood that a worker would decide to quit her job. 
 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Money illusion seems to be the stepchild of economic theory. Most economists do not even wish to ponder its 
existence as money illusion ostentatiously violates the rational expectations postulate that has been so central 
to economic theorizing in the past decades. Recent research, however, shows that money illusion may play a 
much greater and more disruptive role in the economy than mainstream economists allow for (Brunnermeier 
and Julliard (2008), Bernanke (2010) and Liu (2010)). Therefore our study, which sheds further light on the 
phenomenon now for China, seems to be well timed. 
Our findings suggest that money illusion is quite prevalent in China, just as it is in the United States. 
Respondents in our sample in China are less prone to money illusion, that is, they are more likely to base 
decisions on the real monetary value of economic transactions instead of on the nominal monetary value, 
compared to respondents in the sample of Shafir et al in the United States. If asked explicitly to evaluate an 
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economic transaction in terms of happiness or satisfaction instead of economic terms, respondents in our 
sample are as likely as respondents in the Shafir et al. sample to prefer the transaction with the highest 
nominal monetary value to the economic transaction with the highest real monetary value.   
The results show that considerations of happiness, morale and job satisfaction are intimately related 
with each other, in contrast to economic considerations. The default decision-making framework for 
respondents in our sample in China appears to be dominated by economic considerations, while the default 
decision-making framework for respondents in the Shafir sample in the United States appears to be 
dominated by considerations of happiness, morale and/or job satisfaction. This may well reflect the difference 
in affluence between respondents in the United States and China, with the former having already conquered 
the top layers of Maslow's pyramid of needs while (many of) the latter find themselves still scrambling at the 
bottom (Maslow, 1943). It also suggests that affluent societies may be more prone to money illusion and, 
hence, more susceptible to irrational exuberance (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
There are two distinct reasons why our respondents in China are less prone to money illusion than 
Shafir et al.’s respondents in the United States. First, when asked specifically to judge a transaction on 
economic terms, respondents in China are more likely to correctly choose the transaction with the highest real 
monetary value. Second, if no guidance is given on whether to judge a transaction on economic terms or 
terms of well-being, respondents in China are more likely to adopt a decision-making framework that is 
dominated by economic considerations. Hence, they are more likely to correctly choose the transaction with 
the highest real monetary value instead of the transaction with the highest nominal monetary value.  
Our results confirm our initial conjecture, that respondents in our sample in China are less 
susceptible to money illusion than respondents in Shafir et al.’s sample in the United States. We are, however, 
not convinced that it is for reason that China is a creditor nation and many Chinese people personally stand to 
lose from inflation.  The difference in affluence between respondents in the United States and China, which 
allows the former to adopt a more hedonistic framework for decision-making than the latter, seems a more 
plausible explanation.  
When presented with a risk-free and a risky option in real monetary value, respondents in China 
were almost twice as likely compared to respondents in the United States to choose the risky option over the 
risk-free one.  
Although the differences between responses in China and the United States may seem limited at first 
sight, it is important to notice that this is only true when respondents are explicitly asked to judge a 
transaction based on economic terms, as was the case in the first version of problem 1, where 82 percent of 
respondents in China versus 71 percent of respondents in the United States correctly chose the transaction 
with the highest real value over the transaction with the highest monetary value. However, in every day life 
individuals both in China and the United States will often make choices without explicit instructions to decide 
in economic terms or in terms of happiness. In that case respondents in China seem to take a decision based 
on economic terms while respondents in the United States seem guided by happiness. Hence, the responses to 
problem 2, where 64 percent of respondents in China versus 37 percent of respondents in the United States 
correctly chose the transaction (out of three) with the highest real value over the transaction with the highest 
monetary value, may more accurately depict to what extent individuals in China and in the United States, 
respectively, are susceptible to money illusion.  
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Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) conclude that people attend to nominal value because it is 
salient, easy to gauge, and in many cases provides a reasonable estimate of real worth. We would like to add a 
fourth motive, and that is that nominal values reflect wellbeing better than real values does. The tendency is 
likely to persist despite economists’ attempts to educate the public (Fisher, 1928). Shafir et al. amend Solow’s 
model of efficiency wages with money illusion by adding the ratio of the current nominal wage to the 
previous nominal wage and show that over some range higher inflation will result in a lower real wage 
(Solow, 1979).  
Since the responses to questions pertaining to job attractiveness were similar in China as in the 
United States, money illusion may interfere with the Chinese labor market in a way similar as with the U.S. 
labor market. However, China’s labor market in the past decades has broadly been characterized by unlimited 
supplies of labor, as described in Arthur Lewis’ classic essay ‘Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labor’ (1954). With laborers working for subsistence wages, it is unlikely that inflation will result 
in lower real wages, since the abstract subsistence wage level is defined as a basket of goods and services 
rather than in monetary terms. As far as minimum wage laws apply, inflation may indeed erode real wages in 
case the minimum wage law does not provide indexation, not necessarily because of money illusion but also 
in case workers have no bargaining power in an economy with unlimited supplies of labor. Since the spate of 
wage rises in recent years suggests that the Lewis turning point may have been (b)reached, the labor market 
in China soon may share the same characteristics as the U.S. labor market and also be modeled as in Solow’s 
model for efficiency wages added with money illusion, where higher inflation within a certain range will 
result in lower real wages (Cai and Fang, 2010). 
In asset pricing theory both models with nominal variables (nominal interest rate and nominal cash 
flows) as well as models with real variables (real interest rate and real cash flows) are employed (Chen, Roll 
and Ross, 1986). Changes in the rate of inflation influence nominal cash flows as well as the nominal rate of 
interest. To incorporate money illusion in models for asset pricing, we suggest that asset-pricing models 
should not strictly use either nominal variables or real variables, but a combination of both. 
The results of our survey in China are interesting in their own right, but still we believe there are 
further issues to be examined. First, our survey amounts to a cross section and, given China’s rapid 
development, it would be insightful to carry out similar surveys in future years. When China approaches U.S. 
economic standards, also in terms of equality and wealth, we expect that money illusion may become more 
prevalent in China too. Second, as the degree of money illusion may correspond with economic progress, it 
would be interesting to see if other emerging economies in, say Africa or South America, give similar survey 
results. Third, it may be interesting to tie individual responses to individual background characteristics, like 
age, income/wealth and education. Finally, as money illusion can be associated with a few economic 
conditions that may generate economic downturns, it would be beneficial for China to learn from U.S. 
experiences, and perhaps carry out educational programs to inform people about money illusion.  
 
 
104
References 
Akerlof, George A. and Robert J. Shiller (2009), Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2010), “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. 
 
Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Julliard, Christian (2008), “Money Illusion and Housing Frenzies,” Review of 
Financial Studies, 21 (1). pp. 135-180.  
 
Cai, Fang, and Meiyan Wang (2010), “Growth and Structural Changes in Employment in Transitional 
China”, Journal of Comparative Economics 38 (2010) 71–81. 
 
Chen, Nai-Fu,  Richard Roll and Stephen A. Ross (1986), “Economic Forces and the Stock Market,” The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 383-403 
 
Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert (2001), "Does Money Illusion Matter?" American Economic Review, 91 (5): 
1239–1262. 
 
Fisher, Irving (1928), The Money Illusion, New York: Adelphi Company. 
 
Hong, Fang and Jie Chen (2010), “The Relationship Between Home Mortgage Loan and Real Estate Market 
in China: Evidences and Insights from a Regional Perspective,” Working Paper. 
 
Leontief, Wassily (1936), “The Fundamental Assumptions of Mr. Keynes’ Monetary Theory of 
Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 5(4):192–7. 
 
Lewis,W. Arthur (1954), “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” 
http://www.globelicsacademy.net/2008/2008_lectures/lewis%20unlimited%20labor%20supply%201954.pdf. 
 
Liu, Renhe (2010), “The Effects of Inflation on China`s Stock Prices: An Explanation Based on Money 
Illusion Hypothesis,” Working Paper. 
 
Maslow, Abraham H. (1943), “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50(4) (1943):370-96. 
 
Mees, Heleen (2011), “U.S. Monetary Policy and the Interest Conundrum,” Working Paper, 
http://www.heleenmees.com/PDF/papers/US_Monetary_Policy.pdf. 
 
Mees, Heleen (2011), “Beware of Runaway Headline Inflation,” VoxEU, 
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6448. 
 
 
105
 
Noussair, Charles N., Gregers Richter, and Jean-Robert Tyran (2008), “Money Illusion and Nominal Inertia 
in Experimental Asset Markets,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307717. 
 
Okimoto, Daniel I. (2009), “The Financial Crisis and America’s Capital Dependence on Japan and China,” 
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009. 
Patinkin, Don (1965), Money, Interest, and Prices, Harper and Row, New York. 
 
Pei, Minxin (2011), “Why China's Leaders Fear Inflation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1908), Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, 
Leipzig:Duncker & Humblot. 
 
Shafir, Eldar and Richard H. Thaler (1996), “Invest Now, Drink Later, Spend Never: On the Mental 
Accounting of Delayed Consumption,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 27 (2006) 694–712. 
 
Shafir, Eldar, Peter A. Diamond and Amos Tversky  (1997), "On Money Illusion," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112 (2): 341–374. 
 
Solow, Robert M., “Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness,” Journal of Macroeconomics, I (1979), 9–
82.
 
 
106
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond and Amos Tversky for letting us use the 1997 survey for 
our research in China and making suggestions. We also thank our Chinese assistants, Chao Fang and Andy 
Xiaoyang. Without their help we would not have been able to do the survey. And we would like to offer our 
gratitude to Min Chum of Ali Baba and Wei Chi of Tsinghua University for providing us access to Ali Baba 
workers and students at Tsinghua University and Peking University.    
 
 
 
107
V Does News on Real Chinese GDP Growth Impact Stock Markets?* 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The quarterly real GDP growth data for China have interesting properties. One of these is that they are 
released quite rapidly after the relevant quarter, although China tends to have quite significant revisions of 
annual economic growth at a one year lag. Second, real GDP growth follows random walk properties, which 
means that the growth rates cannot be predicted through mere extrapolation. Third, it is often suggested that 
statistics in China are manipulated and therefore unreliable. The Wall Street Journal pointed out the 
discrepancy between Chinese GDP growth data and data on oil and electricity demand (May 29, 2009). In the 
first quarter of 2009, for example, 6.1 percent GDP growth coincided with a mere 3.0 percent growth in 
energy consumption. The Financial Times reported that the tally of GDP estimates provided by the 31 
provincial and municipal governments for the first half of 2009 was significantly higher, about 10 percent, 
than the GDP figure released by the National Bureau of Statistics (August 5, 2009). 
 We study the consequences of these properties on stock market fluctuations. For this, we analyze an 
EGARCH model which includes 16 dummies concerning the announcement dates in the level equation and in 
the conditional volatility equation. The model is fitted to daily stock market returns data for 8 Asian stock 
markets and 4 U.S. stock markets. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EHM), financial markets 
should respond only tepidly to news on GDP that is deemed unreliable.  
 The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe a few features of real GDP growth 
rates of China. In Section 3 we discuss our methodology and we present the results. Section 4 provides the 
general conclusion. Our main finding is that Chinese news has only a limited and also non-systematic impact 
on stock market fluctuations.  
 
 
2.  Real GDP Growth in China  
Figure 1 gives the nominal levels of GDP in China as they are published each quarter. The data are 
cumulated, which means that the first quarter reports the data on the first quarter, whereas the second quarter 
concerns the sum of output in the first two quarters, and so on.  
Figure 2 gives the real GDP growth rates. In Franses and Mees (2010) it is documented that this 
series follows a random walk. This is quite an unusual finding as most growth rates of real GDP data for 
industrialized countries can be described by simple time series models like ARMA, which implies that these 
figures can be predicted to some extent through extrapolation. When the data are a random walk, the best 
forecast is the most recent observation, hence a no-change forecast. In Table 1 we present the actual data and 
the no-change forecasts, as well as the forecast errors. Later on we will classify these forecast errors as 
negative or positive news to see if such news has an impact on stock market returns or stock market volatility.   
In Table 2 we give the announcement dates for the growth rates of real GDP for the United States 
and for China. The actual dates will be used to create associated zero-one dummy variables in the models 
below. We observe that the release dates for the Chinese data lead the dates of U.S. announcements. 
                                                
* Together with Philip Hans Franses. 
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As said, the best forecast for real growth rates for Chinese GDP using extrapolation is the no-change 
forecast. This implies that traders all can rely on the same information concerning expected growth rates. 
Surprises in announcements would then be equally important for all traders, and nobody can make better 
forecasts. The distribution of past forecast errors can be instrumental to assign whether new GDP quotes are 
large or small surprises. In the analysis below we will take absolute forecast errors exceeding 1.0 as large. So, 
traders may assign different interpretation to forecast errors, but they will not be able to create better forecasts 
than the no-change forecasts.  
Professional traders generally will not rely exclusively on historic GDP data to make forecasts for 
real GDP growth. Data regarding payrolls, manufacturing, exports and other leading economic indicators will 
help traders to make their predictions. If the official GDP data are considered to be untrustworthy, however, 
financial markets should only respond tepidly to surprises in announcements of official data. 
Taking altogether this suggests that news on real GDP growth rates of China would not have a large 
impact on stock market returns nor on stock market volatility.  We will put this suggestion to a test in the next 
section.  
 
 
3.  Modeling Stock Markets 
In the section we analyze whether the announcements concerning real GDP growth in China has an impact on 
stock market returns or stock market volatility.  
 
3.1  The data and the model 
We consider four years of daily stock market returns. These are India BSE, Nikkei 225, Hang Seng, Straits 
(Singapore), Korea, LQ45 (Indonesia), Shanghai, and Shenzhen as the leading Asian stock markets, and the 
S&P500, Nasdaq, Dow Jones and Russell2000 as the U.S. stock markets. For the levels equation for the 
returns  we consider    
 
(1)   
 
where the zero-one dummy variables  correspond with the dates in the second column of Table 2 and 
the zero-one dummy variables  with the dates in the third column. Below we will be interested in the 
hypotheses that and that , and for that we will use a joint 
Wald test. Note that we import the dates such that they match the proper time zones. Chinese news will reach 
Asia during the very same day, while it reaches the American time zone the next day. The reverse holds for 
U.S. news.  
The next model we consider as in EGARCH(1,1) equation, which comprises the following two 
equations, that is 
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(2)   
 
with  
 
(3)  
 
Below we are interested in the hypotheses  and , and again 
we will use a Wald test. Estimation will be carried out using the Eviews program. Note that we cannot replace 
(2) by (1) as then the parameters for the dummy variables are not identified.  
 
3.2 The results, general 
The Wald test values for the hypotheses concerning the conditional volatility equations are given in Table 3. 
We see that stock market returns in 4 of the 8 Asian indexes react to U.S. news, while this occurs for only 2 
of the 8 concerning Chinese news. At the same time, U.S. stock market returns do not significantly react to 
U.S. news or to Chinese news. 
 It is well known that at the very same day of presentation of national accounts figures the response at 
the level of returns can be small, but perhaps more response is there to be expected at the level of volatility. 
Table 4 presents the relevant Wald test results, and indeed, news announcements do seem to have more effect 
on volatility than on returns. For 5 of the 12 stock markets Chinese news (and U.S. news alike) have an 
impact on volatility. The S&P500 and Nasdaq respond about similar to both U.S. and Chinese news. This also 
holds for the LQ45 of Indonesia, where news seems to imply the largest effects for volatility.  
 
 
3.3  The results, more refined 
Finally, we examine which of the announcement dates for Chinese news have most impact, and whether this 
news could have been considered as positive or negative. In Table 5 we classify the forecast errors of real 
GDP growth accordingly. In Table 6 we give the dates for which the news has an individual significant 
impact on stock market volatility. 
 Table 6 shows that if news has an impact on conditional volatility it usually makes this volatility to 
decrease, and hence to calm down stock market fluctuations. A second observation of Table 6 is that it does 
not seem to matter much whether this news is positive or negative. In the panel for an increase in volatility, 
we see that it is only positive or no news that makes volatility increase (in, as must be said, a very small 
amount of cases). Table 6 also shows that out of the 16 (news dates) times 12 (stock markets) possibly 
significant outcomes, only 24 are significant, which amounts to a fraction of 12.5%. Table 7 shows that this 
percentage for U.S. news is 19.8% while for Germany it is 10.4%. At the same time, we observe from Table 6 
that the nature of the news that makes volatility to decrease can be positive or negative, and there is no 
systematic pattern.  
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4.  Conclusion 
There is a limited effect of Chinese news on world stock markets (12.5% of the news dates there is a 
significant impact) compared to U.S. news (19.8% of the news dates there is a significant impact). Stock 
market returns in 4 of the 8 Asian stock indexes react to U.S. news, while they react in only 2 of the 8 Asian 
stock indexes to Chinese news. U.S. stock market returns do not significantly react to either U.S. news or to 
Chinese news. U.S. and Chinese news have a similar impact on stock market volatility.  
 We started this paper discussing the fact that Chinese real GDP follow a random walk, and the fact 
that Chinese data are often deemed as not trustworthy. We suggested that these properties imply that stock 
markets respond only tepidly to Chinese news as traders might be expected to take the official announcements 
with a pinch of salt. Indeed we found that stock markets respond less to Chinese news than to U.S. news. 
 An alternative explanation for the fact that stock markets respond more tepidly to Chinese news than 
to U.S. news may be the size of the Chinese economy. We included in the last batch (table 7) German data 
that could serve as a benchmark this hypothesis. The German authorities are known for their punctuality. 
Hence few traders will doubt the trustworthiness of the German GDP data.  
 The stock market’s timid response to the German data shows that the relative size of the economy is 
a quite plausible explanation. Stock indexes respond less to German news than to U.S. news while German 
and U.S. data are deemed equally reliable. German GDP is about a quarter of U.S. GDP. 
Measured in current U.S. dollars the German economy is almost equal the size of the Chinese 
economy (see Table 8A). German and Chinese news significantly impacted world stock markets on 10.4% 
respectively 12.5% of the news dates (compared to 19.8% for U.S. news). The relative size of the Chinese 
economy measured in current U.S. dollars may be a plausible explanation for the fact that stock markets 
respond less often to Chinese news (12.5%) than to U.S. news (19.8%). 
 If GDP is measured on a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) base, the Chinese economy is three times 
the size of the German economy. (see Table 8B). In that case the size of the Chinese economy cannot fully 
account for the fact that stock markets respond less often to Chinese news (12.5%) than to U.S. news 
(19.8%). The unpredictability/unreliability of Chinese GDP data may then serve as an additional explanation.  
 
 
 
 
111
 
Figure 1: Nominal GDP (levels) in China, 1992Q1-2009Q4 
 
        
 
Figure 2: Quarterly real growth rates of GDP in China, 1992Q1-2009Q4 
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Table 1:  The real GDP figures, as they are available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the 
forecasts that follow from a random walk  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english (Consulted: January 22 2010) 
 
The data in this table are calculated at constant prices, and are relative to the same period of the preceding 
year = 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quarter 
REAL 
GROWTH 
NO –CHANGE 
FORECAST 
FORECAST 
ERROR 
2005Q4 10.4 10.4 0.0 
2006Q1 11.4 10.4 1.0 
2006Q2 12.0 11.4 0.6 
2006Q3 11.8 12.0 -0.2 
2006Q4 11.6 11.8 -0.2 
2007Q1 13.0 11.6 1.4 
2007Q2 13.4 13.0 0.4 
2007Q3 13.4 13.4 0.0 
2007Q4 13.0 13.4 -0.4 
2008Q1 10.6 13.0 -2.4 
2008Q2 10.4 10.6 -0.2 
2008Q3 9.90 10.4 -0.5 
2008Q4 9.00 9.90 -0.9 
2009Q1 6.10 9.00 -2.9 
2009Q2 7.10 6.10 1.0 
2009Q3 7.70 7.10 0.6 
2009Q4 8.70 7.70 1.0 
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Table 2:  
Dates with first announcements concerning the flash values of GDP growth in the previous quarter 
 
 
Year    USA   China  Difference   
 
2006    January 27  January 25  2 
    April 28   April 20   8 
    July 28   July 20   8 
    October 27  October 24  3 
 
2007    January 31  January 25  6 
    April 27   April 18   9  
    July 27   July 18   9  
    October 31  October 23  8 
 
2008    January 30  January 24  6 
    April 30   April 17   13 
    July 31   July 17   14 
    October 30  October 21  9 
 
2009     January 30  January 22  8  
    April 29   April 16   13  
    July 31   July 16   15 
    October 29  October 22  7 
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Table 3:  
Wald test values (and p values) for joint significance of sixteen dummy variables measuring days with GDP 
announcements for the levels equation of regression model (with an intercept) model for stock returns, 
01/03/2006-11/24/2009 (correcting for time zones) 
 
 
     U.S. news   Chinese news 
Stock market 
 
India BSE    12.41 (0.715)   13.96 (0.602) 
Nikkei 225    41.89 (0.000)   10.60 (0.833) 
Hang Seng    44.10 (0.000)   38.16 (0.001)  
Straits (Singapore)   40.26 (0.001)   21.60 (0.157) 
Korea     125.9 (0.000)   13.12 (0.664) 
LQ45 (Indonesia)   20.45 (0.201)   34.45 (0.005) 
Shanghai    18.85 (0.276)   10.98 (0.811) 
Shenzhen    18.03 (0.322)   11.47 (0.780) 
 
S&P500     10.28 (0.852)   7.811 (0.954) 
Nasdaq     8.743 (0.924)   16.51 (0.418) 
Dow Jones    8.818 (0.921)   8.376 (0.937) 
Russell2000    12.63 (0.700)   10.31 (0.850) 
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Table 4:  
Wald test values (and p values) for joint significance of sixteen dummy variables measuring days with GDP 
announcements for the conditional volatility equation of an EGARCH(1,1) model for stock returns, 
01/03/2006-11/24/2009, with t-distributed innovations (correcting for time zones) 
 
 
     U.S. news   Chinese news 
Stock market 
 
India BSE    29.81 (0.019)   24.65 (0.076) 
Nikkei 225    362.4 (0.000)   21.12  (0.174) 
Hang Seng    24.80 (0.073)   373.1 (0.000)  
Straits (Singapore)   6.919 (0.975)   7.084 (0.972) 
Korea     17.01 (0.385)   7.318 (0.967)  
LQ45 (Indonesia)   745.6 (0.000)   597.5 (0.000)  
Shanghai    2.425 (1.000)   0.243 (1.000) 
Shenzhen    2.131 (1.000)   32.20 (0.009) 
 
S&P500     36.50 (0.003)   30.61 (0.015) 
Nasdaq     173.2 (0.000)   49.09 (0.000) 
Dow Jones    24.93 (0.071)   21.13 (0.174) 
Russell2000    9.084 (0.910)   15.64 (0.478) 
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Table 5:  
 
Dates with first announcements concerning the flash values of GDP growth in the previous quarter and 
indication if realization was higher (++ for larger than 1.0 forecast errors, or + for forecast errors in between 
0.0 and 1.0) or lower (-- for larger than -1.0 forecast errors or – forecast errors in between 0 and -1.0) than 
expected (based on random walk forecast for real GDP growth, see Table 1) 
 
Year       Nature of the news 
 
2006    January 25   0 
      April 20   + 
      July 20    + 
      October 24   - 
 
2007    January 25   -   
      April 18   ++ 
      July 18    + 
      October 23   0 
 
2008    January 24   - 
      April 17   -- 
      July 17    - 
      October 21   - 
 
2009     January 22   -  
      April 16   -- 
      July 16    + 
      October 22   + 
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Table 6:  
 
Detailed results concerning increase of decrease in conditional volatility due to Chinese news on specific days 
(increase in volatility is due to worse than expected news, and a decrease in volatility due to better than 
expected news) 
 
Stock market    Increase   Decrease 
 
Asia 
India BSE       January 25 2007 (-) 
        April 17 2008 (--)   
Nikkei 225     July 20 2006 (+) 
October 23 2007 (-)  
Hang Seng    July 16 2009 (++) July 20 2006 (+)  
April 18 2007 (++)  
LQ45 (Indonesia)      January 25 2006 (0) 
        October 24 2006 (-) 
       January 25 2007 (-)  
        April 18 2007 (++) 
       October 21 2008 (-) 
April 16 2009 (--) 
        October 22 2009 (+) 
Shenzhen    January 25 2006 (0) July 18 2007 (+) 
 
USA 
S&P500        April 17 2008 (--) 
        October 21 2008 (-) 
Nasdaq     April 20 2006 (+)  January 25 2006 (0) 
        July 18 2007 (+) 
        October 22 2009 (+) 
Dow Jones       October 24 2006 (-) 
Russell2000    July 18 2007 (+) 
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Table 7:  
Number of days (out of the 16) where U.S. and German news has a significant impact on conditional 
volatility  
 
        U.S. news German news 
 
India BSE     2  2   
Nikkei 225     10  2 
Hang Seng     1  2 
Straits (Singapore)    1  1 
Korea      2  1 
LQ45 (Indonesia)    11  1 
Shanghai     0  2 
Shenzhen     0  3 
 
S&P500      3  2 
Nasdaq      5  2 
Dow Jones     2  1 
Russell2000     1  1 
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Table 8A:  
Gross domestic product in current U.S. dollars (billions) 
   
 
China  Germany United States   
 
2006   2657.84  2919.51  13398.93 
2007   3382.45  3328.18  14007.65 
2008   4327.45  3673.11  14441.43 
2009   4757.74  3235.46  14266.20 
 
2006-2009  15125.48 13156.26 56184.21 
 
 
Table 8B:  
Gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (PPP) as share of world GDP (%) 
 
 
China  Germany United States   
 
2006   10.06     4.39    21.66 
2007   10.72     4.29     21.07 
2008   11.35     4.21     20.61 
2009   12.05     4.09     20.02 
 
2006-2009  11.05     4.24     20.84 
 
(Source: IMF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120
References 
Engle, Robert F. (1982), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of the Variance if 
United Kingdom Inflation, Econometrics, 50, 987-1008. 
 
Franses, Philip Hans and Heleen Mees (2010), Approximating the DGP of China’s Quarterly GDP, 
Econometric Institute Report 2010-04, Erasmus School of Economics.  
 
Nelson, Daniel B (1991), Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach, Econometric 
59, 347-370.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121
VI Approximating the DGP of China’s Quarterly GDP* 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Since 1992 China presents its quarterly GDP figures in a format that is accessible to the general public. In 
2007 the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) published the China Quarterly GDP Time Series for 
1992Q1-2005Q4. Since 2006 this information also appears on the NBSC website (www.stats.gov.cn).  
 In this paper we analyze the time series properties of the GDP series as they are given as aggregates 
in current prices (100 million Yuan). We will analyze the total GDP series as well as the three sector-specific 
GDP series, concerning the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Sectors. We construct time series models for the 
data covering 1992Q1-2005Q4, and we use these models to forecast the data for 2006Q1 to 2009Q4. The data 
are presented in Appendix A and B. We also analyze the GDP growth rates at constant prices, and these data 
appear in Appendix C and D.  
 The Chinese GDP series in current prices are reported in a format that contrasts with the usual 
practice in western countries. First, the data are given in cumulated format, that is, Quarter 1 first, and then in 
Quarter 2 the NBSC presents the sum of Quarters 1 and 2, and so on. Second, when cumulating the data, 
NBSC also includes revised figures of earlier quarters. Third, after one year, it is only the cumulated value in 
Quarter 4 (which is of course equal to the sum for that particular year) that is revised.6465 To write it in a more 
formal way, denote actual, that is, de-cumulated GDP in a single year as , where Q is either Quarter 1, 2, 
3 or 4, and T is year. Next, denote as the first revised value of the quarter, as the second revised 
value, and so on. The data that the NBSC subsequently reports in the Quarters 1 to 4 are thus equal to  
 
(1)    
 
And, with (approximately) a one year lag, NBSC presents , the revised year-total. A consequence of this 
way of reporting is that the data have graphical patterns like those reported in Figures 1 and 2. Another 
consequence is for de-cumulated GDP for China, which would amount to data like , and so on, 
and that is that these data are difficult to interpret and to analyze as they amount to a mixture of actual figures 
and revisions. In fact, the actual and revised figures can simply not be identified. A graph of the de-cumulated 
data that we will not analyze in this paper appears in the Appendix.     
                                                
* Together with Philip Hans Franses. 
64 The practice of presenting cumulated data is a heritage of the planned economy, where macroeconomic data are expected to meet 
certain targets. By using cumulated data, one can see at a glance to what extent the targets have been met. 
65 Since 2003 the NBSC is reporting de-cumulated growth figures in its press releases, but not in the time series on the NSBC website. 
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 In this paper we therefore focus on the actual data as presented by the NBSC, that is, those as 
constructed in (1), the cumulated GDP data at current prices. Additionally, we analyze the time series 
properties of real growth rates (concerning cumulated GDP at constant prices).  
 Our rather basic analysis shows that the GDP data (cumulated levels at current prices) can be fitted 
and predicted with (relatively) great precision. The rule that seems to govern the data is that growth in a 
quarter, relative to the same quarter in the previous year, is a random walk. Second, this random walk 
experiences shocks only in the first quarter, and in the other three quarters, the error term has variance 
(approximately) equal to zero. In words this means that once the observation in Quarter 1 is known, the data 
for the rest of the year can be predicted quite accurately. We show that the median percentage error of one-
step-ahead forecasts for the actual nominal GDP (in 100 million Yuan) for these quarters has a mean often 
lower than 1.0%. .   
 GDP growth in constant prices can also be described as a random walk, albeit that the error term 
variance is much larger. As a result, real GDP growth, as opposed to nominal GDP growth, cannot accurately 
be predicted through extrapolation.    
 
 
2.  An Analysis of Cumulative GDP in Current Prices 
We start with an analysis of cumulative total GDP, as it is given in Figure 1, for the sample 1992Q1 to 
2005Q4. The data seem to have a trend (upwards) and strong seasonality, which is in part of course due to the 
accumulation process. It is common in such instances to take logarithms of the data and to use so-called 
differencing filters to remove non-stationary components, see Franses (1998), among others. Denoting the 
quarterly series as composed like (1) as , where  runs from 1992Q1 to 2005Q4, then we shall analyze the 
properties of  
 
(2)   
 
The  denotes the familiar lag operator and “log” denotes the natural logarithm. In words, the variable in (2) 
is the change (1-L) in the annual growth rate , observed per quarter. A graph of the series in 
(2) is given in Figure 3.  
 
 
2.1  Approximating the DGP 
The time series properties of this variable turn out to have interesting properties, and certainly when 
compared with GDP data for other countries. The first property is that the mean of the variable in Figure 3 is 
equal to zero. A regression of on a constant gives a t-ratio of -0.990. The residuals of 
this regression do not appear to be auto-correlated. The LM test for first to fourth auto-correlation has a p-
value of 0.164. This is quite interesting as many quarterly and trending economic time series can be described 
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by the so-called airline model66, which implies auto-correlations for  at lags 1, 3, 4 
and 5.  
 The series  has a second interesting property and that is that in the regression 
of the squares of  on four seasonal dummies only the parameter for the first seasonal 
dummy obtains a significant parameter (t-statistic is 6.977). Basically this means that total GDP in current 
prices can be described by 
 
(3)   
 
where  is a one-zero seasonal dummy for the first quarter and is the variance of the error term. The 
variance is estimated as 0.001098 with standard error 0.000151. 
 
 
2.2  Forecasts 
The expression in (3) says that in all quarters but the first one, the data on GDP in current prices obey the 
rule: growth in this quarter is equal to growth in the previous quarter. And in the first quarter, the rule is this 
quarter’s growth is growth in the previous quarter plus a non-zero error term. In other words, the actual data 
are all approximately zero except in Quarter 1, which is visualized in Figure 4.  
 With the model in (3), we can easily create forecasts for GDP, using the following extrapolation 
scheme: 
 
(4)    
 
where  denotes the h-step-ahead forecast. In case of recurrent one-step-ahead (static) forecasts, the 
forecast origin each time moves with one quarter. In case of multiple-step-ahead (dynamic) forecasts, the 
forecast origin is the same (2005Q4), and in (4) earlier forecasts then replace the future observations.  
 In Figure 5 we give the multiple-step-ahead forecasts generated from 2005Q4 as the forecast 
horizon, and the realizations as they are displayed in Appendix B. It is clear from this graph that these 
multiple-step-ahead forecasts seem to give an adequate impression of the upward trend in China’s GDP. The 
actual forecasts are presented in Table 1. This table also gives the percentage forecast error. Even though the 
forecasts are created for years ahead, still the percentage forecast error remains below around 10%.  
 In Figure 6 we give the one-step-ahead forecasts, where the first forecast origin is 2005Q4, then in 
becomes 2006Q1 and so on, until 2009Q3. Table 2 presents these forecasts and the percentage forecast errors. 
As could be expected given (3), the forecast errors in the first quarters are largest, with the exceptionally large 
                                                
66 The airline model is given by , see Franses (1998, Chapter 5), where 
 is an error term with zero auto-correlation. This model is also at the heart of various seasonal adjustment programs.  
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value in 2009Q1. So, indeed, it is not easy to forecast first-quarter GDP in current prices in China. In contrast, 
the forecast errors for the other three quarters are small, as one can safely state that percentage forecast errors 
below 1% are quite small (for levels of GDP type data). The median error is 0.436 and the median absolute 
error is 0.599.  
 The model in (3) suggests that once the first-quarter observation is known, it shall not be too difficult 
to forecast Quarters 2, 3 and 4. If we thus generate three-step-ahead forecasts for the final quarter (= year) 
GDP data, we get forecasts of 210236.0 for 2006Q4, 253135.1 for 2007Q4, 307823.5 for 2008Q4 and 
311422.6 for 2009Q4. These forecasts have percentage errors equal to 0.802, 1.648, 2.021 and 7.684, 
respectively, which is rather small (as compared forecasts for the levels of GDP for other countries).  
 
 
3.  The Three Components of Cumulated GDP in Current Prices 
Given that total cumulated GDP can be approximated by a simple model as given in (3), it is now of interest 
whether this also holds for its three components. Following the same approach as in the previous section, it so 
turns out the nominal GDP for the Primary Sector, for the Secondary Sector and for the Tertiary Sector each 
can be described by a model like (3), where the is estimated (with standard errors in parentheses) as 
0.004161 (0.000989), 0.001470 (0.000255) and 0.001341 (0.000333), respectively. Clearly, the error term has 
largest variance for the Primary Sector. Graphs similar to that in Figure 4 are given in Figures 7, 8 and 9. One 
can see a very close fit between the data and the model. Hence, the data generating process (DGP) of Chinese 
GDP in current prices can be approximated rather well.  
 In Tables 3 to 8 we present the multiple-step-ahead forecasts and one-step-ahead forecasts for the 
three sectors, and we contrast these with the realizations displayed in Appendix B. One can see that these 
forecasts are again quite accurate, although forecasts for the Secondary Sector seem to be best, except for 
2009Q4.  
 
 
4.  Analysis of Growth Rates at Constant Prices 
The second important variable that is reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China is the Growth 
Rate of Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices. Dong (2006) discusses the creation of these inflation-
corrected growth rates. In contrast to what is common practice in western countries, NBSC does not report a 
single GDP deflator. In fact, each component of the national accounts has its own deflator. We might 
therefore expect that modeling and forecasting of this variable would be less easy than in the earlier case of 
cumulated GDP at current prices.  
 The relevant growth rates for total GDP appear in Figure 10 and for the three sectors in Figure 11. In 
Figure 12 we contrast the growth rates with those of the USA, where one should bear in mind that the 
Chinese data refer to real growth rates of cumulated data within each calendar year. Until 2007Q4, the USA 
growth figures show stability with an average of 3.2%. The Chinese data show much more fluctuations. The 
data as used in this paper are displayed in Appendix C and D. Again, we analyze the data for 1992Q1 to 
2005Q4 and we create forecasts for 2006Q1 to 2009Q4.  
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 Given the fact that constant prices GDP cannot be derived as a function of current prices GDP and a 
GDP deflator, we shall not expect that (3) has predictive value for the models for constant prices GDP. The 
autocorrelations of the growth rates (total and for the three sectors) show a pattern that is typical for a unit 
root process (relevant more formal tests confirm this), so we will analyze the growth rates after first 
differencing, that is, this quarter’s growth minus growth in the previous quarter.  
 For constant prices growth in total GDP we obtain 
 
 (5)   
  
where  and are the one-zero dummies for Quarters 1 and 2. If we regress the squares of the 
estimated residuals on the four seasonal dummies, one can learn that the variance in Quarter 1 is about 0.97 
and significant, while the variances in the other three quarters are estimated as being insignificantly different 
from zero. Note that this variance is substantially larger than that for nominal GDP. Anyway, similar to GDP 
at current prices, it shall thus be most difficult to forecast data in Quarter 1. This is reflected by the one-step-
ahead forecasts in Table 9, where indeed the forecast errors are largest in the first quarter, and notably in 
2008Q1 and 2009Q1.  
 A similar model as in (5) is obtained for the growth rates at constant prices for GDP in the Primary 
Sector. The estimation results are 
 
(6)   
 
And also here we obtain that error variance in Quarter 1 is the only significant variance, with value 0.867. 
 For the Secondary Sector GDP growth rates we get 
 
(7)   
 
Here the error variance in Quarter 1 is 3.339, so one may expect large forecast errors in Quarter 1.  
 Finally, for the Tertiary Sector we obtain that the growth simply is a zero-mean random walk. The 
variance of this variable is 1.852 in Quarter 1 and 0.824 in Quarter 4, and otherwise this variance is zero. 
 In contrast with the GDP data at current prices, the GDP data at constant prices will be much less 
easy to forecast. This is also reflected by the forecast errors in Tables 10, 11 and 12. In particular, the forecast 
for 2009Q4 for the Secondary sector is quite off track.  
 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we have demonstrated that quarterly Chinese GDP time series data, at current prices, can be 
predicted quite well using very simple extrapolation schemes. This does not only hold for one-step-ahead 
forecasts, where percentage errors of less than 1% are often found, but also for multiple-step-ahead forecasts 
where percentage errors are much larger, but still much smaller than what is typically found for other country-
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specific GDP data. When econometric models are to be developed to predict GDP for China, they should 
have the challenge of improving this reported forecast accuracy.  
 In contrast to what is common practice, China does not use a single GDP deflator, but uses various 
different prices data to correct the current prices GDP to constant prices GDP. This should make the growth 
rates in constant prices GDP much less easy to model and forecast, which we verified in the second part of 
the paper. Basically, these growth rates are random walks, with some mild seasonality and with large 
variance.  
 Current prices GDP in China is reported in cumulated form. This makes the Quarter 4 observation 
automatically equal to the year total. The cumulated data contain actual quarterly data and the revisions to 
earlier quarters. This makes the de-cumulated GDP data less useful as it cannot be identified which part of the 
de-cumulated observation can be associated with genuine new information and with revisions. This should 
reduce the usefulness of de-cumulated GDP in econometric models for other macro-economic variables. At 
the same time, as there is almost no variation in the cumulated GDP data, at least not in Quarters 2, 3 and 4, 
this particular series is also less useful for subsequent econometric modeling. The only variable that could be 
considered for modeling and forecasting is the growth rate of GDP at constant prices.  
When it comes to forecasting GDP at current prices, the only observation that seems of interest to 
forecast is the first-quarter observation. Given knowledge of that quarter, the next three quarters within the 
same year can be predicted with great accuracy.   
Finally, GDP growth in constant prices can also be described as a random walk, albeit that the error 
term variance is much larger. Therefore real GDP growth cannot accurately be predicted through 
extrapolation.  
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Appendix A: The data for 1992Q1-2005Q4  
 
Aggregates in current prices, in 100 million Yuan 
 
Quarter 
GDP Primary Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
     
1992Q1 4974.300 589.9000 2365.200 2019.200 
1992Q2 11332.10 1690.900 5350.300 4290.900 
1992Q3 18451.50 3670.800 8319.500 6461.200 
1992Q4 26923.50 5866.600 11699.50 9357.400 
1993Q1 6500.500 673.1000 3363.800 2463.600 
1993Q2 14543.50 1897.400 7532.200 5113.900 
1993Q3 23591.50 4020.500 11574.60 7996.400 
1993Q4 35333.90 6963.800 16454.40 11915.70 
1994Q1 9064.700 922.7000 4710.100 3431.900 
1994Q2 20149.70 2539.500 10546.10 7064.100 
1994Q3 32596.60 5380.300 16248.60 10967.70 
1994Q4 48197.90 9572.700 22445.40 16179.80 
1995Q1 11858.50 1232.600 6227.100 4398.800 
1995Q2 25967.60 3420.800 13693.40 8853.400 
1995Q3 41502.60 7139.200 20775.60 13587.80 
1995Q4 60793.70 12135.80 28679.50 19978.40 
1996Q1 14261.20 1487.200 7576.500 5197.500 
1996Q2 30861.80 4251.900 16197.90 10412.00 
1996Q3 48533.10 8194.100 24413.80 15925.20 
1996Q4 71176.60 14015.40 33835.00 23326.20 
1997Q1 16256.70 1675.500 8433.500 6147.700 
1997Q2 34954.30 4730.500 18109.30 12114.50 
1997Q3 54102.40 8547.500 27084.20 18470.70 
1997Q4 78973.00 14441.90 37543.00 26988.10 
1998Q1 17501.30 1775.200 8757.100 6969.000 
1998Q2 37222.70 4860.400 18693.10 13669.20 
1998Q3 57595.20 8740.200 28013.00 20842.00 
1998Q4 84402.30 14817.60 39004.20 30580.50 
1999Q1 18789.70 1878.600 9204.800 7706.300 
1999Q2 39554.90 5039.900 19479.00 15036.00 
1999Q3 61414.20 9048.700 29436.90 22928.60 
1999Q4 89677.10 14770.00 41033.60 33873.50 
2000Q1 20647.00 1924.900 9981.400 8740.700 
2000Q2 43748.20 5094.500 21429.90 17223.80 
2000Q3 68087.50 9169.300 32629.50 26288.70 
2000Q4 99214.60 14944.70 45555.90 38714.00 
2001Q1 23299.50 2035.200 11127.40 10136.90 
2001Q2 48950.90 5297.100 23813.30 19840.50 
2001Q3 75818.20 9715.200 35856.10 30246.90 
2001Q4 109655.2 15781.30 49512.30 44361.60 
2002Q1 25375.70 2181.300 11811.30 11383.10 
2002Q2 53341.00 5635.200 25562.60 22143.20 
2002Q3 83056.70 10325.60 38807.30 33923.80 
2002Q4 120332.7 16537.00 53896.80 49898.90 
2003Q1 28861.80 2258.100 13776.40 12827.30 
2003Q2 59868.90 5779.400 29478.00 24611.50 
2003Q3 93329.30 10866.40 44853.10 37609.80 
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2003Q4 135822.8 17381.70 62436.30 56004.80 
2004Q1 33420.60 2663.500 16077.30 14679.80 
2004Q2 70405.90 7027.500 34674.50 28703.90 
2004Q3 109967.6 13385.00 52869.60 43713.00 
2004Q4 159878.3 21412.70 73904.30 64561.30 
2005Q1 38848.60 3013.600 18968.40 16866.60 
2005Q2 81422.50 7652.000 40902.60 32867.90 
2005Q3 125984.9 14451.20 61542.40 49991.30 
2005Q4 183867.9 23070.40 87364.60 73432.90 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007), China Quarterly GDP Time Series, 1992-2005, Department of National Accounts, 
China Statistics Press, ISBN 978-7-5037-5356-5.  
 
Appendix B: The data for 2006Q1-2009Q4 
 
Quarter 
GDP Primary Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
     
2006Q1 44419.80 3093.000 22076.10 19250.70 
2006Q2 93611.60 7973.600 47909.40 37728.60 
2006Q3 144569.6 15058.20 72008.20 57503.20 
2006Q4 211923.0 24040.00 103162.0 84721.00 
2007Q1 53058.00 3654.000 26465.00 22939.00 
2007Q2 112458.0 9283.000 57614.00 45561.00 
2007Q3 174428.0 17937.00 86405.00 70086.00 
2007Q4 257306.0 28627.00 124799.0 103880.0 
2008Q1 63475.00 4720.000 31658.00 27097.00 
2008Q2 134726.0 11800.00 69330.00 53596.00 
2008Q3 208025.0 22062.00 103974.0 81989.00 
2008Q4 314045.0 33702.00 149003.0 131340.0 
2009Q1 65745.00 4700.000 31968.00 29077.00 
2009Q2 139862.0 12025.00 70070.00 57767.00 
2009Q3 217817.0 22500.00 106477.0 88840.00 
2009Q4 335353.0 35477.00 156958.0 142918.0 
 
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english (Consulted: January 22 2010) 
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Figure A1: Quarterly GDP (de-cumulated) as the aggregate in current prices, 1992Q1-2009Q4  
 
 
Appendix C: The data for 1992Q1-2005Q4 
 
The data in this table are calculated at constant prices, and are relative to the same period of the preceding 
year = 100  
 
Quarter GROWTH 
GROWTH
1 GROWTH2 GROWTH3 
1992Q1 13.6 10.0 17.4 9.80 
1992Q2 13.3 7.70 18.0 9.50 
1992Q3 13.3 5.50 18.8 10.8 
1992Q4 14.2 4.70 21.2 12.4 
1993Q1 15.1 6.10 19.4 12.2 
1993Q2 14.8 4.20 19.7 13.1 
1993Q3 14.3 4.20 19.4 13.0 
1993Q4 14.0 4.70 19.9 12.2 
1994Q1 12.9 6.00 16.5 9.80 
1994Q2 12.4 4.50 16.6 9.60 
1994Q3 12.4 4.50 16.9 9.90 
1994Q4 13.1 4.00 18.4 11.1 
1995Q1 12.0 6.00 14.7 9.70 
1995Q2 11.0 6.20 13.6 8.80 
1995Q3 10.6 5.50 13.1 9.20 
1995Q4 10.9 5.00 13.9 9.80 
1996Q1 10.9 5.50 12.3 10.2 
1996Q2 10.3 5.00 12.0 9.60 
1996Q3 10.0 4.80 11.9 9.60 
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1996Q4 10.0 5.10 12.1 9.40 
1997Q1 10.4 5.00 10.3 12.2 
1997Q2 10.2 5.00 10.7 11.6 
1997Q3 9.60 3.90 10.3 11.5 
1997Q4 9.30 3.50 10.5 10.7 
1998Q1 7.60 4.00 7.60 8.60 
1998Q2 7.20 2.20 7.70 8.50 
1998Q3 7.50 2.50 8.10 9.00 
1998Q4 7.80 3.50 8.90 8.40 
1999Q1 9.10 4.00 9.60 9.50 
1999Q2 8.30 3.00 9.00 9.20 
1999Q3 8.10 3.30 8.70 9.30 
1999Q4 7.60 2.80 8.10 9.30 
2000Q1 9.00 3.00 9.10 10.4 
2000Q2 8.90 1.50 9.50 10.7 
2000Q3 8.90 2.20 9.60 10.7 
2000Q4 8.40 2.40 9.40 9.70 
2001Q1 8.50 3.10 9.20 8.80 
2001Q2 8.10 1.80 9.50 8.40 
2001Q3 8.00 2.90 9.10 8.40 
2001Q4 8.30 2.80 8.40 10.3 
2002Q1 8.90 3.40 9.10 9.90 
2002Q2 8.90 2.00 9.50 10.1 
2002Q3 9.20 3.40 9.80 10.2 
2002Q4 9.10 2.90 9.80 10.4 
2003Q1 10.8 3.60 12.5 10.3 
2003Q2 9.70 2.10 11.8 9.10 
2003Q3 10.1 3.10 12.5 9.30 
2003Q4 10.0 2.50 12.7 9.50 
2004Q1 10.4 4.60 11.6 10.0 
2004Q2 10.9 4.40 11.5 11.6 
2004Q3 10.5 6.00 11.1 10.9 
2004Q4 10.1 6.30 11.1 10.1 
2005Q1 10.5 4.60 11.2 10.6 
2005Q2 10.5 5.00 11.3 10.8 
2005Q3 10.4 5.00 11.2 10.9 
2005Q4 10.4 5.20 11.7 10.5 
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Appendix D: The data for 2006Q1-2009Q4 
 
The data in this table are calculated at constant prices, and are relative to the same period of the preceding 
year = 100  
Quarter GROWTH 
GROWTH
1 GROWTH2 GROWTH3 
2006Q1 11.4 4.50 12.6 11.3 
2006Q2 12.0 5.10 13.6 11.7 
2006Q3 11.8 4.90 13.3 11.8 
2006Q4 11.6 5.00 13.0 12.1 
2007Q1 13.0 4.40 14.6 12.7 
2007Q2 13.4 4.00 15.0 13.5 
2007Q3 13.4 4.30 14.8 14.0 
2007Q4 13.0 3.70 14.7 13.8 
2008Q1 10.6 2.80 11.5 10.9 
2008Q2 10.4 3.50 11.3 10.7 
2008Q3 9.90 4.50 10.6 10.5 
2008Q4 9.00 5.50 9.30 9.50 
2009Q1 6.10 3.50 5.30 7.40 
2009Q2 7.10 3.80 6.60 8.30 
2009Q3 7.70 4.00 7.50 8.80 
2009Q4 8.70 4.20 9.50 8.90 
 
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english (Consulted: January 22 2010) 
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Figure 1: Quarterly GDP (cumulated) as the aggregate in current prices, 1992Q1-2005Q4 (the data are given 
in Appendix A) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Quarterly GDP (cumulated) as the aggregate in current prices, 1992Q1-2005Q4, per industry 
(primary, secondary and tertiary) (the data are given in Appendix A) 
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Figure 3: Quarterly change in the annual growth rate of GDP (cumulated) as the aggregate in current prices, 
1992Q1-2005Q4  
 
 
Figure 4: Quarterly change in the annual growth rate of GDP (cumulated) as the aggregate in current prices, 
1992Q1-2005Q4 versus the same variable when assumed to be non-zero only in Quarter 1 
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Figure 5: Multi-step-ahead forecasts (Dynamic Forecasts) for 2006Q1 to 2009Q4 from forecast origin 
2005Q4 generated using (4) 
 
 
Figure 6: One-step-ahead forecasts (Static Forecasts) for 2006Q1 to 2009Q4 from forecast origin 2005Q4, 
2006Q1, and so on, generated using (4) 
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Figure 7: Quarterly change in the annual growth rate of GDP Primary Sector (cumulated) as the aggregate in 
current prices, 1992.1-2005.4 versus the same variable when assumed to be non-zero only in Quarter 1 
 
Figure 8: Quarterly change in the annual growth rate of GDP Secondary Sector (cumulated) as the aggregate 
in current prices, 1992.1-2005.4 versus the same variable when assumed to be non-zero only in Quarter 1 
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Figure 9: Quarterly change in the annual growth rate of GDP Tertiary Sector (cumulated) as the aggregate in 
current prices, 1992.1-2005.4 versus the same variable when assumed to be non-zero only in Quarter 1 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Growth Rate of total GDP, at constant prices, 1992Q1-2005Q4 
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Figure 11: Growth Rate of GDP in the three sectors, at constant prices, 1992Q1-2005Q4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Real growth rates, USA and China, 1992Q1-2009Q4 
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Table 1: Multiple-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, 2006Q1-2009Q4, 
percentage forecast error computed as  
 
 
 Forecast GDP Percentage 
Quarter   Forecast Error 
2006Q1 44702.33 44419.80 -0.636 
2006Q2 93691.30 93611.60 -0.085 
2006Q3 144968.4 144569.6 -0.276 
2006Q4 211573.2 211923.0 0.165 
2007Q1 51466.36 53058.00 3.000 
2007Q2 107868.0 112458.0 4.082 
2007Q3 166903.9 174428.0 4.314 
2007Q4 243586.9 257306.0 5.332 
2008Q1 59286.41 63475.00 6.599 
2008Q2 124257.9 134726.0 7.770 
2008Q3 192264.1 208025.0 7.576 
2008Q4 280598.7 314045.0 10.650 
2009Q1 68332.17 65745.00 -3.935 
2009Q2 143216.9 139862.0 -2.399 
2009Q3 221599.3 217817.0 -1.736 
2009Q4 323411.7 335353.0 3.962 
 
 
 
Table 2: One-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, 2006Q1-2009Q4, 
percentage forecast error computed as  
 
 
    
Quarter 
Forecast GDP 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 44702.33 44419.80 -0.636 
2006Q2 93099.14 93611.60 0.547 
2006Q3 144845.1 144569.6 -0.191 
2006Q4 210991.2 211923.0 0.440 
2007Q1 51225.62 53058.00 3.454 
2007Q2 111816.0 112458.0 0.571 
2007Q3 173675.1 174428.0 0.432 
2007Q4 255692.1 257306.0 0.627 
2008Q1 64455.67 63475.00 -1.545 
2008Q2 134537.1 134726.0 0.140 
2008Q3 208966.8 208025.0 -0.453 
2008Q4 306866.3 314045.0 2.286 
2009Q1 77514.53 65745.00 -17.902 
2009Q2 139544.1 139862.0 0.227 
2009Q3 215955.3 217817.0 0.855 
2009Q4 328827.5 335353.0 1.984 
    
Median error   0.436 
Median absolute 
error    0.599 
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Table 3: Multiple-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Primary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
 
Quarter Forecast GDP1 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006:1 3253.665 3093.000 -5.195 
2006:2 8261.563 7973.600 -3.612 
2006:3 15602.39 15058.20 -3.614 
2006:4 24908.20 24040.00 -3.612 
2007:1 3520.170 3654.000 3.663 
2007:2 8938.260 9283.000 3.714 
2007:3 16880.37 17937.00 5.891 
2007:4 26948.41 28627.00 5.864 
2008:1 3816.436 4720.000 19.143 
2008:2 9690.526 11800.00 17.877 
2008:3 18301.06 22062.00 17.047 
2008:4 29216.45 33702.00 13.309 
2009:1 4146.254 4700.000 11.782 
2009:2 10527.98 12025.00 12.449 
2009:3 19882.65 22500.00 11.633 
2009:4 31741.35 35477.00 11.769 
 
 
Table 4: One-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Primary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
 
obs Forecast GDP1 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 3253.665 3093.000 -5.194 
2006Q2 7853.609 7973.600 1.505 
2006Q3 15058.56 15058.20 -0.002 
2006Q4 24039.44 24040.00 0.002 
2007Q1 3229.705 3654.000 11.612 
2007Q2 9419.830 9283.000 -1.474 
2007Q3 17531.01 17937.00 2.263 
2007Q4 28635.92 28627.00 -0.032 
2008Q1 4360.271 4720.000 7.621 
2008Q2 11991.18 11800.00 -1.620 
2008Q3 22800.45 22062.00 -3.347 
2008Q4 35210.40 33702.00 -4.476 
2009Q1 5568.335 4700.000 -18.475 
2009Q2 11750.00 12025.00 2.287 
2009Q3 22482.67 22500.00 0.077 
2009Q4 34371.09 35477.00 3.218 
    
Median error   0.000 
Median 
absolute 
error   2.275 
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Table 5: Multiple-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Secondary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
 
Quarter Forecast GDP2 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 22439.63 22076.10 -1.647 
2006Q2 48387.80 47909.40 -0.999 
2006Q3 72804.70 72008.20 -1.106 
2006Q4 103352.4 103162.0 -0.185 
2007Q1 26565.62 26465.00 -0.380 
2007Q2 57284.89 57614.00 0.571 
2007Q3 86191.34 86405.00 0.247 
2007Q4 122355.8 124799.0 1.958 
2008Q1 31473.37 31658.00 0.583 
2008Q2 67867.76 69330.00 2.109 
2008Q3 102114.4 103974.0 1.789 
2008Q4 144960.0 149003.0 2.713 
2009Q1 37315.21 31968.00 -16.727 
2009Q2 80464.83 70070.00 -14.835 
2009Q3 121068.1 106477.0 -13.704 
2009Q4 171866.3 156958.0 -8.674 
 
 
 
Table 6: One-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Secondary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
 
Quarter Forecast GDP2 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 22439.63 22076.10 -1.647 
2006Q2 47603.90 47909.40 0.638 
2006Q3 72084.89 72008.20 -0.107 
2006Q4 102221.7 103162.0 0.911 
2007Q1 26087.10 26465.00 1.428 
2007Q2 57434.16 57614.00 0.312 
2007Q3 86594.29 86405.00 -0.219 
2007Q4 123787.5 124799.0 0.811 
2008Q1 32039.26 31658.00 -1.204 
2008Q2 68919.10 69330.00 0.593 
2008Q3 103975.7 103974.0 -0.002 
2008Q4 150174.8 149003.0 -0.786 
2009Q1 37825.67 31968.00 -18.324 
2009Q2 70008.89 70070.00 0.087 
2009Q3 105083.8 106477.0 1.308 
2009Q4 152590.0 156958.0 2.863 
    
Median error   0.200 
Median 
absolute 
error   0.799 
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Table 7: Multiple-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Tertiary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
 
Quarter Forecast GDP3 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 19197.17 19250.70 0.278 
2006Q2 37409.47 37728.60 0.846 
2006Q3 56898.92 57503.20 1.051 
2006Q4 83579.60 84721.00 1.347 
2007Q1 21864.42 22939.00 4.685 
2007Q2 42607.14 45561.00 6.483 
2007Q3 64804.45 70086.00 7.536 
2007Q4 95192.14 103880.0 8.364 
2008Q1 24918.96 27097.00 8.038 
2008Q2 48559.52 53596.00 9.397 
2008Q3 73857.88 81989.00 9.917 
2008Q4 108490.8 131340.0 17.397 
2009Q1 28419.28 29077.00 2.262 
2009Q2 55380.59 57767.00 4.131 
2009Q3 84232.57 88840.00 5.186 
2009Q4 123730.4 142918.0 15.508 
 
 
Table 8: One-step-ahead forecasts and realizations of the levels of current prices GDP, Tertiary Sector, 
2006Q1-2009Q4, percentage forecast error computed as  
Quarter Forecast GDP3 
Percentage 
Forecast Error 
2006Q1 19197.17 19250.70 0.278 
2006Q2 37513.79 37728.60 0.569 
2006Q3 57384.31 57503.20 0.207 
2006Q4 84467.23 84721.00 0.300 
2007Q1 22224.81 22939.00 3.113 
2007Q2 44957.14 45561.00 1.325 
2007Q3 69440.78 70086.00 0.921 
2007Q4 103259.6 103880.0 0.597 
2008Q1 28145.34 27097.00 -3.869 
2008Q2 53819.54 53596.00 -0.417 
2008Q3 82446.15 81989.00 -0.558 
2008Q4 121522.4 131340.0 7.475 
2009Q1 34282.89 29077.00 -17.904 
2009Q2 57512.30 57767.00 0.441 
2009Q3 88369.63 88840.00 0.529 
2009Q4 142314.8 142918.0 0.424 
    
Median error   0.433 
Median 
absolute 
error   0.564 
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Table 9: One-step-ahead forecast for constant prices growth in GDP (total, based on cumulated data), 
realizations and differences calculated as Forecast-Realization 
 
Quarter Forecast GROWTH 
Forecast-
Growth 
2006Q1 10.7 11.4 -0.7 
2006Q2 11.0 12.0 -1.0 
2006Q3 12.0 11.8 0.2 
2006Q4 11.8 11.6 0.2 
2007Q1 11.9 13.0 -1.1 
2007Q2 12.6 13.4 -0.8 
2007Q3 13.4 13.4 0.0 
2007Q4 13.4 13.0 0.4 
2008Q1 13.3 10.6 2.7 
2008Q2 10.2 10.4 -0.2 
2008Q3 10.4 9.90 0.5 
2008Q4 9.90 9.00 0.9 
2009Q1 9.30 6.10 3.2 
2009Q2 5.73 7.10 -1.4 
2009Q3 7.10 7.70 -0.6 
2009Q4 7.70 8.70 -1.0 
    
Median error   -0.10 
Median 
absolute error   0.75 
 
 
Table 10: One-step-ahead forecast for constant prices growth in GDP (Primary Sector, based on cumulated 
data), realizations and differences calculated as Forecast-Realization 
 
Quarter Forecast 
GROWTH
1 
Forecast-
GROWTH1 
2006Q1 5.9 4.5 1.4 
2006Q2 3.5 5.1 -1.6 
2006Q3 5.1 4.9 0.2 
2006Q4 4.9 5.0 -0.1 
2007Q1 5.7 4.4 1.3 
2007Q2 3.4 4.0 -0.6 
2007Q3 4.0 4.3 -0.3 
2007Q4 4.3 3.7 0.6 
2008Q1 4.4 2.8 1.6 
2008Q2 1.8 3.5 -1.7 
2008Q3 3.5 4.5 -1.0 
2008Q4 4.5 5.5 -1.0 
2009Q1 6.2 3.5 2.7 
2009Q2 2.5 3.8 -1.3 
2009Q3 3.8 4.0 -0.2 
2009Q4 4.0 4.2 -0.2 
    
Median error   -0.20 
Median 
absolute error   1.00 
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Table 11: One-step-ahead forecast for constant prices growth in GDP (Secondary Sector, based on cumulated 
data), realizations and differences calculated as Forecast-Realization 
 
Quarter Forecast GROWTH2 
Forecast-
GROWTH2 
2006Q1 10.8 12.6 -1.8 
2006Q2 12.6 13.6 -1.0 
2006Q3 13.6 13.3 0.3 
2006Q4 13.3 13.0 0.3 
2007Q1 12.1 14.6 -2.5 
2007Q2 14.6 15.0 -0.4 
2007Q3 15.0 14.8 0.2 
2007Q4 14.8 14.7 0.1 
2008Q1 13.8 11.5 2.3 
2008Q2 11.5 11.3 0.2 
2008Q3 11.3 10.6 0.7 
2008Q4 10.6 9.3 1.3 
2009Q1 8.4 5.3 3.1 
2009Q2 5.3 6.6 -1.3 
2009Q3 6.6 7.5 -0.9 
2009Q4 7.5 9.5 -2.0 
    
Median error   0.15 
Median 
absolute error   0.95 
 
 
Table 12: One-step-ahead forecast for constant prices growth in GDP (Tertiary Sector, based on cumulated 
data), realizations and differences calculated as Forecast-Realization 
 
Quarter Forecast GROWTH3 
Forecast-
GROWTH3 
2006Q1 10.5 11.3 -0.8 
2006Q2 11.3 11.7 -0.4 
2006Q3 11.7 11.8 -0.1 
2006Q4 11.8 12.1 -0.3 
2007Q1 12.1 12.7 -0.6 
2007Q2 12.7 13.5 -0.8 
2007Q3 13.5 14.0 -0.5 
2007Q4 14.0 13.8 0.2 
2008Q1 13.8 10.9 2.9 
2008Q2 10.9 10.7 0.2 
2008Q3 10.7 10.5 0.2 
2008Q4 10.5 9.50 1.0 
2009Q1 9.50 7.40 2.1 
2009Q2 7.40 8.30 -0.9 
2009Q3 8.30 8.80 -0.5 
2009Q4 8.80 8.90 -0.1 
    
Median error   -0.20 
Median 
absolute error   0.50 
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VII Summary in English 
This collection of papers reflects my first foray in academia. All papers relate – one way or the other – to 
China. Chapter 2 proves the central thesis of this thesis, namely that China’s boom caused the 2008 financial 
crisis and ensuing recession. It builds on the work by Taylor (2008), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010), Bernanke 
(2005), Greenspan (2011) and Warnock and Warnock (2009). Its main contribution is that it shows that the 
built-up of total debt securities, rather than foreign purchases of U.S. Treasuries, depressed 10-year Treasury 
yields from 2004 on. In addition, I show that the Fed, with its excessively loose monetary policy in the early 
2000s, contributed to a large extent to the housing bubble and current debt overload of U.S. households.  
The paper on China’s household savings rate (Chapter 3) builds on the work of Ando and Modigliani 
(1963), Modigliani and Cao (2004), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005), Horioka and Wan (2007), Chamon and 
Prasad (2010) and Wei and Zhang (2011). We use data that are more recent and cover a longer time span 
(1960 – 2009) than previous studies. The paper’s first contribution is that it disproves many assertions about 
China’s household savings rate, including (1) the claim that China’s one-child-policy explains the high 
household savings rate, (2) the claim that the household savings curve is u-shaped, (3) the claim that the 
savings rate is high because interest rate are low, and (4) the claim that the so-called competitive savings 
motive, also dubbed ‘keeping up with the Wangs,’ is a decisive factor in Chinese households’ preference for 
saving over consumption. Its second contribution is that it supports the conventional Keynesian savings 
hypothesis over Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis, although habit formation and precautionary saving 
motives are also important. Disposable income (which is measured by its reciprocal), the average 5-year 
income growth rate and the old-age dependency rate are the main determinants of the household savings rate.  
In chapter 4 we show that individuals in China are susceptible to money illusion, albeit to a lesser 
extent than their American counterparts. The paper builds on the seminal paper by Shafir, Diamond and 
Tversky (1997). Although it is tentative to draw conclusions from comparing two not entirely representative 
samples, our findings suggest that money illusion may be more prevalent in affluent societies, which may 
therefore be more vulnerable for irrational exuberance (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). In chapter 5 we look at 
financial markets’ response to U.S., Chinese and German quarterly GDP growth data. Based on a comparison 
of financial markets reactions, we have found no evidence that China’s National Bureau of Statistics ‘cooks 
the books.’ As far as financial markets respond less to Chinese growth data compared to U.S. growth data, the 
difference can fully be attributed to the size of the Chinese economy. Last and also least, in chapter 6 we 
show that China’s Q2, Q3 and Q4 GDP numbers are rather predictable because China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics reports quarterly GDP cumulatively. A keen understanding of the cumulated Chinese data, however, 
won’t bring any privileged knowledge about China’s quarterly GDP growth to which financial markets 
respond. 
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VIII Summary in Dutch 
 Deze verzameling papers weerspiegelt mijn eerste uitstapje in de academische wereld. De papers hebben – op 
een of andere manier – allemaal betrekking op China. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft het bewijs van de centrale stelling 
van dit proefschrift, namelijk dat de opkomst van China de financiële crisis van 2008 heeft veroorzaakt. Mijn 
onderzoek bouwt voort op het werk van Taylor (2008), Obstfeld en Rogoff (2010), Bernanke (2005), 
Greenspan (2011) en Warnock en Warnock (2009). Mijn belangrijkste bijdrage is dat ik laat zien dat het 
totaal aan schuldvorderingen, in plaats van de buitenlandse aankopen van Amerikaanse staatsobligaties, 
verantwoordelijk is voor de daling van de rente op Amerikaanse staatsobligaties sinds 2004. Daarnaast laat ik 
zien hoe het Amerikaanse stelsel van centrale banken, de Federal Reserve, door een excessief los monetair 
beleid te voeren na de eeuwwisseling, heeft bijgedragen aan de bubbel op de Amerikaanse huizenmarkt en de 
hoge schuldenlast van Amerikaanse huishoudens. 
De paper over de spaarquote van Chinese huishoudens (hoofdstuk 3) bouwt voort op het werk van 
Ando en Modigliani (1963), Modigliani en Cao (2004), Blanchard en Giavazzi (2005), Horioka en Wan 
(2007), Chamon en Prasad (2010) en Wei en Zhang (2011). We maken gebruik van gegevens die recenter zijn 
en een langere periode (1960 – 2009) beslaan dan eerdere onderzoeken. De eerste bijdrage is dat onze 
bevindingen veel beweringen over het huishouden van China spaarquote ontkrachten, waaronder (1) de 
bewering dat het één-kindbeleid in China de hoge spaarquote van Chinese huishoudens verklaart, (2) de 
bewering dat de spaarcurve U-vormig is en (3) de bewering dat het zogenoemde competitieve spaarmotief, 
dat wil zeggen dat Chinezen veel sparen omdat de buren het ook doen,' het spaargedrag bepaalt. De tweede 
bijdrage is dat onze bevindingen de traditionele Keynesiaanse spaarhypothese steunen, in plaats van 
Modigliani’s levenscyclushypothese, hoewel gewoontevorming en sparen voor de oude dag ook belangrijke 
motieven zijn. Behalve het besteedbaar inkomen, zijn de gemiddelde inkomensgroei en de ratio 65-
plussers/beroepsbevolking de belangrijkste determinanten van de spaarquote van Chinese huishoudens.  
In hoofdstuk 4 laten we zien dat mensen in China gevoelig zijn voor geldillusie, zij het in mindere 
mate dan Amerikanen. De paper is gebaseerd op het baanbrekende artikel van Shafir, Diamond en Tversky 
(1997). Hoewel alleen tentatieve conclusies kunnen worden getrokken uit de vergelijking van twee niet 
geheel representatieve steekproeven, impliceren onze bevindingen dat geldillusie vaker voorkomt in 
welvarende samenlevingen, en dat die bijgevolg kwetsbaarder zijn voor irrationele exuberantie (Akerlof en 
Shiller, 2009). In hoofdstuk 5 kijken we hoe financiële markten reageren op de Amerikaanse, Chinese en 
Duitse groeicijfers. Op basis van een vergelijking van de reactie van financiële markten op deze 
kwartaalcijfers hebben we geen bewijs kunnen vinden voor de bewering dat het Chinese Bureau voor de 
Statistiek met de boeken knoeit. Voor zover financiële markten minder sterk reageren op Chinese groeicijfers  
dan op Amerikaanse groeicijfers, kan het verschil volledig worden toegeschreven aan de omvang van de 
Chinese economie. Last and also least, in hoofdstuk 6 laten we zien dat in kwartaal 2, 3 en 4 de Chinese BBP 
data relatief voorspelbaar zijn, omdat het Chinese Bureau voor de Statistiek het BBP cumulatief rapporteert 
per kwartaal. Een goed begrip van de gecumuleerde Chinese data leidt echter niet tot bijzondere kennis over 
de kwartaalgroei van het BBP van China waar financiële markten op reageren. 
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HOW CHINA’S BOOM CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Since the financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing economic recession that rocked the
world economy, plenty of blame has been going around. The chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, specifically singled out subprime mortgages and the Wall Street
bankers that sold those mortgages. In bureaucratic jargon it is often dubbed a regulatory
oversight failure. This study, however, shows that the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary
policy at the start of the new millennium triggered the U.S. refinancing boom in 2003 and
2004, spurring personal consumption expenditures through home equity extraction. The
U.S. spending binge boosted economic growth and savings in China and oil-exporting
nations. The build-up of savings in China, which are heavily skewed towards fixed income
assets, depressed interest rates worldwide from 2004 on. The decline in long-term interest
rates accounts for the U.S. housing boom. Despite popular belief, the proliferation of
exotic mortgage products can hardly be faulted for the U.S. housing boom and eventual
bust.  
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